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Development aid has always been a controversial practice as well as a value-laden research
subject. Conceived after World War II most probably as a vaccine against the creeping
influence of communism, disdained by many for never achieving the objectives, accused
of perpetuating the North’s colonial-like hegemony, believed to smother any burgeoning
self-reliance of the Global South, one time labeled as a bottomless pit, another time
as a hopelessly under-financed commitment, development aid seems to elude unbiased
analyses. My research will not embroider on these themes, nor judge whether development
is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. My research takes the practices of development aid in themselves
as object of research. Indeed, before anything, development aid is realized through a
complex ensemble of social interactions that involve actors of extreme diversity—and
although these interactions happen to have important impacts in many parts of the
world, rigorous empirical descriptions of these interactions remain unduly overshadowed
by ideological discussions about the ‘desirability’ or ‘effectiveness’ of development.
All research stems from a sensation of amazement, and mine is no exception. There is,
on the one hand, the observation that development aid brings together extremely hetero-
geneous actors, such as multilateral donors, development professionals from the Global
North and South, the private sector from the North and from the South, government em-
ployees, village chiefs, farmers. These actors are incredibly diverse in terms of financial
resources, outreach, interests, cultural background and world view. On the other hand,
when it comes to delivering development aid and implementing projects, they all seem
to speak the same development jargon and to display congruence and commensurability;
this congruence seems to extend from the donor, over the development professional, to
the village chief. And although the ideas about what counts as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aid have
constantly changed over time —with new concepts, theories, and policies sprouting every
few years— the apparent congruence amongst actors more or less remains.
The questions that I posed myself were then: How can the congruence between actors
be explained against the background of heterogeneity and the constantly changing ideas?
When a new idea emerges, where does it come from and how does it gain support? Is
this support really homogeneous amongst all actors or is it just an appearance?
At first sight the answer to these questions seems simple: the man with the money
has the power to align all minds; everyone dances to his tunes. My observations, however,
xi
0. Preface
revealed that things are not as simple as that. Indeed, in order to get an answer to my
questions, I tried to observe development aid from the vantage point of different actors,
by establishing some long-term physical presence at different point in the development
aid network. To limit the scope of the research I focused on development aid in water
management (including access to drinking water). The three standpoints that I occupied
were those of (i) an intergovernmental organization that advocates an integrated man-
agement of water resources, (ii) a non-governmental development organization (NGO)
specialized in water projects in Africa and Latin America, and (iii) a number of rural
villages in a wetland area in Mali.
The dissertation is organized in four parts. Part I sketches the context of the research.
In particular, chapter 1 sets the scene, introduces the actors in global development aid,
describes the dimensions of the global water crisis, and highlights the principal devel-
opment organizations involved in the water sector. Chapter 2 rephrases my previously
introduced research questions in more scholarly terms and describes the state-of-art in
the field. Chapter 3 describes in detail the three sites where data was collected. Part I
ends with a motivation of my research from a more ethical perspective.
Parts II and III collect six original articles —respectively four empirical and two
theoretical articles— that report my own research. They were written to be published in
journals, so each of the chapters in these two parts can be read independently.1
The four empirical articles of Part II focus on two paradigms that seem to be hege-
monic in contemporary development aid: Capacity Building (CB) and Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM). The first is used by development actors to emphasize
that they focus on the skills and competences of water managers, rather than on tech-
nical solutions. The latter paradigm advocates a cross-sectoral management of water.
Chapter 5 explores the genealogy of the Capacity Building paradigm, and links it to the
perennial tendency of development aid to invoke technological determinism. Chapter 6
describes how the Capacity Building paradigm is interpreted differently by the different
actors involved in a development project in Mali. Chapter 7 compares the implementa-
tion of IWRM-inspired water policy reforms in Burkina-Faso and Mali, and scrutinizes
the role of individuals in this process. Chapter 8 describes the emergence of IWRM in
the sphere of intergovernmental organizations and the deployment of IWRM in Mali.
The chapters 6 and 8 use Actor-Network Theory, partially or entirely, to describe the
processes that sustain the translations and deployments of the paradigms.
The first theoretical essay of Part III demonstrates that ethnographic data is in-
evitably conditioned by theoretical assumptions at the onset of the research (chapter 9).
1This means that there is some repetition in the articles. The advantage is that the articles can be
read independent from each other and in any order.
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The second article reflects on the adequacy of combining multi-sited ethnography as data
collection tool with Actor-Network Theory as data description tool (chapter 10).
Part IV summarizes the conclusions from the six articles. This is done in two steps.
First, I respond in scholarly terms to my initial research questions as they were formu-
lated in chapter 2. In a second step I translate the academic and highly context-specific
conclusions into some practical implications that hopefully make sense to the develop-
ment practitioners themselves.
Whichever the background of the reader, this dissertation will be challenging and require
an open mind, since it floats between different disciplinary fields and research subjects.
Nevertheless, I am not sure whether this research could be called interdisciplinary. I have
always wondered what interdisciplinarity actually means, especially if one does not want
to economize on methodological rigor.
From theoretical point of view, my research largely inscribes itself in a discipline that
could be broadly defined as social anthropology, with a particular conceptual grounding
on the subfield of ‘science and technology studies’, and to a some extent also on ‘political
ecology’.
The research methodology is unequivocally qualitative and typical of social anthro-
pology; data was collected through participant observations, focus group discussions,
interviews, and to a minor extent from policy documents and reports.
The subject of the research is also clearly circumscribed; the research is concerned
with the social interactions that compose the act of doing development aid. Development
aid takes many forms and is active in many fields, therefore I chose to focus on one sector
in particular: the water sector.
The conclusion is that I did not combine different research methodologies from differ-
ent disciplines, nor did I fit together diverse theoretical concepts in a gaudy patchwork. I
can think of only two reason why my research could be termed ‘interdisciplinary’. First,
it applies theoretical concepts (such as Actor-Network Theory) that are typical of one
discipline (Science and Technology Studies) to subjects that are not readily analyzed by
that concept or discipline. Second, it employed participant observation as data collection





This research was a particularly ambitious one, in multiple senses. At organizational level,
it aimed to be a Joint PhD research project of two universities in two different countries.
In intellectual terms, it forced a dialogue between disciplines that do not converse very
often. In methodological terms, it aimed at the collection of data from three completely
different sites of inquiry.
Yes, the organization could easily have slipped into chaos; the conversation between
disciplines could have turned into a Tower of Babel; or the data could have been too
fragmented. Instead, this PhD project turned out to be a great success (in my opinion)
and this would not have been possible without the pro-active help of many, many people.
In the first place I need to thank three professors: Giuliano Pancaldi, Roberto Scazz-
ieri and Koen Vlassenroot. Each in their own way, they have guided me in my PhD
journey—in the intellectual explorations and in the practical organization. Not at the
least they have offered their absolutely unconditional help in all practical matters of my
ambitious research.
Obviously, many other people have also helped to improve the intellectual and method-
ological set-up of my research and the interpretation of the data. I am very grateful to the
help and comments I have received from Anna Guagnini, Anna-Maria Gentili, Armando
Caracheo, Daniela Crocetti, Enrico Petracca, Francesco Martini, Giuditta Parolini, Ivan
Severi, Marta Cavazza, Massimo Riccottilli, Matteo Serafini, Raffaella Campaner, Rup-
sha Banerjee, Tommaso Panajoli and the many other colleagues connected to the doctoral
program in Science, Technology and Humanities and/or the University of Bologna; from
Christopher Parker, Els Lecoutere, Haidari Misafi, Jeroen Adam, Jeroen Cuvelier, Karen
Bu¨scher, Koenraad Bogaert and the many other colleagues at the Centre of Third World
Studies at Ghent University ; from the participants of Track 40 at the 2010 EASST con-
ference; from the participants of the DIMEDEV workshop in Jena; from Saurabh Arora,
Yuti Ariani, and the participants of the TIS seminar at the Technical University of Eind-
hoven; from the faculty and students of the 2011 BIARI institute; from my like-minded
colleague Jean-Philippe Venot at IWMI.
I acknowledge that my research was supported by a doctoral scholarship from the Ital-
ian Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR), and co-funding from the
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For the first time in my life I encountered myself in
front of a vast expanse of water. In those days the
abundance of water at the confluence of the two rivers
was such that one could barely discern the other bank.
Amadou Hampaˆte´ Baˆ — Amkoullel, l’enfant Peul
In the middle of the Sahel, about five hundred kilometers northeast of Bamako —the
fast growing capital of Mali— the Niger river and the Bani river merge and they give
shape to an immense wetland area whose size surpasses that of Sicily or Belgium. In this
fertile wetland, known as the Inner Niger Delta, around one million people make a living
of agriculture, fishing, and animal husbandry. The river regulates all aspects of their
lives. In the months during and after the annual rainy season, that extends from June
to September, the water level rises four to six meter and floods the entire Inner Niger
Delta. The rural villages that were surrounded by a barren and dusty landscape in May,
become small islands by September. For some months most villages are only accessible
by pirogue. Ingenious, century-old water control infrastructure retains the flood water
in perimeters and ponds for agriculture and fishing. Pastoralists and their herds leave
the Delta before the rainy season starts, and return towards the end of November when
the water has started retreating again and pastures in the Delta are full of fresh bourgou
grass. However, although the Inner Delta is one of the most abundantly irrigated areas
in West Africa —sometimes promoted as the ‘bread basket’ of West Africa— less than
half of the population in this area has access to safe drinking water. Waterborne and
water-related diseases cause 14.6% of the total disease burden in Mali,1 compared to a
global average of 6.2%, and this number is even much higher in the Inner Niger Delta.2
1Mainly caused by diarrhea and malaria.
2It is estimated that 4% of the global disease burden derives from a lack of access to safe drinking
water or improved sanitation, and 2.2% is caused by malaria (WHO, 2008).
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Figure 1.1: Mali and its neighboring countries in West Africa
4
Mopti, the capital city of the region that encompasses the Inner Niger Delta, is a major
hub for boat transport along the Niger river. Constructed on three interlinked islands,
this lively port city is strategically located right at the confluence of the Niger river and
Bani river. The principal land highway that connects Bamako in the tropical South with
the ancient trade cities Gao and Timbuktu in the arid North, circumvents the Inner Niger
Delta and passes some ten kilometers east of Mopti. Right there, on the dry eastern ‘bank’
of the Inner Niger Delta, at the crossroad through which all the road traffic from Bamako
to Mopti, Gao or Bandiagara must pass, the orderly town Se´vare´ emerged. Se´vare´ is a
popular location for foreign aid organizations to install a regional office.3 Organizations
such as USAID, Care, Save the Children, Plan International, World Vision, or IUCN are
all present in Se´vare´. It must be the town with the highest concentration of white pickup
cars4 in Mali. Also regional governmental entities prefer to have their offices in Se´vare´
rather than in Mopti, and France even has a military base near Se´vare´.
In late September 2010, in the largest hotel of Se´vere´, that is situated right along the
main road to Bamako, I attended a one day conference concerning the ‘municipal own-
ership’ (or maˆıtrise d’ouvrage communale) of water infrastructure. The conference was
attended by representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are active in
Mali’s water sector (water management and/or drinking water supply), by government
delegates, national and Western consultants, and the mayors of some rural villages in
the Inner Niger Delta. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss how governmental
and non-governmental development actors should help the rural municipalities in assum-
ing their responsibility of planning the construction of water infrastructure (including
drinking water supply infrastructure) in their territory, effectively monitoring and con-
trolling the construction of the infrastructure, and managing the exploitation of the wa-
ter infrastructure. According to the Malian law, the municipality is the only competent
decision-making body in these matter. However, most external interveners consider the
rural municipal councils to lack the adequate human resources to assume this role. This
conference was invoked to discuss this problem, which is very prominent in the rural parts
of the Inner Niger Delta.
After all represented organizations had presented (in fluent French) their viewpoints
during the morning sessions, the spokesman of the regional government —who was chair
of the conference— finally addressed the few mayors themselves in the afternoon and
asked: “What is needed, according to you, so that the municipalities can more effectively
assume their responsibilities as maˆıtre d’ouvrage?” The first to answer was a timid, elderly
mayor whose hesitant and very soft spoken answer was incomprehensible to the majority
3The situation has drastically changed, first, because of more frequent kidnappings by al-Qa’ida in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) since late 2010, and second, because of the military insurgence of the National
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Dine in early 2012. Most aid organizations
have withdrawn their international personnel from Se´vare´ and Mopti to Bamako in 2011.
4The favorite car of international aid organizations.
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of the conference attendees. There was some squabbling in the group and finally some
participants suggested, with a tone somewhere between compassion and irritation, that
the mayor could answer the question in Bambara, the lingua franca of the Malian pop-
ulation.5 The spokesman of the regional government intervened and indulgently stated:
“There is no need to speak in Bambara. The mayor speaks French well. I could clearly
understand that according to him the municipalities lack the capacities to assume their
legal responsibilities.”
That the rural municipal councils “lack the capacities to fully assume their legal
responsibilities” would not be a surprising answer, were it not that the concept ‘capacity’
has a very specific meaning in the context of development aid. ‘Capacity building’ or
‘capacity development’ is a paradigm that is nowadays widely cited by aid organizations to
distance their work from old-fashioned ‘technical assistance’. Capacity building is about
improving the capabilities and skills of the beneficiaries. Technical assistance, instead,
merely relied on Western technology and Western technical experts without building
local capacities. Technical assistance was ‘flawed’, capacity building is the ‘correct’ way.
Earlier in 2010, I had spent some time at the headquarters of an international NGO
that was also present at the Se´vare´ conference in September. During the participant
observation at their headquarters, I witnessed that the Belgian Directorate for Develop-
ment Cooperation, one of the principal donors of the NGO, obliged the NGO to state
more clearly in their project proposals how the NGO intended ‘to build the capacities’ of
their partners in the Global South. One of the NGO employees was then charged with
the task to devise an operational strategy on ‘capacity building’—for this purpose he
frequented some of the many workshops that were being organized by private consultants
and public network organizations on ‘capacity building’. This sudden ‘capacity’ buzz was
not surprising at all, as the entire Belgian NGO sector had been subjected, during the
winter of 2009-2010, to an independent evaluation of the modes and effectiveness of the
NGOs’ capacity building activities in the Global South. It was, however, surprising to
notice that capacity building had a prominent role, not only in the discourse of the NGO,
the donor, and development consultants, but also in the discourse of the mayor of a rural
Malian municipality who hardly spoke French.
By means of this Se´vare´ scene I have introduced an apparent contradiction in devel-
opment aid. On the one hand, development aid is carried by a very complex network of
actors: donors, multilateral agencies, development professionals from the Global North
and South, the private sector from the North and from the South, governmental admin-
istrations, village chiefs, grassroots NGOs, farmers, and so on and so forth. These actors
are incredibly diverse in terms of interests, cultural background and values, world view,
5French is the official language of the Malian government and, hence, it is the language used by all
development actors. It is estimated, however, that only 15% of the population speaks French (Konate´
et al., 2010). The language that is most spoken by the population is Bambara (or Bamanankan for the
speakers themselves); 80% speaks Bambara as first or second language.
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level of education, financial resources, and outreach. On the other hand, when it comes to
delivering development aid and implementing projects, all actors speak the same devel-
opment jargon and seem to display congruence and commensurability. This congruence
seems to extend from the donor over the development professional to the mayors and
the village chiefs. And although the ideas about what counts as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aid
have significantly changed over time —the idea of ‘capacity building’ replacing the idea
of ‘technical assistance’— the apparent congruence amongst actors more or less remains.
The questions that I asked myself were then: How come that all the actors involved
in development aid apparently think in the same way? Is it merely a strategy to get into
the pocket of the donor, or are the social dynamics in development aid more complex?
Where do the new concepts and theories, such as ‘capacity building’, come from and how
do they gain support? Do all these actors interpret a new development concept or theory,
such as ‘capacity building’, in the same way?
To answer these questions I observed development aid in the water sector, from dif-
ferent standpoints. One of my standpoints was the above described Inner Niger Delta in
Mali. Other standpoints were the headquarters of a multilateral organization in Stock-
holm and the headquarters of a development NGO in Belgium.
In the rest of this first chapter I first introduce the setting of development aid and the
principal actors in this setting. Then I explain the dimensions of the global water crises
and describe the general outline of development aid in the water sector.
1.1 The global development aid machinery
The origins of development aid are usually situated at the end of World War II, when the
Western countries recognized the need of collaboration in order to reconstruct war-torn
Europe and to secure world peace. In July 1944 the financial ministers of 44 countries met
in Bretton Woods and created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, commonly known as the World Bank. First deployed
to implement the Marshall Plan in Europe, the Bretton Woods institutions were soon
active in other (re-)emerging parts of the world as well (Nolan, 2002).
The United Nations system (UN) was created in 1945 to replace the preceding but
flawed League of Nations (Nolan, 2002). The UN Economic Affairs Department soon
started experimenting with ‘technical assistance’ to the ‘underdeveloped countries’. In
1949, under impetus of the United States, an ‘Expanded Program of Technical Assistance’
was created under the UN umbrella (Owen, 1950). In 1965 this became the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Since the 1950s until today, the global aid industry has grown considerably (Degnbol-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003; Burall and Maxwell, 2006). In 1992, in Rio de
Janeiro, at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
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the signatories of Agenda 21 agreed to allocate 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI)
to development aid. To date, only the Scandinavian countries, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands have attained this percentage. The United States, who never adopted this
goal, are the largest governmental donor of the world in absolute terms, but in relative
terms they rank only 19th of 23 (OECD, 2011). In 2010 the members of the Development
Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) —the club of donors from the Global North— spent
on average 0.32% of their GNI on aid. Or in other words, global aid amounted to one
quarter percent of the global economy (OECD, 2011).6
The different categories of actors. Development aid involves a plethora of organiza-
tions, agencies, and special purpose vehicles. The complexity of the network grows faster
than the volume of aid itself (Burall and Maxwell, 2006). We can roughly distinguish
four different categories of organizations (see Figure 1.2). First, the largest portion of
aid flows through bilateral channels, which directly connect governmental organizations
from the Global North with governmental organizations in the South.
The governments of the Global North also finance a set of multilateral organizations
—the second category— such as the UN, the European Union, or the World Bank. The
multilateral organizations handle around one-third of the official global aid. The once
indisputable power of the World Bank has gradually been declining in favor of regional
development banks such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and other multilateral
financing schemes such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
or the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) (Lele et al., 2010).
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) form the third category. Existing already
since colonial times, the number of NGOs has increased explosively over the second
half of the twentieth century, both in the Global North and the Global South. In this
category I also place the private philanthropic organizations, such as the historical Ford
and Rockefeller foundations, the very recent Bill & Melinda Gates foundation, as well as
the (in the West largely unknown) Aga Khan foundation. The NGOs and foundations
claim an added value with respect to the governmental and multilateral organizations, for
being rooted in the ground level, being more flexible, representing the interests of peoples
rather than governments, and for swiftlier catching the real problems of people living in
the poor countries (Rottenburg, 2009). Most scholars do indeed concur that NGOs and
foundations can complement the large-scale programs of governmental and multilateral
organizations (Fisher, 1997).
The fourth category is the private sector. Not only does the aid sector rely on thou-
6It goes without saying that, although the West has spent over $2.3 trillion on development aid since
the early 1950s, this figure is by far outstripped by the sums that the West has spent to protect the own
markets from imports produced in precisely those countries that are the beneficiaries of the development
aid, as well as the sums that the aid-receiving countries could earn if international trade barriers were
removed (Chang, 2007; Rottenburg, 2009).
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sands of private consultants to define or evaluate development policies and projects, the
three aforementioned categories also need the private sector from the North and the
South to provide the services at the end of the aid assembly line: private companies are
contracted to build the dam, dig the water well, construct the pipe network, or manage
the infrastructure.
Changing ideologies. The development sector is characterized by continuously chang-
ing approaches to ‘doing development aid’ (Cornwall, 2007; Kremer et al., 2009b). These
changes largely correlate with the changes in the broader political and intellectual context
of each era (this is also the topic of chapter 5).
After World War II, with the defeat of Nazism, communism remained the only threat
to world peace—according to the West. Therefore, the development aid of the 1940s-
1960s was designed to stem the influence of communism in the recently independent or
soon to become independent nations in the Global South (Ross, 2003; De Haan, 2009).
Aid was centrally planned (at the UN, the World Bank, or somewhere else in the North),
based on capital investments (the ‘big push’) and technology transfer (the ‘tech-fix’),
and focused on productive and economic growth. It was believed that national economic
growth would ‘trickle down’ and as such improve the lives of the poor (Nolan, 2002).
The appointment of Robert McNamara as head of the World Bank in 1968 heralded
an era of more attention to equity, rural development, and the needs of the very poor.
Agriculture started do be seen as a productive sector, rather than a traditional sector an-
tithetic to modernization. This period also witnessed the rise of criticism on development
from within the Global South, in particular from the marxist ‘Dependency School’.
In the 1980s, the attention swung back to ‘growth’, propelled by a neo-liberal wind in
the multilateral organizations. This new wind was largely motivated by the unsustain-
able debts accumulated by several developing countries. ‘Structural adjustments’ were
imposed on the aid-receiving economies, in a bid to reduce the state-involvement and to
let market forces do the job. It was, nevertheless, also the decade in which the concepts
of ‘human capital’ and ‘human development’ saw the light (De Haan, 2009).
Poverty reduction was brought back in the policies in the mid 1990s. The ‘structural
adjustment plans’ became ‘poverty reduction strategy plans’. In 2000 the world agreed
to particularly concentrate the aid on eight Millennium Development Goals, all of them
addressing the needs of the poorest. The Paris Declaration of 2005 further pushed the
international agenda towards the needs of the people in the South. In Paris, governments
agreed that the ownership of development needed to rooted in the South, that the govern-
ments of North and South should be mutually accountable, and that aid needed to better
aligned, harmonized, and focused on achieving results in the lives of the poorest. The
earlier mentioned ‘capacity building’ paradigm can be placed in this context of increased
attention to ownership (more details in chapters 5 and 6).
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Figure 1.2: Types of development organizations and the links between them.
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1.2 The global water crises
Water is a natural resource that is essential to food production, human health (drinking
water, sanitation, food preparation), the environment, as well as industrial and energy
production. All human and economic development therefore directly and indirectly de-
pends on water. Moreover, as my brief introduction of the Inner Niger Delta showed, the
various uses of water are interconnected. Therefore, in any form of development thinking
or planning, water needs to be transversally addressed (UN-Water, 2012). That there is
indeed an urgent need to do so, is shown by some macro data.
The macro view. Worldwide between 1.4 and 2.1 billion people live in water-stressed
or over-exploited river basins, which means that their withdrawal of water approaches or
exceeds the natural replenishment (IPCC, 2008). The much commented land grabbings in
Africa are in reality driven by a need for water rather than a need for land, because Africa
is the continent with the most unexploited water resources. The 60 million ha bought by
foreign investors in Africa since 2009 include 150 billion m3 of annual freshwater (GWP,
2011; Skinner and Cotula, 2011). In the Inner Niger Delta alone, foreign companies have
applied for 870,000 ha of land leases since 2004 (Hertzog et al., 2012).
Moreover, at global level, the spatial and temporal variability of water is increasing.
Wet areas are observed to get wetter, dry areas to get drier (IPCC, 2008). The Sahel, for
instance, is witnessing a consistent increase in temperature and decrease in precipitation
over the past four decades (Zwarts, 2010). Mastering this erratic character of water
distribution is necessary to adapt to climate change. In Sub-Saharan Africa, however,
only 3% of agricultural land enjoys controlled irrigation (UN-Water, 2012). Increasing
this number could increase the food security of this region, where malnutrition affects
30% of the population (FAO/WFP, 2010). In the Inner Niger Delta, 75% is malnourished,
despite the fertility of the area. To the contrary, in Asia, a region where 41% of all culti-
vated land is irrigated, groundwater levels are dwindling due to excessive withdrawals.
A last but not less important crisis is that nearly 800 million people still lack access
to safe drinking water. Most of them live in rural Sub-Saharan Africa (WHO-UNICEF,
2012). In some rural municipalities of the Inner Niger Delta, where water is abundant,
only 20% of the population has access to a safe source of drinking water.
To conclude, the major challenges in the water sector are to increase the productive
use of water to cope with the growing needs for food and energy, increase the efficient use
of water in food, energy and industry, balance these different uses, and safeguard equity.
The micro view. In fact, these macro numbers hide large inequalities. Micro analyses
reveal that it are always the poorest and subaltern who lack access to safe drinking water
and sanitation, who live in the areas that are most prone to droughts or floods, and who
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lack access to water for productive use (Mehta, 2005; UNDP, 2006; Harris et al., 2011).
The various global water crises are above all crises of governance and access, rather
than crises of bio-physical nature (UNDP, 2006). The Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), created in 2000 to address the needs of the poorest, include one goal on water:
to halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without access to safe drinking water
and sanitation (Sachs, 2005). Anyhow, water is central to at least five of the eight MDGs.
1.3 Development aid to the water sector
The international aid to the water sector slightly increased in the early 1980s, thanks to
the proclamation of an International Drinking Water and Sanitation Supply Decade, and
has sharply risen since 2001, thanks to the adoption of the MDGs. In 2009, $8.3 billion,
or 7% of all development aid, was directed to the water sector (OECD-DAC, 2012).
Following the definition of OECD-DAC (2012), this comprised aid to:
• water supply and use, sanitation and solid waste management, education and train-
ing in water supply and sanitation (totaling 86.2% of the water aid);
• water resources policy, planning and programs, water legislation and management,
water resources development, water resources protection (13.8% of the water aid).
Remark that the OECD-DAC definition of aid to water excludes the sponsoring of dams,
because their construction is counted as aid to the agricultural sector (irrigation) or
energy sector (hydropower). However, once considered a crucial development asset, dams
have fallen into disfavor with the donors. The total aid to the construction or repair of
dams currently equals one-tenth of the total aid to the water sector (OECD-DAC, 2012).
The principal bilateral donors to water and sanitation are, in order of absolute contri-
bution: Japan, Germany, France and Spain (OECD-DAC, 2012). Bilateral donors tend
to grow fond of particular aid domains, usually because the donor can rely on domain-
specific technical capacity in the home country. Therefore, the Netherlands, Denmark
and Sweden, who are small donors in absolute terms, firmly positioned themselves in the
water management domain. Figure 1.3 gives an overview of the principal actors in the
water sector (for easy comprehension the same outline as figure 1.2 was used).
As the definition of OECD-DAC exemplifies, donors continue to address ‘water’ as a
separate sector that includes drinking water supply, sanitation, and some management
aspects. Water is not yet fully considered as a transversal, trans-boundary, and cross-
sectoral resource that is essential to all forms of human and economic development.
The call to manage water in a cross-sectoral fashion is ever sounding louder though, as
exemplified by recent UN publications (e.g. UNDP, 2006; UN-Water, 2009, 2012), but
this idea is relatively recent, as demonstrated in chapter 8.
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Figure 1.3: Organizations (international and Malian) involved in water development.
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Chapter 2
Research question and outline
Now passing up the strait were we, sore grieving;
For here was Scylla, and there on t’ other side
Did dread Charybdis swallow awfully
Homer — The Odyssey
Most major challenges that the world faces today, such as environmental degradation,
unsustainable economic development, enduring poverty, chronic hunger, epidemics, or
insecurity, have roots in human behavior and social dynamics. As a result, technology
alone will not solve them; they need, above all, behavioral and social innovations. The
social sciences increasingly engage with these real-world problems, but the portion of
social scientists that do so nevertheless remains very small (Van Langenhove, 2012). At
the origin of the present dissertation lay the desire to address real-world global problems.
Development ‘assistance’ (or ‘aid’, or ‘cooperation’)1 was conceived in the 1940s to
address some of the global challenges mentioned above. Since its inception it has become
a noteworthy global business. In 2010, the global development aid network handled $143
billion, constituting nearly a quarter percent of the gross global economy (OECD, 2011).2
In other word, at least one quarter percent of the global economy is supposedly at work
to exclusively address these global challenges. Besides many other imaginable reasons,
this makes a scrutiny of development aid more than worthwhile.
1Although laden with different connotations, ‘development assistance’, ‘development aid’ and ‘devel-
opment cooperation’ are used interchangeably in this dissertation.
2Putting this number in perspective: The global aid sector is 6.5 times bigger than the global tobacco
industry (Shafey et al., 2009), but is only one third of the global arms industry (SIPRI, 2011). Global
migrant remittances are estimated to mount to 2.3 times the global official aid (World Bank, 2012).
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2.1 The need to observe development aid per se
It is useful to distinguish ‘development’ from ‘development aid’ as two different —yet
intimately related— subjects of anthropological inquiry. The former is an ideology about
socio-economic change that (loosely) draws inspiration from changes occurring in the
Western world. The latter can be defined as the actual ensemble of the actors and
interactions, the financial and material flows, and the policies and practices, that together
aim at achieving this socio-economic change (Gould, 2008).
Ever since its emergence as discipline, anthropology has been in an ambiguous relation-
ship first with the colonial rule (Asad, 1973), then the development assistance machinery
(Grillo and Rew, 1985). Often docking itself on these structures, sometimes serving them,
and sometimes heavily criticizing them, anthropology has approached ‘development’ and
‘development aid’ in a diversity of ways. At one end of the spectrum stand the applied
anthropologists who are mostly concerned with development aid and who put anthro-
pological methods and theory into action —mostly from within development agencies—
in order to ‘improve’ the aid (e.g. Cernea, 1991; Horowitz, 1996). At the other extreme
flock the critical anthropologists that besiege the development ideology —mostly from
academic strongholds— to deconstruct it as a hegemonic Western narrative that po-
litically, economically, and epistemologically continues to subdue the ex-colonies (e.g.
Apthorpe, 1986; Hobart, 1993; Escobar, 1995; Crush, 1995).
For scholars of both sides of the spectrum it seems difficult to transcend the framework
of development thinking itself (Gould, 2008). Therefore, somewhere in the middle of
this spectrum lies important anthropological knowledge that is not readily explored,
to wit, knowledge about the architecture and functioning of development cooperation
per se: its actors and interactions, the relation between policy making and practice, the
professional strategies of development experts, the strategies of the beneficiaries. Suchlike
ethnographies of development aid, called ‘aidnographies’ by Gould (2004), that are not of
an evaluative nor ideological nature, but that are strong in empirical rigor, remain rare.
The present dissertation is the result of such an observation of the complex but real-
world practice of delivering aid. As explained next, the specific research questions at the
basis of the observation stemmed from a sense of contradiction in development aid.
2.2 Research question
In the nearly seven decades that separate us from the inception of development aid, when
the Bretton Woods institutions were created in 1944 and the United Nations in 1945, the
community of development professionals have adopted a succession of very diverse ideas
about what development actually is, and how it should be implemented by aid-delivering
agencies and aid-receiving governments (Roberts, 2004; Thorbecke, 2007; Kremer et al.,
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2009b; Nederveen Pieterse, 2010, see also section 1.1).
As Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) notice, the advice that the president of an average
Sub-Saharan African country receives from donors and multilateral agencies in the 2000s
is very different from what he would have been told in the 1950s or even the 1980s.3
Indeed, each decade or so, the priorities of the development sector have changed to such
an extent that some scholars have labeled those changes as genuine ‘paradigm shifts’
(Fine, 2002; Kremer et al., 2009b) —following Thomas Kuhn’s influential description of
paradigm shifts in scientific communities (Kuhn, 1962). There are, in fact, many aspects
of Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts that apply strikingly well to the the community of
development experts as well.
Writing about the history of science, Kuhn defined a ‘paradigm’ as the collection of
“universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems
and solutions for a community of researchers” (Kuhn, 1962). The paradigm determines
what the scientists need to observe, which research questions count as interesting, how the
questions are to be structured, and how the results should be interpreted. The concept of
‘paradigm’ can thus easily be transferred to the community of development professionals
to indicate the collection of ‘model problems and solutions’ that exemplify the vision of
the community on what development is and how it is to be achieved. We could, hence,
talk about the ‘neo-liberal’ paradigm of the 1980s (Fine, 2002), the ‘ownership’ paradigm
of the late 1990s and 2000s, or the ‘capacity building’ paradigm of the 2000s (Ku¨hl, 2009).
In the context of science as well as development, the paradigm stays in place as long
as there is a sufficiently large community that sustains the paradigm with archetypal
applications —‘projects’ and ‘programs’ in the case of development. Evidence that con-
tradicts the paradigm is waived away. In fact, a paradigm not only includes a body of
knowledge that is considered as ‘received knowledge’ by the community, the paradigm
also provides a whole meaning-making framework that is incommensurable with that
of preceding or competing paradigms. When a new community starts availing itself of
the growing catalog of inexplicable evidence in an attempt to challenge the established
paradigm, the choice of an individual to commit to the new paradigm is more the result
of persuasion (Kuhn, 1962; Fine, 2002) and a switch to the meta-narrative of the other
paradigm (Rottenburg, 2009), than of evidence-based conviction.
At least in one important aspect, however, the world of development aid significantly
differs from Kuhn’s world of scientists. Development aid brings together extremely het-
erogeneous actors: multilateral donors, development professionals from the Global North
and South, the private sector from the North and the South, government administrations,
village chiefs, farmers, and more. These actors are heterogeneous, not only in terms of
financial resources and interests, but also in ethical values and world view (Long, 1992;
3It is safe to use “he” in this sentence, given that the first female president on the African continent
was only elected in 2005: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, elected President of Liberia.
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Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003; Rottenburg, 2009), and in their epis-
temic conceptions of evidence, causality, relevance, and legitimacy (Rottenburg, 2009).
Nevertheless, it has been noted that basically all actors seem to speak the language of
the reigning paradigm —from the donor, over the development professional, to the village
chief—and to cooperate in an apparently congruent way (Ferguson, 2007 [1990]; Mosse,
2004; Rottenburg, 2009). And although the development paradigms have frequently
shifted, producing new theories, policies, and project approaches every few years, the
congruence amongst actors more or less remains unchanged. It is this contradiction —the
surprising appearance of congruence and commensurability throughout the extremely
heterogeneous network of development actors— that asks for explanation (Mitchell, 2002;
Mosse, 2005a). The research question is thus:
Given the immense heterogeneity of actors involved in development coopera-
tion, how can their congruent support for a specific development paradigm or
paradigm shift be explained?
This question has been subdivided in three sub-questions:
1. Where does a new paradigm (and hence paradigm shift) come from?
2. How does a new paradigm gain support?
3. Is there actually congruence amongst all actors or is this just an appearance?
It is tempting to intuitively explain this homogeneous support as the effect of unequal
power relations in development aid and the unidirectional flows of aid money. If this
would be the case, then this needs to be demonstrated and explained—not assumed. If
we want to understand how the development aid architecture actually works, we first
need to open up the entire construct and scrutinize every link and every interaction, in
order to show how power is constructed and how congruency is achieved.
2.3 State-of-the-art
The study of the epistemic/symbolic interactions between actors in development co-
operation have been addressed in different ways. There is a principal opposition of a
Foucauldian or discourse-oriented approach, and an actor-oriented approach.
The train of discourse-focused ethnographies of aid is pioneered by James Ferguson’s
Anti-Politics Machine (2007 [1990]). Inspired by Foucault’s power/knowledge theories,
Ferguson’s work is sympathetic to the deconstructionist school, but it draws on a major
World Bank project in Lesotho for empirical data. His and other Foucauldian analy-
ses of development aid have provided insights on how, at any given historical moment,
specific discursive regimes make certain development practices appropriate and others
unthinkable, throughout the entire network.
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The Foucauldian approach has been criticized, however, in a number of obvious ways.
First, actors are treated as cogwheels in an agency-annihilating machine. No one seems
in control, not even the policy makers and development planners themselves. Discourse
theory leaves no space to investigate the strategies and negotiations for the control of dis-
courses conducted by differently positioned groups (Rossi, 2004). Second, it assumes an
unrealistic institutional homogeneity (Grillo, 1997). Third, Foucauldian analyses ignore
the inherent openness of the development discourses, as well as their volatility over time
(Gardner and Lewis, 2000; Goldman, 2001). In fact, Foucault’s own work was situated
within one single spatial and cultural domain, whereas in development aid the discourse
analyst faces the interaction of very different cultural contexts into which various exoge-
nous discourses penetrate (Stoler, 1995).
A second approach to the ethnography of aid is called by Olivier de Sardan (2005, p.11-
15) the ‘entangled social logic approach’. It emerged from an Anglophone pole (e.g. Long
and Long, 1992) and Francophone pole (e.g. Bierschenk et al., 2000). Assuming an actor-
oriented stance, these accounts describe the continuous negotiations on the interfaces
between the many different social worlds. Long and Long (1992) describe development
interventions as an “ongoing, socially constructed and negotiated process”. This body of
literature has demonstrated that there is room for human agency, not only in the sphere of
the policy making organizations (de Vries, 1992; Lewis, 1998; Stirrat, 2001; Mosse, 2011a)
and in the implementation at field level (Torres, 1997; Arce and Long, 1999; Bierschenk
et al., 2000; Rossi, 2006), but at every interface in the network (Long and Long, 1992;
Arce et al., 1994; Grillo, 1997; Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Lewis and Mosse, 2006a).
Noteworthy is the body of literature that focuses on two very specific categories of
development actors: the mediators and the brokers. Development brokers are individuals
or organizations that pertain to the developee community —but usually not the tradi-
tional elite— and that implant themselves on the interface between the developer and
developee to attract or steer the flow of development aid. They act as social entrepreneurs
that swiftly speak the development language and nimbly interact with the international
organizations (Bierschenk et al., 2002; Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Lewis and Mosse, 2006a).
The development mediators, instead, are the field workers that function as agents of me-
diation between the different socio-cultural and epistemic realms of meaning. They graft
the technical message of the developer organizations onto the system of signification of
the developees (Bierschenk et al., 2000; Olivier de Sardan, 2005).
Olivier de Sardan argues that the development mediator plays a triple role. “He or she
is the spokesperson on behalf of technical-scientific knowledge and the mediator between
technical-scientific knowledge and popular knowledge” (2005, p.169). The former is the
formal role —the one he or she is trained for— while the latter is the actual but hidden
role. Apart from these two, the mediator also needs to play a third role, the one of
negotiating, defending and securing the own personal interests.
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Some ethnographers have tried to reconcile the ‘structural’ aspects of the Foucauldian
approach and the ‘agentive’ aspects of the actor-oriented approach, by relying on Bour-
dieu’s habitus (Rossi, 2004), Giddens’ third way (Rossi, 2004), or Foucault’s governmen-
tality (Shore and Wright, 1997; Mosse, 2005a). In these views the actors autonomously
use the cultural resources at their disposition to pursue their own projects, but they still
incorporate the socio-cultural rules of the game in an unconscious manner.
Recently some ethnographers of aid (Mosse, 2004, 2005a; Lewis and Mosse, 2006b)
have signaled the usability of insights of Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) for the description
of the architecture and dynamics of aid. ANT originates in science and technology studies,
where is was used to describe how scientists, their instruments, and the ‘consumers’ of
the science or technology connect in complex ways so that the scientific experiment or
technology is made to work (e.g. Callon, 1986; Law, 1986; Latour, 1987, 1988).
The principles of ANT can be extended to any domain of the social sciences (Latour,
2000, 2005). At its most fundamental level, ANT claims that ‘the social’ needs to be
explained as a living assemblage of myriad connections between many heterogeneous
actors who possess the agency to forge, maintain, or transform these connections. The
connections can be of material, semiotic, economic, legal, linguistic, or other nature;
the actors can be human and non-human. ANT scholars do not accept ‘society’, ‘social
context’, or ‘social structure’ as a given dimension of reality. The social exists only
through the action of actors that form connections (Callon and Law, 1982; Callon, 1986;
Latour, 2005). Therefore, ANT could provide a way out of the agency-structure quandary.
As I will explain in the next section, and more thoroughly in chapter 9, I did not
choose any particular theory from the outset of my research. I had firmly resolved, how-
ever, that the data was not to be collected at one single site. As argued in Chapter 10,
localized ethnographies miss out on some important aspects of the interactions in devel-
opment aid. To start, there is no convincing argument in privileging specific interfaces
nor specific actors in the network (Mosse and Lewis, 2006). In order to grasp the diffused
and differential agency of the actors, one needs to look at development aid from different
perspectives. Second, to understand the interactions at one interface in the network,
one has to understand the entire network. Following the method of grounded theorizing,
my research started at one arbitrary site and developed along surprising paths, towards
additional sites, as more data was collected.
2.4 Research methodology
Grounded Theory Method
In order to answer the research questions, I collected qualitative data on the dynamics of
a number of development paradigms that appeared to be hegemonic in the development
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aid network. Data collection and analysis happened by means of the Grounded Theory
Method (GTM).4 GTM is very widely used in the social sciences for the collection and
analysis of (qualitative) empirical data. As thoroughly explained and analyzed in the first
theoretical article of Part III (Chapter 9), the method requires the researcher to enter the
field and start collecting data without sticking to any pre-conceived theory or hypothesis.
Only the collected empirical data can give way to theorizing about the social processes
under scrutiny —not any existing theories— and this theorizing should happen according
a systematic and inductive procedure. It is a hallmark of GTM that the theorizing starts
as soon as the data start to be collected (Charmaz, 2001). Data collection and analysis are
not two separate phases of the research. They happen simultaneously because the data
sampling is guided by the requirements of the theorizing, rather than by requirements of
completeness.
I applied GTM in the postmodern version of Kathy Charmaz (2006) and Adele Clarke
(2005), which takes into consideration the situatedness of the researcher, rather than the
original positivist version of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967). This is also
discussed in chapter 9.
Multi-sited ethnography in the water sector
The research field was reduced to manageable dimensions by focusing the data collection
on one specific sector: development aid in the water sector (in my definition this includes
water management and access to drinking water). Since I was especially interested in
the connections between actors, and the dynamics of the entire network, I collected the
data at three different (physical) sites in the network. Some reflections concerning the
compatibility of GTM, multi-sited ethnography, and the ethnography of aid, are described
and discussed in the second theoretical article of Part III (chapter 10). The qualitative
data were collected at three very diverse but interconnected sites:
1. the headquarters of WaNGO,5 a non-governmental development organization spe-
cialized in implementing water projects in Africa and Latin America, one of which
in the Inner Niger Delta in Mali;
2. a number of rural villages in the Inner Niger Delta (IND) in Mali;
3. the headquarters of the Global Water Partnership (GWP), an inter-governmental
organization founded by the World Bank and UNDP that fosters the integrated
management of water resources worldwide, including Mali.
The three sites roughly represent three completely different realities in the field of
development cooperation. On the first site I could observe how the headquarters of a
4I follow Bryant and Charmaz (2007b) in that the method should be called ‘Grounded Theory Method’
(GTM), while the outcome of the method is a ‘Grounded Theory’.
5This is a pseudnym.
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Western NGO closely supervise the work in Mali, but also how they interact on a daily
basis with donors and consultants. The second site, the IND, offered the possibility to
observe the ‘implementation’ of projects, but is was also the perfect setting to observe the
interaction of the many diverse actors, such as international NGOs and national govern-
mental and non-governmental actors. The observation at the headquarters of GWP, the
multilateral agency in Stockholm, gave me a window on the interactions of multilateral
agencies in international forums. The precise context and characteristics of each of the
three sites are described in detail in the following chapter 3.
The first site, the NGO headquarters, was selected as entry point to the field because
of its accessibility. The second site, the IND, was chosen on the basis of the data that
was collected at the first site. I did not aim at getting a comprehensive and complete
overview of the entire network of development actors in the water sector and their support
to the hegemonic paradigms. I chose the IND merely to complement the observations
at the first site, since the paradigms that appeared hegemonic at the first site were also
sustained in the IND, but by completely different actors. In grounded theorizing the data
sampling does not aim at completeness; instead it looks for diversity, in order to make
the theorizing as rich as possible. The selection of the third site, the headquarters of
GWP, followed from the observations at the second site.
After the data collection phase was finished, the database of qualitative data consisted
of 13 months of participant observation at three different sites, 21 focus group discussions,
47 interviews, and over 50 reports and policy documents. The details of the observations,
interviews, and focus discussions (such as data and place) are listed in Appendix D.
Focus on three paradigms
At the start of the data collection phase, the research field had been limited to the
water sector, yet no particular sites (but the first) had been selected. From the the first
participant observation emerged that the field of inquiry had to be further focused on
a small number of concepts, theories, policies, or paradigms. The data collection was
eventually concentrated on the following three (apparently) hegemonic paradigms in the
water sector:
• ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’ (IWRM) as best practice;
• ‘Capacity Building’ as mode of providing the aid;
• ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’, and its relation with the IWRM paradigm.
At each of the three sites qualitative data was collected with regard to all three
paradigms. During the data collection and analysis, however, ‘Adaptation to Climate
Change’ was gradually abandoned as separate paradigm, and was only considered in
relation with IWRM. The empirical results presented in Part II of this dissertation try
to answer the research question(s) with respect to the chosen paradigms.
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2.5 Definition of frequently used concepts
In this dissertation the term field refers to the ensemble of all physical places where
(ethnographic) data is collected or could be collected (Amit, 2000). For the present
research the field encompasses all places where development aid is practiced. It includes
the villages in the Inner Niger Delta, the headquarters of the NGO, the headquarters of
GWP, and any other physical place where development actors interact.
The term site indicates one (arbitrarily) circumscribed physical place where the
ethnographer establishes a physical presence for a certain amount of time to collect data.
The headquarters of GWP, for instance, constituted one site of the multi-sited ethnogra-
phy. One site, however, does not coincide with one actor. Actors from different categories
interact at the GWP headquarters. A site, one could say, is an entry point to the field.
Finally, the term ground level is used to indicate the (physical) place where the
development aid is supposed to be ‘delivered’, e.g. a rural village in Mali where a water
well is constructed. What some would refer to as ‘happening at local level’, this disserta-
tion refers to as ‘happening at the ground level ’. As argued elsewhere (Chapter 10), the
distinction between ‘local’ and ‘global’ is in fact difficult to defend.
It is also appropriate to clarify the terms discourse, development paradigm, theory, pol-
icy, and project. This dissertation refers to ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’,
‘Capacity Building’ and ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’ as development paradigms
—the term coined by Thomas Kuhn (1962). To Kuhn the term meant many things at
once: an overarching meaning-making framework, a collection of archetypal applications
of the meaning-making framework, and the community of experts/practitioners that re-
produce the applications. The broad meaning of the term makes it affine to Foucault’s
term discourse. It was opted to use the term paradigm instead of discourse in this dis-
sertation for the sole reason not to implicitly invoke a reference to Foucauldian theories.
Paradigms acquire concrete shape in theories. The Capacity Building paradigm is
supported by a vast community, but single organizations tend to develop their own specific
theories. Examples are the theories on Capacity Building developed by UNDP (2009) or
the European Centre for Development Policy Management (2008).
These theories are further translated into development policies. A donor will rely
on a specific theory of Capacity Building, that was developed by a specialized agency or
think tank, to develop his own context-specific policy that makes sense to both to the
donor himself and the recipient of the aid.
A development project is the translation of a development policy into a collection of
programmed actions that are limited in time and space. Projects constitute the archetypal
applications of the paradigm.
In a sense, the terms paradigm, theory, policy, and project not only refer to different
levels of concreteness, but also to different steps in a process of translation.
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Chapter 3
The three sites of observation
There are two kinds of people in this world: those who
have seen Africa and those who haven’t.
Khalid Siddig — personal communication
In order to get an answer to the research questions described in section 2.2, qualitative
data were collected from three different sites in the development aid network, via a multi-
sited ethnography. From the outset, the research focused on development aid in the water
sector (water management and access to drinking water). Three different standpoints
have been occupied in this sector (see Figure 3.1). They were, in chronological order:
1. the international headquarters of WaNGO, a development NGO specialized in im-
plementing water projects in Africa and Latin America, one of which in the Inner
Niger Delta in Mali;
2. six rural villages in the Inner Niger Delta (IND) in Mali;
3. the international headquarters of the Global Water Partnership (GWP), an inter-
governmental organization founded by the World Bank and UNDP that fosters the
integrated management of water resources worldwide, including in Mali.
The first site of the multi-sited ethnography, the NGO, was selected as entry point to the
field because of its accessibility. The second site, the IND, was chosen to complement the
first, as in the IND the same paradigms are sustained by different actors in very different
contexts. The selection of the third site, the headquarters of GWP, followed from the
observation at the second site.
This chapter introduces the background details of each of the three sites. It does not
describe the observations themselves.
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3.1 First site: headquarters of a development NGO
The data collection started at the headquarters of a mid-sized, international, non-govern-
mental development organization: WaNGO.1 As mentioned in section 1.1, the emergence
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Global North and South since the
1960s, and their boom since the 1980s, has reshaped the face of the development sector
(Fisher, 1997). The steadily increasing number of NGOs are engaged in a wide range of
political or practical activities —ranging from grass-roots and sustainable development,
human rights, environmental protection, and many other activities— that are ignored
or inadequately addressed by governmental agencies in both the North and the South.
According to the critics of international development aid, local or grass-roots NGOs can
give voice to alternative development views and practices (Fisher, 1997).
The bilateral and multilateral development community has also embraced NGOs. The
Belgian government, for instance, one of the principal supporters of WaNGO, channels
10% of the ODA through non-governmental aid, which is only slightly less than the budget
of the direct bilateral technical cooperation (DGD, 2011, see also chapter 6). Strongly
rooted in the field at the local level, and flexible in the transfer of aid and skills, NGOs are
believed to be complementary to the work of the multilateral and bi-lateral development
agencies and to mitigate the failures of state-directed development (Fisher, 1997).
The generic term ‘NGO’, however, conceals a tremendous diversity of organizations,
both in terms of raison d’eˆtre, ideology, size, and action radius. Not only is the number
of NGOs rising, they also forge, in formal and informal ways, innovative and increasingly
complex connections amongst each other, with the international development agencies,
donors and local actors. These relationships “have profound impacts both on globaliza-
tion and on local lives” (Fisher, 1997). Networks of NGOs connect the local, national,
regional and global level. Varying with their size and outreach, they control in an impor-
tant way (i) the framing or reformulation of local problems, (ii) the flow of information
and ideas between the different levels, (iii) flows of technologies, and (iv) flows of devel-
opment aid (Jasanoff, 1997).
WaNGO was selected as standpoint in order to observe their (supposed) role as epis-
temic/discursive mediator between the donors in Brussels (the Belgian government and
the European Commission) and the development project implementers in Mali. During
2010 a participant observation was carried out at their headquarters, which are situated
in Belgium.
Profile of WaNGO The NGO was founded in the late 1970s by a small number of
young, Belgian engineers and agronomists who personally engaged in providing technical
assistance in Haiti. The organization decided in 1992 to concentrate its activities in
1This is a pseudonym
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two sectors: drinking water supply and agriculture. In 2001 the activities were further
directed towards the single core theme ‘water’, embracing the central mission to “promote
an equitable, sustainable and participatory management of water both in the Global
North and the Global South.”2 In 2005 the organization officially adopted ‘Integrated
Water Resources Management’ as guiding principle for all interventions.
WaNGO earns the label of ‘international’ organization because, apart from its head-
quarters in Belgium, it has six branches in the Global South that, although financially
and ideologically dependent on the headquarters, constitute administratively indepen-
dent entities. These branches currently implement development projects in nine African
and Latin American countries. One of these branches is WaNGO-Mali, which had its
main office near the Inner Niger Delta until 2011. Since 2011 the head office is located
in Mali’s capital Bamako.
The WaNGO headquarters in Belgium employ around 15 people, who are evenly
distributed over an Administrative Department, a Department for Southern Operations,
and a Department for Northern operations. The organization sustains another 45-50
employees in the different offices in the Global South. The long term strategic decisions
are taken by a board of directors that is composed of 11 professionals from the private
sector and from academia, the majority of them having a background in engineering or
economics.
The different branches of WaNGO in the Global South are active players in regional
and national forums to promote sustainable water use and management in the beneficiary
countries and at local level. Notably, in several of the 9 beneficiary countries, WaNGO
is an active member3 of the respective national water partnerships that were founded by
GWP. (GWP’s headquarters constituted the third site of observation in this research).
Also in Belgium, WaNGO is engaged in various advocacy networks. It is an active
member of an NGO-federation and an advocacy network that represent NGOs in negotia-
tions with the home government. It also steers, or is an active member of, three advocacy
networks that strive to push sustainable development, climate and water higher on the
national political agenda.
The funding In 2010 WaNGO had an annual budget of nearly 9 million euro, of
which 90% was destined to support and implement the projects in the 9 African and
Latin-American countries. The largest part of the budget is obtained from the typical
development donors: the Belgian government (41%), the European Commission (38%),
and other public bodies and funds (3%). The remaining 18% is obtained from private
donations (mostly companies and individuals).4
2The current motto of WaNGO.
3personal communication of the presidents of 2 national branches of GWP
4This data is obtained from WaNGO’s 2011 annual report, which describes the situation of 2010.
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WaNGO prides itself on working in a highly professional manner5 and using the
highest possible standard of financial accounting6. This has led the WaNGO headquarters
to enjoying a particular status in the home country: the organization pertains to a group
of NGOs that receive unearmarked funding from the home government over a period of
6 years. This funding covers the activities of WaNGO in those countries and sectors that
coincide with the home government’s aid priorities. This unearmarked flow, however,
covers only 37% of WaNGO’s budget.
The remaining and thus largest portion of the budget has a more erratic character.
It is obtained from other donors by responding to calls-for-proposals (e.g. from the
European Commission) and is necessarily linked to specific, precisely defined projects of
shorter duration (typically 2-3 years). Project grants are awarded by the donors through
periodic calls for proposals. For WaNGO the process of proposal writing is very resource
consuming: writing a complete proposal for the European Commission takes 1 to 2
personmonths7 while the average rate of success is below 15% (European Commission,
2011).
Operational strategies WaNGO has elaborated a number of explicit operational
strategies to guide the formulation and implementation of projects. Operational strate-
gies are available for a number of countries, such as Haiti. Other operational strategies
focus on specific themes, such as: Integrated Water Resources Management, climate
change, local/municipal ownership of water infrastructure, transversal monitoring and
evaluation, supply of drinking water.
5Personal communications of various WaNGO employees, including head of the Advocacy Depart-
ment, 3 February 2010.
6Personal communication of the head of Administrations of WaNGO, 14 June 2010.
7Observed in the occasion of the call for proposals for the EU-ACP Water Facility, deadline 2 June
2010.
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3.2 Second site: the Inner Niger Delta in Mali
The second site of observation is less clearly circumscribed than the other two sites. In
broad terms it can be defined as the ‘Inner Niger Delta’, which is the vast wetland area
in the middle of the Sahel in the center of Mali.
In more specific terms, however, data collection was concentrated on (i) six rural
villages in six different municipalities in the Inner Niger Delta, some of which targeted by
a development project run by WaNGO-Mali, and (ii) the actors linked to WaNGO-Mali
(whose principal office was located, until 2011, near the Inner Niger Delta).
Since the Inner Niger Delta constituted only one of the three site in the multi-sited
ethnography, all information about Mali, the Inner Niger Delta, and the villages is delib-
erately squeezed in one single section. This should make clear that this site had no more
or less weight in the research than the other two sites.
The rest of this section will provide the reader with some information concerning
1. Mali: the general context, the situation of the water sector, and the aid in the water
sector;
2. the Inner Niger Delta in Mali: the general context, why it is so interesting in terms
of water management, and which aid it receives;
3. the six municipalities and six villages in the Inner Niger Delta where qualitative
data was collected.
3.2.1 Mali
Mali is a land-locked country in West Africa that stretches from 10◦30’N to 25◦10’N,
and from 12◦20’W to 04◦20’E (see Figure 1.1). This vast country of 1,240,000 km2 (this
is more than the area of France and the Iberian Peninsula together) accommodates 16
million inhabitants,8 more than 90% of which are living in the southern half of the country
where the capital Bamako is located.
Development With a Gross Domestic Product of PPP $1,123 per capita and a Human
Development Index of 0.359, Mali ranks below the Sub-Saharan average and is amongst
the poorest countries in the world, both in economic as in human terms (see Table 3.1).9
The number of households living in extreme poverty is only slightly higher than the
8The author’s estimation for 2012, based on the census of 2009 and the average population growth
rate of 2000-2009.
9‘PPP’ stands for ‘Purchasing Power Parity’. It is a correction of the GDP per capita measure that
levels out the differences in cost of similar goods or services in different countries, in order to make the
comparison of standards of living in different countries closer to reality.
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Development indicators Mali SSA Ref. year Source
Economic
GDP per capita [PPP $] 1,123 1,966 2011 (UNDP, 2012)
Net ODA received [% of GDP] 17.6 9.2 2010 (UNDP, 2011)
Remittances inflows [% of GDP] 5.6 2.2 2010 (UNDP, 2011)
Income below PPP $1.25 a day [% pop.] 51.4 47.5 2000-2009 (UNDP, 2011)
Human
Human Development Index [-] 0.359 0.463 2011 (UNDP, 2012)
Life expectancy [years] 51.4 54.4 2011 (UNDP, 2012)
Tot. fertility rate [children/woman] 6.1 4.5 2011 (UNDP, 2012)
Population growth [% per year] 3.0 2.4 2010-2015 (UNDP, 2011)
Adult literacy rate [% population] 26.2 61.6 2005-2010 (UNDP, 2011)
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa, ODA = Official Development Assistance
Table 3.1: Selected indicators of economic and human development in Mali,
compared to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan average, but the literacy rate of the adult population is very low (26.2%)
compared to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (61.6%).
The high population growth (3.0%), together with internal migration from the poor
rural areas to urban centers, makes the capital Bamako one of the fastest growing cities
in Africa. The current population of nearly 2 million is expected to increase by 47-50%
in the decade 2010-2020 (UNHABITAT, 2010).
Climate Mali’s climate ranges from subtropical in the south (or ‘Guinean’ in the ter-
minology of the Malian Ministry of Environment) to arid in the north (‘Saharan’ in the
terminology of the Malian Ministry of Environment). The Sahara covers approximately
half of the country and hence 65% of the country is considered arid or semi-arid. In the
entire country rains are concentrated in one rainy season of 6-3 months, which alternates
with a dry season of 6-9 months. In the entire country most rainfall is registered in Au-
gust, whereas zero rainfall is registered in December and January. The amount of rainfall
largely ranges from south to north (see Figure 3.2) and is very erratic over the course of
years (MEA, 2010; Zwarts, 2010).
The erratic rainfall in the arid and semi-arid areas has led to three prolonged periods
of drought during the twentieth century (see Figure 3.3). The first two droughts, from
1900 to 1915 and from 1940 to 1949 were both followed by periods of recovered rainfall.
The third drought started in the 1970s and heralded a protracted period of unusually low
precipitation. This period is called the Great Drought or la Grande Se´cheresse (1972-
1993). Since the late 1980s rainfall has gradually improved but continues to remains
below the average of the XX century. In addition, the Sahel region witnesses a general
increase in average temperature since the 1970s, in accordance with —but slightly higher
than— the global tendency (Zwarts, 2010).
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Figure 3.2: The average precipitation (in mm/year) and
climatic zones (as defined by the Ministry of Environment) in Mali.
Economy Agricultural activities account for 33% of Mali’s GDP and employs 70% of
the labor force. Therefore, the erratic climatic conditions in the region and the volatility
of international food prices directly affect both the economy and national food security.
The vast majority of agricultural activity is concentrated in the southern half of the
country, which is irrigated by the Niger river, Bani river and Senegal river. Contrary to
most of the neighboring countries, Mali is self-sufficient in terms of food in most years.
The two major export products are gold and cotton. Especially the mining of the former
commodity has generated a sustained economic growth in the country over the past few
years.
Many households, however, are highly dependent on the remittances of emigrated
family members and the government is highly dependent on foreign aid (see Table 3.1).
There are about forty bilateral and multilateral donors active in Mali, but their aid is
highly variable. The United States, European Commission, World Bank, France, and the
Netherlands are (or have been) the most important donors to Mali in the past few years.
The total amount of ODA disbursed to Mali varied between $950 million and $2,830
million in the period 2006-2010 (OECD-DAC, 2012). Besides the governmental aid, over
2,000 development NGOs (national and international) are active in Mali (MMEE, 2006).
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Figure 3.3: Annual precipitation anomalies and temperature anomalies in the Sahel
(1900-2005) with respect to the average precipitation and temperature of the 20th century.
History The area that is nowadays denominated as ‘Mali’ has a very ancient and rich
history, as it has been part of the three different West African empires that subsequently
controlled the trans-Saharan trade in gold, salt and other precious commodities. The
earliest was the Ghana empire (century V—1078), ruled by the Soninke´ people. The Mali
kingdom, ruled by Malinke´ people, arose in the XIII century. The trading cities Djenne´
and Timbuktu developed in full splendor during this period. The Songhai empire, that
had been developing around the trade city Gao since the XIII century, supplanted the
Mali empire in the XV century. The fall of the Songhai empire in 1591 ended the region’s
control over the trans-Saharan trade.
After the collapse of the Songhai empire at the end of the XVI century, several small
kingdoms arose and succeeded each other. One worth mentioning is the Islamic theocratic
state Diina, established by the Islamic clergyman Seku Amadu (Cheikou Amadou) in
1818. The Diina codified and formalized the natural resources management in the Inner
Niger Delta in Mali. The customary rules of the Diina still have effects in present-day
natural resources management (see further in this section). The Toucouleur conquered
the Diina in 1862.
In 1893, the French defeated the Toucouleur and established the colony of French
Sudan in 1895. The French colonial administration nevertheless sustained the principles
of common resource management inherited from the Diina (Benjaminsen and Ba, 2008).
Mali became independent from France in 1960. After three decades of one-party
rule and military dictatorship, a multi-party democracy was eventually installed in 1991.
Together with the installment of democracy, a new constitution was adopted and the
central government started to delegate (‘decentralize’) part of its decision-making com-
petencies to the 8 regions (plus one capital district), the 49 provinces ( or ‘cercles ’), and
703 municipalities (or ‘communes ’).
In the first half of 2012 the country was rocked by a wave of violence. The sudden
advance of the Tuareg rebel movement MNLA and radical Islamist movement Anc¸ar
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Water development indicators Mali SSA Ref. year Source
Health-related
Access to an improved water source
total [% of total population] 64 61 2010 (WHO-UNICEF, 2012)
rural [% of rural population] 51 49 2010 (WHO-UNICEF, 2012)
urban [% of urban population] 87 83 2010 (WHO-UNICEF, 2012)
Access to improved sanitation
total [% of total population] 22 30 2010 (WHO-UNICEF, 2012)
rural [% of rural population] 14 23 2010 (WHO-UNICEF, 2012)
urban [% of urban population] 35 43 2010 (WHO-UNICEF, 2012)
Water-related burden of disease [% of tot.] 14.6 16.8 2004 (WHO, 2008)
Environment and agriculture
Renewable freshwater [m3/year/capita] 6,707 4,300 2011 (FAO, 2012a)
Freshwater withdrawal [% of tot. renew.] 6.5 3.2 2002 (UNEP, 2010)
Crop area equipped for irrigation [%] 4.7 3.0 2005 (FAO, 2012a)
Pop. affected by droughts [millions] 1.62 72.6 2005-2011 (UNDP, 2012)
Pop. affected by droughts [% of tot. pop.] 11.1 8.1 2005-2011 (UNDP, 2012)
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa, pop. = population
Table 3.2: Selected indicators of water-related development in Mali,
compared to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
Dine in the Saharan north of the country had repercussions for the political instability
in Bamako. Part of the Malian army, dissatisfied with the course of events in the north
and the feeble response of the government, staged a coup in March 2012. Under heavy
political and economic pressure of the West African Community (ECOWAS), civil rule
was restored in Bamako in April 2012. In the meantime the MNLA had declared the
independence of the three northern regions of Mali that they had brought under their
control (referring to them as the new country ‘Azawad’). At the time of writing, the
three northern regions are still under control of MNLA and Anc¸ar Dine. The information
provided in this dissertation mostly refers to the situation in Mali before the military
coup.
Water in Mali Generally speaking, Mali is a water rich country (see Table 3.2), as
it is irrigated by the Niger river, its tributary the Bani river, and the Senegal river.
These renewable freshwater resources, however, and the rainfall as well, are very unevenly
distributed in space, producing a very lush ecosystem in the south of the country and a
very arid landscape in the north (see Figure 3.2).
The water resources are only moderately developed for productive use. The Se´lengue´
dam on the Niger river, south of Bamako, and the Manantali dam on the Senegal river, in
the southwest of the country, are the two major hydropower dams in Mali. The Se´lengue´
dam, as it is situated upstream of Bamako, also regulates the water level of the Niger
river in Bamako.
Some 300 km downstream of Bamako, i.e. northeast of Bamako, the Markala dam
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deviates a portion of the water from the Niger river into a vast, artificially irrigated area
of Mali, the Office du Niger. This area produces 500,000 tonnes of rice per year, i.e. 60%
of the national rice production, and 200,000 tonnes of horticultural products. Located
at the southern end of the Inner Niger Delta, the Office du Niger was created by the
French colonizer to become the ‘bread basket’ of West Africa. Of the 960,000 ha that
were originally planned to be included in the Office du Niger, today only 96,000 ha are
effectively irrigated and cultivated (Hertzog et al., 2012). This means that the irrigation
and production potential of the Office du Niger is not nearly exhausted. The World Bank
and the German bilateral cooperation have put much efforts, since the 1980s until the
2000s, in making the Office du Niger economically viable (World Bank, 2005).
In terms of delivering safe drinking water to the population, Mali has made significant
progress in the last few years, and will probably attain the Millennium Development Goal.
According to the latest data, 64% of the total population has access to safe drinking water.
There are huge differences, however, between the rural and urban population (see Table
3.2). In matters of sanitation there is much less progress, as currently only 22% of the
total population has access to improved sanitation (see Table 3.2). It is unlikely that the
Millennium Goal for sanitation will be attained (WHO-UNICEF, 2012).
Aid to Mali’s water sector The progress is made thanks to huge investments by
multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental donors in infrastructure (see Table 3.4).
Water-related development aid typically addresses three sectors separately:
• drinking water supply and sanitation (WSS), often supplemented with hygienic
awareness-raising;
• water resources management, including management of river basins and manage-
ment of water for energy production;
• water for agriculture and food production, mostly in the form of irrigation.
Traditionally the major bilateral and multilateral donors to WSS in Mali are Germany,
France, the World Bank and the Water Facility of the African Development Bank (see
Table 3.3). In the sector of water management, important donors are Denmark (at Malian
policy making level) and the World Bank (in the entire Niger basin).
The question is to what extent the investments made in WSS infrastructure, as de-
scribed in Table 3.4, are sustainable. Operation and maintenance of water infrastructure
is looked after by the public utility company EDM (in the urban areas) and by small
public or private companies —created ad hoc— in the rural areas. These operators need
to severely underprice the services (see Table 3.4). As a result, the maintenance of the
infrastructure is at risk. In rural areas the breakdown rate of water facilities is estimated
at 30% (World Bank, 2011).
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Donors Project WSS WRM Bn FCFA
France (AFD) Water supply in Nioro
and Die´ma
y n 4.2
France (AFD) WSS in Fana and Sikasso y n 9.9
Germany (KfW) WSS study in Kayes y n 22.8
European Development Fund (EDF) WSS in 5 regions y n 6.8
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Agricultural water man-
agement in Kati and
Kangaba
n y 5.8
Arab Bank for Economic Develop-
ment in Africa (BADEA)
Small dams in Kayes,
Ye´limane´, Nioro du Sa-
hel
n y 7.0
BADEA Water supply in Sikasso y n 4.1
Kuwait Fund (KFDEA) Water supply in 5 regions y n 7.1
Netherlands GIRENS n y 1.4
World Bank WSS in 4 regions y n 15.0
African Development Bank (AfDB) Water supply in Gao and
Kidal
y n 10.7
Denmark (Danida) PASEPARE y y 5.7
WSS=Water Supply and Sanitation, WRM =Water Resources Management, FCFA=0.0015 EUR
Source: adapted from Danida (2006)
Table 3.3: Snapshot (2005-2006) of multilateral and bilateral aid
projects and programs in Mali’s water sector
in Mali in SSA
Capital investment
Public sector 0.59 1.70
Private 0.00 1.90
Official development assistance (ODA) 2.90 1.60
Non-OECD aid 0.11 0.22
Total investments 3.60 5.40
Operation & maintenance
Public sector 2.20 4.20
Underpricing 5.80 2.50
Source: World Bank (2010)
Table 3.4: Expenditure to water supply and sanitation in Mali and
Sub-Saharan Africa, in $ per capita and by source of financing (2009)
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The governmental actors in Mali’s water sector The three typical channels of aid
to the water sector (water supply and sanitation; IWRM; agricultural water management)
do not coincide with the competences of three distinct ministries. Moreover, in Mali the
ministerial competences are often reshuﬄed —8 times since 2000.
Freshwater management and drinking water supply was a competency, until October
2007, of the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water (MMEE). From 2007 until the military
coup in March 2012, energy and water were placed in one single ministry, the Ministry of
Energy and Water (MEE). Since the return to civil rule, in April 2012, water and energy
are housed in the Ministry of Energy, Water and Environment. Since 2000, six different
ministers have been in charge of the water portfolio.
Where sanitation and water pollution are concerned, they are the competency of the
Ministry of Environement, known under that name until May 2004. Since 2004 until
the military coup in 2012 the ministry was known as the Ministry of Environment and
Sanitation (MEA). Since the restoration of democratic rule in April 2012 the environment
is now housed together with water and energy in one ministry.
The Ministry of Agriculture (MA) and the Ministry of Fishery and Livestock —usually
together, but separated from May 2004 until March 2012— play only a minor decision-
making role in the water sector.
The legislation in matters of water is governed by the Water Code that was adopted in
2002 (law 02-006). It establishes the public ownership of water and describes the priority
uses of water—supply of drinking water in the first place. It designates the State as
the lead manager and describes the transfer of rights and obligations of the State to the
local governments (regions, cercles, and municipalities). The Water Code confirms the
decentralization of competences (see above, page 36).
Each of the ministries can count on executive bodies or ‘directorates’ responsible
for the follow-up of the legislation and rules, and the implementation of governmental
programs. Contrary to the ministries, the outline and mission of these directorates has
remained relatively stable over time.
The directorates have developed operational strategies, such as: the National Strategy
for the Development of Irrigation, developed in 1999; the National Water Policy, adopted
in 2006; the National Sanitation Policy, developed in 2006 and adopted in 2009; the
National Strategy for Access to Water, adopted in 2007; and the National Action Plan
for Integrated Water Resources Management, adopted in 2008.
Each of these strategies is inscribed in Mali’s all-encompassing Strategical Framework
for Growth and Poverty Reduction — the principal instrument not only for the alignment
of national policies but also for the harmonization of donor aid. The main actors in the
water sector in Mali are now described. The description refers to the situation before the
military coup in 2012.
The Ministry of Energy and Water (MEE) is the lead institution for the man-
40
3.2. Second site: the Inner Niger Delta in Mali
agement of both water resources and public supply of drinking water. It exercises its
legal supervision over the water sector through the National Water Directorate (DNH),
which is the ‘executive arm’ of the MEE. The DNH was officially created in 1999 but
builds on a series of pre-existing structures that date back to colonial time.
The decentralization process formally transferred the competence of identifying, con-
structing, and managing water infrastructure (drinking water supply, sanitation, small-
scale irrigation) to local governments—municipalities in particular. However, the state
continues to control, through the DNH, the water infrastructure in the urban centers of
the country. That are the 18 centers where the public utility company SOMAGEP (for-
merly EDM) delivers water and energy to the consumers. The Urban Hydraulics Division
of DNH coordinates and monitors the implementation of investment projects of the state
(including those supported by foreign partners) in the urban centers of the country.
The DNH also manages country wide programs of water supply and sanitation in non-
urban areas, with the support of foreign technical and financial partners. DNH is a magnet
for donors interested in water-related cooperation, and can count with foreign technical
assistants (e.g. from the French Development Agency and from the German Technical
Cooperation) in its ranks virtually since its creation (Matz, 2010). In principle, in the
case of country wide programs managed by DNH, the rural municipalities nevertheless
remain the legal owners and managers of the infrastructure.
Due to the fact that DNH historically played the role of owner and manager of all
water infrastructure, the composition of DNH staff has always been marked by the near-
dominance of technical expertise on water among executives of the organization. Skills
in sociology, physical and fiscal planning and monitoring and evaluation are substantially
under-represented and in some cases not available.
The DNH is centralized under the national MEE ministry, but has 9 regional offices
(Regional Directorates for Water and Energy - DRHE). The DRHEs are supposed to
verify the compliance with norms and laws in matters of water supply at local level;
collect geological, hydrological and socio-economic data; control the quality and quantity
of water resources at local level; provide technical support to the local governments
(municipalities, cercles, and regions) in the planning and follow up of works and the
management of the water infrastructure; support and supervise the tender process of
private entities for the construction and management of infrastructure; evaluate projects.
The decentralization of staff and resources from the central DNH to the regional
DRHEs has been faltering. One the one hand there is a lack of political will at the
central ministerial level to delegate resources and competencies. On the other hand there
is a lack of financial and human resources. The total staff of DHN is approximately 220,
of which 90 officers work at the national level. At the regional level, 64% of positions are
not filled, according to (Danida, 2010). This faltering decentralization seriously hinders
the functioning of the regional DRHE units.
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Also, since 2001, the DNH together with the National Directorate for Energy con-
trols the two dams on the Niger river in Mali —the Se´lingue´ dam before Bamako, and
the Markala dam after Bamako— through the Water Management Commission of the
Se´lingue´ Dam. The main duty of this commission is to balance energy production at the
Se´lingue´ dam with irrigation downstream of Se´lingue´ and Markala.
The Ministry of Environment and Sanitation (MEA) is in charge of sanita-
tion, in all its dimensions. The follow up of legislation and norms happens through its
‘executive arm’, the National Directorate of Sanitation and of Pollution and Nuisance
Control (DNACPN). The MEA has developed a National Sanitation Policy, adopted in
early 2009. It includes all areas of sanitation (except the air pollution) and hygiene
awareness raising.
Since its inception in 1998, the DNACPN has little funding and its experience in
managing projects and programs is limited. It has mostly carried out activities in urban
areas, such as: the development of strategic plans for sanitation; construction and cleaning
of sewers, gutters, lavatories, latrines; the creation of solid waste landfills; the construction
of wastewater treatment plants.
DNACPN is represented in every region of the country by the Regional Directorates
(DRACPN) and is also represented at sub-regional level. In 2007 the DNACPN had 202
agents, 59 of which at national level and 143 in the regional DRACPN units (Danida,
2010). In line with the national decentralization process, the DRACPN are responsible
for: the promotion of individual and communal drainage structures and support to local
authorities in waste management; the identification of pollution and nuisances at local
level; the dissemination and control of the legislation and norms at the regional level;
the development and execution of public awareness campaigns in terms of good hygienic
behavior.
Another entity worth mentioning is the Agency of the Niger River Basin, which could
be considered the Malian branch of the transnational Niger Basin Authority. Created in
2002 as national answer to the ill-functioning of the transnational Niger Basin Authority,
it is dedicated to the preservation of the Niger River, its water resources and banks. It
is an entity of the Malian government and reports to the Minister of Environment and
Sanitation. It never managed, however, to play an important role in the development of
water resources.
The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries,
once together now separate, have little weight in water policy making but they have the
competence to plan fish ponds and minor crop irrigation infrastructure in rural areas.
They can count on the following national directorates: Agriculture, Rural Engineering,
Livestock, and Fisheries. These services are also decentralized to the regions, cercles and,
sometimes, municipalities.
The Regulatory Commission of Water and Electricity was created in 2000,
42
3.2. Second site: the Inner Niger Delta in Mali
in conjunction with a liberalization of the water and electricity market in urban areas, to
play the role of watchdog of the water and energy market. It checks whether the laws and
norms are followed up, it defends the interests of users and controls the quality of public
service. it approves and controls the prices, and it is an arbiter in disputes. Although
its powers extend, by law, to all urban centers, in practice they are limited to the areas
where the national utility company EDM is operating.
The Cell for Planning and Statistics (CPS) of the Water Sector, Environment,
and Urban and State Areas was established in 2007. The main tasks assigned to the CPS
are: the coordination of national plans, programs and projects; forecasting and monitor-
ing the environment and the economy; keep track of funding and technical cooperation;
coordinate the production of statistical information. The CPS has developed the Sectoral
Program for Water and Sanitation (PROSEA), which is conceived to be the overarching
framework for all donors active in the water and sanitation sector.
The acronym TFP (Technical and Financial Partners) is commonly used to
refer to all external (international) development actors, from donors over multilateral
agencies to private consultants. Ninety percent of investment costs in the water sector
(water management, drinking water supply, sanitation) are covered by the TFPs (DNH,
2008). Table 3.3 gives an idea of the number of multilateral and bilateral TFPs active
in the water sector in Mali. Apart from these organizations, an estimated 200 NGOs are
also active in Mali’s water sector (MMEE, 2006). Only 35% of the investments in the
water sector are channeled through DNH (DNH, 2008).
3.2.2 The Inner Niger Delta in Mali
The Inner Niger Delta (or Delta Inte´rieur du Niger in French), abbreviated as IND, is
situated in the middle of Mali’s Sahel zone, at the confluence of the Niger river and
the Bani river. During and immediately after the rainy season, the two rivers flood a
vast landlocked floodplain, giving shape the largest inland wetland in West Africa and the
second largest in Africa (after the Okavanga Delta in Botswana). The wetland, composed
of small rivers, lakes, floodplains, and islands, extends over 390 km, from Djenne´ in the
south to Timbuktu in the north, with the river port town Mopti in between.
The rainy season in Mali’s Sahel zone starts in May and peaks in August. The rise of
the water level in the IND is somewhat delayed; it starts in June and peaks in September.
In this period, the water level can rise up to 10cm per day. Depending on the amount
of rainfall during the wet season, the water levels rise between 4 and 6 m with respect
to the water level in the dry season. The flooded area during the wet season can exceed
35,000 km2 but can also be as little as 8,000 - 10,000 km2. Around November/December
the water level is decreasing already at its fastest pace, around 3-5 cm per day. Towards
the end of the dry season, i.e. May, the permanent wet area shrivels to less than 4,000 km2.
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This cyclic expansion and retraction of the river is essential to the ecosystem in the
IND as well as to the economic activities of the one million people living here. The natural
richness sustains a population density that is much higher than that of the surrounding
Sahel. It is not a coincidence that the big West African empires of the V to XVI centuries
(the Ghana, Mali, and Songhai empires) emerged around the IND (Benjaminsen and Ba,
2008).
In this area, all uses of water are intimately intertwined. The water in the IND
sustains the unique ecosystem and the economic activity of the inhabitants of the IND.
The management of water is regulated by different governmental decision making levels
as well as the customary rules set by the Diina. This equilibrium of balanced uses and
intertwined regulatory bodies, however, is put under pressure by population growth,
Mali’s need for energy (from hydropower), and climatic changes.
Ecosystem After the three lakes Horo, Se´ri, and De´bo had already been separately
protected as Ramsar sites10 in 1987, the entire IND has been designated as Ramsar site
in 2004. The area houses an exceptionally high number of unique animal and plant
species, many of which are adapted to the seasonal fluctuations of the water level.
The Delta is a habitual stopover for more than 350 different types of migratory birds.
Each year more than 1 million birds come from more than 80 countries to use the delta.
The Delta is also exceptionally rich of fish. Of the at least 138 different species that have
been counted in the Delta, at least 24 are endemic, meaning that their world distribution
is limited to the IND itself (MEA, 2010).
People and livelihoods In the collective memory of the IND inhabitants, the different
ethnic groups (each with a different culture, language, and traditional livelihood activity,
see Table 3.5) have for centuries shared the natural resources in the IND in harmony
(Zwarts et al., 2005; Benjaminsen and Ba, 2008). Before the rainy season starts, the
semi-nomadic Fula herders leave the Delta with their cattle and move to the northeast
and northwest. At the start of the rainy season in May-June, just before the area is
covered by the Niger water, the sedentary ethnic groups, such as the Rima¨ıbe´, Marka,
Bambara, and Sonrai, plant rice inside their soon-to-be-flooded paddies and plant millet
in the non-submersed areas. The Fula herders re-enter the IND with their cattle in
November-December, when the water starts to retreat, in order to graze on the green
flood-plains, where the semi-nomadic Bozo and Somono fishermen had been fishing for
some months. At that time, however, rice is still to be harvested, so the herds follow well
established corridors through the Delta. After the harvest is over, many young men of
10The international Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, commonly known as the
Ramsar Convention, is an international treaty for the conservation and sustainable utilization of wetlands
(Ramsar, 2012). It is named after the town of Ramsar in Iran where the treaty was signed in 1971.
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Ethnic groups activity sedentary/nomadic %
Bozo, Somono fishermen semi-nomadic 30%
Rima¨ıbe´, Songhai (or Sonrai), Marka, Bambara farmers sedentary 30%
Fula (or Fulani, FulBe, Peul, Pheul) herders semi-nomadic 40%
Source: (Zwarts et al., 2005)
Table 3.5: Ethnic groups and traditional economic activities in the IND
the sedentary groups leave their villages to find a seasonal job in the urban centers, while
the women continue horticultural activities during the dry season (Zwarts et al., 2005).
In this traditional system the ethnic groups produce complementary elements of the
daily diet for the different peoples in the delta. The produce is intensively exchanged
through local trade, for example in the port of Mopti.
This traditional scheme is changing. Partially because of the Great Drought in the
1970s and 1980s (see Table 3.3), but also because of population growth and immigration,
new mixed professions have emerged, such as agro-pastoralism and agro-fishery (Zwarts
et al., 2005).
The Diina The various Fula kingdoms that ruled the Inner Delta for centuries (from
the XVII to the XIX century) instituted a system of resource management, of which
the Fula are traditionally in charge. Noble sedentary Fula chiefs, called the jowros, each
controlled a leyde or land unit. They conceded parts of the land to subordinate ethnic
groups for agricultural activities (Cotula and Cisse´, 2006; Benjaminsen and Ba, 2008).
In 1818 Fula clergymen conquered the Delta under the leadership of Seku Amadu
(Cheikou Amadou) and established an Islamic theocratic state, the Diina. The Diina
formalized the existing natural resources management. The Fula jowros were granted
authority over the leyde; the use of the pastural floodplains was defined; entry routes for
the livestock were traced throughout the Delta. The Fula herders that wanted to use
the floodplains for grazing were to pay a fee to the jowros. The Rima¨ıbe´, a subordinate
ethnic group of farmers, obtained the control of the agricultural land, which was conceded
to them by the jowros. The jowros nevertheless remained in charge of the entire leyde
(Cotula and Cisse´, 2006; Benjaminsen and Ba, 2008).
The French maintained the natural resources management of the Diina. Some jowros,
for instance, became chefs de canton. After independence in 1960 the State started to
build its own centralized administration with technical services. This centralized manage-
ment weakened the traditional system of leyde-based resource management. The process
of administrative decentralization, initiated in the early 1990s, which delegates many
policy making competences in natural resources management to the lower governmental
levels, can be considered as an attempt to integrate the traditional management into
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modern legislation. This integration is not without conflicts, between the different ruling
bodies and between the different ethnic groups (Benjaminsen and Ba, 2008).
In fact, the power of jowros in the IND is increasingly contested and undermined.
To some they are still the legitimate, customary managers of pastureland in the IND.
To others they are aristocratic profiteers that make impressive amounts of money from
nothing more than selling grazing rights. Reconciling the jowros ’ customary power with
the newly acquired power of the decentralized governments will be critical for the sus-
tainable and equitable management of natural resources in the IND and the success of
the decentralization process (Cotula and Cisse´, 2006).
Drinking water and sanitation Despite the abundance of water in the region, many
inhabitants of the IND still lack access to safe drinking water. Many rely on surface water
as source of drinking water, exposing them to the risks of water-borne or water-related
diseases. On average 60% of the IND inhabitants have access to an improved source of
drinking water, while in the remote municipalities this number is as low as 20% (MEA,
2010).
The access to improved sanitation (such as latrines) is relatively high in the urban
centers, but is estimated to be as low as 5% in the rural municipalities (MEA, 2010). This
absence of improved sanitation directly impinges upon the quality of the vast bodies of
stagnant water in the IND during and after the rainy season.
In fact, choosing the right type and location of latrines in the IND is not an easy
matter, because large parts of the villages are flooded during several months of the year.
Moreover, also during the rest of the year the top groundwater layers are very close to
the surface, making the risk of groundwater contamination very real.
Pressures The water and natural resources in the IND have come under pressure from
various sides. First, the traditional rulers of the common pool resources have been partly
replaced by the decentralized governments (such as the municipality). This has the
former pushed to vehemently (and legally) fight their customary claims on the resources
(Benjaminsen and Ba, 2008), in a context where hybrids of both customary and statutory
norms are emerging (Cotula and Cisse´, 2006).
Second, the IND has witnessed a considerable influx of people and a power shift
from herding to farming interests. This has put more pressure on land ownership, on
the repartition of land for pastural purposes and for agricultural purposes, and on the
respect of the established livestock corridors throughout the IND (Benjaminsen and Ba,
2008).
Third, the water level (and hence the flooded area) is partially controlled by the
Se´lengue´ and Markala dams. In dry years the flood area is 13% lower than the natural
area would be, due to the amount of water retained or deviated by the two existing dams
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(Zwarts, 2010). The construction of two more dams upstream of the IND is planned: on
the Niger river in Fomi, and on the Bani river in Djenne´. If also these dams would be
constructed, the flooded area would shink by more than 50%, with obviously significant
impacts on both the environment and the one million people living in the IND (Zwarts,
2010).
Fourth, since four decades a significant increase in average temperature and decrease
in rainfall has been observed (see Figure 3.3). Historical data (from the Great Drought,
amongst others) have shown that a decrease of 20% in rainfall in the Sahel region led to
a decline of the flood extent in the IND of about 60% (Zwarts, 2010). Hence, increas-
ing temperatures and decreasing rainfall —the general tendency that is being witnessed
now— would have severe impacts for the ecosystem and economic activities in the IND.
Aid to the water sector in the IND Despite the abundant natural resources, the
rural municipalities of the IND remain amongst the poorest in Mali (MEA, 2010). Nu-
merous TFPs intervene in the water sector in the IND, in order to support the munic-
ipalities in the construction of drinking water and sanitation infrastructure: the World
Bank (through the National Program for Rural Infrastructure—PNIR), the French De-
velopment Agency (AFD), the African Development Bank (AfDB), UNDP (through the
Project of Support to the Rural Municipalities—PACR), and the national ANICT fund.
International NGOs also support the municipalities in constructing water wells and la-
trines: World Vision, WaNGO (through the IWRMIND project), Save the Children, and
many other smaller initiatives.
Other TFPs support the management of water and natural resources, such as the
World Bank (through the Niger River Basin project), the Netherlands (Program for
Sustainable Development in the IND—PDD-DIN), or IUCN.
3.2.3 Six municipalities and six villages in the IND
WaNGO intervenes in Mali since 1994 and in the IND since 1997. It started a large-
scale program in the IND in 2004, called IWRMIND, to support the municipalities in
water management and in the supply of drinking water. The first and second phase of
IWRMIND (2004-2007) included 4 municipalities, the third phase (2007-2010) 14 munic-
ipalities, and the current fourth phase (2011-2013) targets 18 municipalities.
Six municipalities in the IND were selected for further scrutiny (see Table 3.6). All
six were partner in the third phase of WaNGO’s IWRMIND project. The municipal
councils of the six municipalities were interviewed (5 focus group discussions with 4-7
council members; in 1 case an interview with only the mayor).
Also the villagers of six villages in those municipalities—one village per municipality—
were interviewed (6 focus group discussions with 4-10 villagers). Three of these villages
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were not involved in the IWRMIND project, the three other villages were involved in
IWRMIND (see Table 3.7). The details (date and place) of the focus group discussions
are given in Appendix D.
Municipality Ouroube´-Doude´ The municipality is located in the north of the Mopti
cercle, between lake De´bo and lake Korientze. Only a small part of the municipality —the
part between the Niger river and the ‘Koli Koli’ arm of the Niger— is flooded during the
wet season. The small municipality is home to 12,200 inhabitants, who live in 9 villages.
The population is composed of a majority of Fula pastoralists and Rima¨ıbe´ farmers,
followed by Bozo, Marka and Bambara.
Village De`ra-Sedengue´ in Ouroube´-Doude´ Sitting on the eastern bank of the Niger
river, immediately south of lake De´bo, the village is completely flooded during the wet
season. It has a population of nearly 1,900 people, of which the majority is Bambara or
Fula. The village is said to be founded by Bambara settlers, which is very uncommon so
far up north in the country. Nearly half of the population makes a living from fishery.
Rice cultivation and animal husbandry are the second and third economic activity.
Municipality Konna This municipality in the northeast of the Mopti cercle, south of
Ouroube´-Doude´, has 34,700 inhabitants in 28 villages. Two-thirds of the municipality is
located in the inundated IND. It is the second most important economic center in the
Mopti cercle, after the town Mopti itself.
Village Takoutala in Konna This small village has a population of 500, principally
composed of two ethnic groups: the Fula pastoralists and the subaltern Rima¨ıbe´ farmers.
The village is situated on the dry eastern bank of the IND, which makes it 100% rain-
dependent rather than river-dependent. Around 70% of the revenue of the village derives
from animal husbandry, the rest from rain-fed agriculture.
Municipality in cercle targeted by WaNGO activity TFPs
2004-6 2006-7 2007-11 water sector
Ouroube´-Doude´ Mopti no no yes medium
Konna Mopti no no yes medium
Socoura Mopti yes yes yes high
Soye´ Mopti yes yes yes high
Togue´-Mourrari Djenne´ no no yes high
Ke´wa Djenne´ yes yes yes low
TFPs = external Technical and Financial Partners
Table 3.6: The six selected municipalities and some characteristics
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Figure 3.4: The six selected municipalities and their position in the Inner Niger Delta.
Village in municipality majority targeted by WaNGO activity TFPs
ethnic group(s) 2006-7 2007-11 water sector
De`ra-Sedengue´ Ouroube´-Doude´ Bambara, Fula no no none
Takoutala Konna Fula, Rima¨ıbe´ no no none
N’Gomi Socoura Bozo, Fula yes no none since 2010
Soye´ Soye´ Fula, Rima¨ıbe´ yes yes WaNGO
Mourrah Togue´-Mourrari Fula no yes WaNGO
Para-Bozo Ke´wa Bozo no yes WaNGO
TFPs = external Technical and Financial Partners
Table 3.7: The selected villages in each of the six municipalities
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Municipality Socoura Socoura is the large rural municipality that surrounds Mopti
and Se´vare´. The latter two cities constitute the urban municipality of Mopti, which is an
enclave in the municipality of Socoura (see Figure 3.4). The Socoura municipality houses
45,500 inhabitants in 28 villages. Exactly half of the villages are located on inundated
grounds, the other half on dry grounds. Due to the proximity to the large city of Mopti,
the population is very heterogeneous, and includes people from Fula, Diawanbe´, Rima¨ıbe´,
Bozo, Marka, Bambara, Dogon and Bobo descent. The primary economic activities are
rice cultivation in the wet areas, horticulture in the dry areas, and animal husbandry.
Fishing and forest exploitation are secondary activities.
Village N’Gomi in Socoura The village is located in the south of the municipality,
hence south of Mopti, on the bank of the Niger river. It is roughly divided in two
neighborhoods: one of the Bozo fishermen and the other of the Fula pastoralists. Both
groups are semi-nomadic, with the Bozo trying their luck in lake De´bo in the northern part
of the IND during the dry season, and the pastoralists moving to drier parts of the IND
during the wet season. The principal economic activities of the village are agriculture,
fishery and animal husbandry. N’Gomi is relatively well equipped as far as infrastructure
is concerned (sanitary and educational centers, small sewerage system, drinking water
wells).
Municipality Soye´ The municipality is located south of Mopti, between the Niger
river and Bani river. It is almost entirely flooded during the wet season, with the villages
becoming islands. The bourgou grass thrives in the floodplains. Therefore, the soil use
in the municipality is dominated by pastures and livestock corridors. It has a population
of about 20,700 inhabitants in 26 villages.
Village Soye´ in the municipality Soye´ The village is the administrative center of
the Soye´ municipality and counts 2000 inhabitants. It is a cosmopolitan village inhabited
by a majority of Fula, but most other ethnic groups of the IND are represented.
Municipality Togue´-Mourrari The municipality is located in the extreme northern
part of the Djenne´ cercle, above the Niger river, deep in the IND. Therefore, during
six months, this municipality is only accessible over water. This small municipality has
around 7,500 inhabitants in 11 villages. The population is composed of Fula pastoral-
ists, Bozo fishermen, as well as Marka farmers. The principal activity, for 70% of the
population, is agriculture, mostly rice cultivation.
Village Mourrah in Togue´-Mourrari Mourrah is the administrative center of the
municipality. The village makes a living of rice cultivation, livestock husbandry, as well
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as fishing.
Municipality Ke´wa The municipality is located in the northern part of the Djenne´
cercle, between the Niger and Bani rivers. It has over 24,000 inhabitants living in 16
villages. The vast majority of the population makes a living of fishing, as the principal
ethnic groups are the Somonos followed by the Bozos. The rest of the population are
mostly farmers that cultivate rice.
Village Para-Bozo in Ke´wa The village is located in the north of the municipality,
deep in the IND, between the Niger and Bani rivers. Like the rest of the municipality,
the majority (80%) of the villagers makes a living of fishing.
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3.3 Third site: headquarters of a multilateral orga-
nization
The third participant observation was conducted at the headquarters (Global Secretariat)
of the Global Water Partnership (GWP). GWP is an network organization that advocates
IWRM worldwide, through its network of numerous water organizations (governmental,
non-governmental, and private). The World Bank, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) took
the initiative to found GWP in 1996, four years after the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro,
where the need for Integrated Water Resources Management was explicitly inscribed in
the Rio action plan Agenda 21.
From 1996 to 2011, over 2500 water organizations in nearly all countries in the world
have adhered to the network of GWP, and 80 Country Water Partnerships (CWPs) and
13 Regional Water Partnerships (RWPs) have been created (GWP, 2011). Since the
foundation of GWP in 1996, the headquarters have always been housed by SIDA in
Stockholm. In the framework of the multi-sited ethnography, a participant observation
was carried out during 2011 at the Global Secretariat of GWP in Stockholm.
Identity of GWP Network organizations like GWP are another growing force in the
development sector. On the one hand, Perkin and Court (2005) and Ramalingam (2011)
remark that network organizations are eagerly embraced by donors and development
agencies to deliver aid interventions. On the other hand, NGOs as well as private busi-
nesses have discovered the strengths of network organizations for collective advocacy
(Hearn and Mendizabal, 2011).
Put simply, the term ‘network organization’ indicates the formal or informal organi-
zational structure that links actors (individuals or organisations) who share a common
interest on a specific issue or who share a general set of values (Perkin and Court, 2005).
Network organizations have been categorized as semi-structured alternative to (unstruc-
tured) markets at one extreme, and (strictly structured) hierarchic organizations at the
other extreme (Powell, 1990; Perkin and Court, 2005; Hearn and Mendizabal, 2011).
In effect, the identity of GWP is not unequivocal. Their website states that GWP
was founded by the World Bank, UNDP, and SIDA to foster IWRM (GWP, 2012). The
executive secretary of the Global Secretariat prefers to present GWP as a knowledge dis-
semination network.11 The different strategic partners and various RWPs and CWPs give
weight to other roles. A number of RWPs and CWPs, as well as the World Bank, praise
GWP for offering a discussion forum at national and regional level where heterogeneous
actors can meet to discuss water in a “neutral environment”12. The International Water
11Stated during the annual conference, 18-19 August 2011
12ibid.
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Management Institute appreciates GWP for its role as “bridge between research and pol-
icy making”,13 whereas the International Fund for Agricultural Development considers
the CWPs to be “watchdogs” that keep governmental policy making in check.14
Structure Although the Global Secretariat in Stockholm contends that the global net-
work is horizontal and not hierarchical, in practice the CWPs almost exclusively interact
with their respective RWPs and rarely with the Global Secretariat.15
The Global Secretariat is very active in the multilateral sphere. Their everyday inter-
locutors are the donors, multilateral agencies, and other global network organizations.16
Although independent from the UN system, GWP is accredited as inter-governmental or-
ganization by a number of UN entities (e.g. by the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Changes—UNFCCC), and acts as such in various international forums. The
headquarters are connected to the local level (the CWPs) exclusively through the 13
RWPs, with which they engage at a daily basis.
The RWPs are very present at the regional policy making level (e.g. the ‘West African’
level or ‘Southern African’ level) and intensively interact with regional intergovernmental
bodies such as regional economic unions (e.g. ECOWAS or SADC) and regional devel-
opment banks (e.g. AfDB). The regional offices are in close contact with the CWPs.
The national CWPs functions as a forum for all actors active in the national water sec-
tor. The national networks manage to influence the national water policies with varying
success. Each national CWP office manages its own pool of member organizations.
The day-to-day activities of the global network are managed by the Global Secre-
tariat, but the long-term strategic decisions are taken by a Steering Committee, which is
composed of 12 water professionals that are active in other governmental and intergov-
ernmental agencies. Moreover, permanent observers from the World Bank, UNDP, the
World Water Council (WWC) and one of the donors also sit in this Steering Committee.
Besides this Steering Committee, GWP can also count on a Technical Committee,
composed of 10 renowned water academics and water professionals, for technical assis-
tance. The Technical Committee publishes background papers, policy briefs, technical
briefs, and perspective papers to bring scientific knowledge closer to practice and to
translate local experiences in global knowledge.
Operational strategies During 2011, the year in which the observations took place,
the Global Secretariat was developing operational strategies concerning ‘Adaptation to
Climate Change’ and ‘Food Security’ for internal use. Strategies on ‘Transboundary
Cooperation’ and ‘Urbanization’ were also planned.
13ibid.
14ibid.
15Observed, May 2011 - September 2011
16Ibid.
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Funding Despite its vast network and global outreach, GWP has a relatively small
budget. In 2010 the global headquarter received AC7.3 million of funding from 9 European
governments and the European Commission. Twenty-one percent was designated to
specific projects while the remaining 79% was non-earmarked funding. Regionally and
locally GWP raised another 1.0 million euro.
This discrepancy between small budget and large outreach can be explained in a
number of ways. First, GWP is a knowledge and advocacy organization —it does not
finance infrastructure. Second, only the global headquarter and the 13 regional offices are
financially supported by this budget. Third, the network receives an inestimable amount
of in kind contributions from the 2400 member organizations worldwide, in the form of





In his Epistemological Explorations, Jeremy Gould vents his view on the sense and need
of conducting ethnographies of development aid—or what he calls ‘aidnographies’. Since
his authority and eloquence surpass mine by far, I quote him at length (Gould, 2008,
p.6-8), as an interlude:
“I, [Jeremy Gould,] try and maintain some belief or hope that our science can contribute
to greater social, economic and political justice. This has become increasingly difficult.
Having been actively involved in ‘development’ for more than 25 years, I must say I
am disappointed. I am certainly not alone in this — there is a whole army of scholars,
politicians and activists who have made a career of their disappointments in development:
in the asymmetries of North South relations; in the way ‘development’ always seems to
privilege the haves over the have-nots, men over women; in the way Southern governments
have squandered aid and that Northern governments and the international agencies they
command have used aid to further their geo-politically and commercial interests, and so
on. I share many of these sentiments; indeed, I find my self increasingly impatient, even
angry about the complacency and arrogance with which the captains of the aid industry
perpetrate the disappointing institutions and practices of ‘development’ from one failure
to the next: from the failure of technology transfer through the disaster of structural
adjustment and onto the imminent implosion of poverty reduction and the MDGs.
But my disappointment is also of a different nature. In a way, it’s a self-disappoint-
ment; a recognition of our collective intellectual failure to lay bare the essence of ‘devel-
opment’ — i.e., to expose the logic underlying this perverse paradox of institutionalised
complacency and arrogance in the wake of incessant failure — and to make this knowledge
accessible for shared analysis and political contestation. [. . . ]
My real disappointment is not about behaving (ir)responsibly, but about our failure
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to transcend an ‘embedded’ perspective on development and to find a means to think
consistently outside development. This implies transcending the apparatus’ own intrinsic
demands to analyze and assess development on the basis of its own self-image, in terms
of its own normatively and politically constituted ambitions. To think like a development
native, one is incessantly drawn into efforts to make what one does look successful and
conducive to incremental improvement.
This problem goes to the heart of the matter. It is incredibly difficult to speak from
a rich empirical familiarity of the institutions and practices of development without suc-
cumbing to the temptation to engage in debates about how to make it work better. This
is, I suspect, because at its core the development apparatus is self-referential. It appears
to be about ‘developing’ external objects (poor economies, deprived actors), but in fact,







Introducing the empirical articles
The following four chapters report the empirical data of the research. The qualitative
data was collected from various sources: three participant observations, interviews, focus
group discussions and documents. The data collection and analysis followed the Grounded
Theory Method (as in Charmaz, 2006, see also chapter 9). Faithful to this method, the
inquiry started with no particular theory nor a clear delineation of the field in mind.
From the onset, however, the research focused on development aid in the water sector.
As the first participant observation (at the headquarters of WaNGO) proceeded, three
paradigms emerged as interesting lines for further inquiry: (i) ‘Integrated Water Re-
sources Management’ (IWRM) as best practice, (ii) ‘Capacity Building’ as mode to de-
liver the aid, (iii) ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’. These paradigms were ‘followed’ into
two other but connected sites. During the data collection and analysis, however, ‘Adap-
tation to Climate Change’ was gradually abandoned as separate paradigm, and was only
considered in relation with IWRM.
‘IWRM’ is defined by its principal advocate, the Global Water Partnership (GWP),
as “a process that promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land
and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP,
2000a). The paradigm recognizes that water is key to different and often competing goals:
human health, food production,economic development, and environmental sustainability.
Therefore, the paradigm advocates a cross-sectoral management of water resources as well
as a vertical integration of different decision-making levels (GWP, 2000a; Conca, 2006).
Numerous scholars have observed that over the past two decades the IWRM paradigm has
attained a hegemonic status in water policy making and management worldwide (Conca,
2006; Saravanan et al., 2009; Orlove and Caton, 2010). Over 80% of countries worldwide
now have the IWRM principles in their water laws and two thirds have developed a
national IWRM plan (UN-Water, 2011).
‘Capacity’ is defined by OECD-DAC as “the ability of people, organizations and soci-
ety as a whole to manage their affairs successfully” (2006, p.12). OECD-DAC emphasizes
that this definition avoids any judgment on the objectives that the people choose to pur-
sue, and on what counts as successful management. ‘Capacity building’, then, is “the
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process whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create,
adapt and maintain capacity over time” (ibid., p.12). UNDP uses a very similar defini-
tion (UNDP, 2009, p.5). The capacity building discourse entered the development sector
in the early 1990s as an explicit opposition to the technological determinism underlying
Technical Assistance (TA) (Berg and Seymour Whitaker, 1993; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002).
By the turn of the millennium the most forward-looking agencies had already raised CB
to a priority status (Lafontaine, 2000). Capacity building has now become one of the
leading paradigms in current development practice (Ku¨hl, 2009).
Each of the four empirical articles in this Part II engages with one of the selected
paradigms, but each article uses slightly different theoretical perspectives for the report-
ing of the data. These different perspectives mirror the different stages that the data
collection and analysis went through (see Table 4.1 below, as well as chapter 9). The first
of four empirical articles, chapter 5, takes a genealogical approach and is based on archive
data. The subsequent articles (chapters 6, 7, and 8) take an actor-oriented approach and
rely on the entire corpus of data, which consisted of 13 months of participant observation
at three different sites, 21 focus group discussions, 47 interviews, and over 50 reports and
policy documents. The details (such as data and place) of the observations, interviews,
and focus discussions are listed in Appendix D.































Table 4.1: Theoretical approaches and main data sources of the four empirical chapters.
The different theoretical approaches do not contradict each other, but add richness to
the reporting of the data. In fact, the evolution in the four articles reflects the evolution
in the grounded theorizing, which was exclusively based on the collected data, and an evo-
lution in the level of articulation. I am not alone in arguing that one social phenomenon
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can be explained by means of different theories or theoretical concepts. Stinchcombe
(1968), for instance, argues that the social scientist “should be aware of, and capable of
applying, several different theoretical perspectives—not just a single one.” I elaborate my
own view on this in the reflexive chapter 9.
Concretely, the first empirical article (chapter 5) probes the origins of a paradigm shift,
by having a closer look at the emergence of the ‘Capacity Building’ paradigm. If this
paradigm is interpreted as an opposition to the technological determinism ingrained in
traditional Technical Cooperation —as argued by the proponents of Capacity Building
themselves— Capacity Building can be considered as the latest offspring of an age-long
genealogy of discussions on the role of knowledge and technology in development. In fact,
chapter 5 shows that the genealogy of these discussions dates back to the Enlightenment.
Moreover, at any moment in history, more deterministic and less deterministic interpreta-
tions have existed along each other, with the sequence of development paradigms swinging
back and forth between both extremes. Capacity Building is, hence, no more than the
latest non-deterministic paradigm concerning the role of knowledge and technology in
development.
As is the case with Capacity Building, new development paradigms are usually pre-
sented as the thaumaturgic successor of a previous failing paradigm —with failure usually
being attributed either to the misconception of the previous paradigm, or to a gap be-
tween the original paradigm and its practical implementation. In the case of Capacity
Building, the failing predecessor was Technical Assistance. This dichotomized image of
the paradigm and its implementation as two monolithic and separate entities is unten-
able. In fact, the ethnographic data adduced in the third article (chapter 6) shows
how the Capacity Building paradigm is interpreted differently at various points in the
development network —from the donor to the rural municipalities in Mali’s Inner Niger
Delta. The link between the donor and the Malian municipalities exist only by virtue
of numerous mediators and intermediaries that, perforce, interpret the paradigm differ-
ently. Therefore, it is hard to claim that there exists a ‘gap’. Moreover, all actors actively
translate the new paradigm according to their own interests, in order to reaffirm the own
position in the network and in order to reproduce the network. Hence, the paradigm
stands or falls with the integrity of the network.
The third empirical article (chapter 7) is the first of two articles to have a closer
look at the IWRM paradigm. Definitely moving away from the idea that paradigms
have an overpowering and disembodied discursive power, this article highlights the role
of individual agency in the deployment of a paradigm. Taking the introduction of the
IWRM paradigm in Burkina Faso (in 1996) and Mali (in 2004) as entry point, the article
describes the interplay between national policy entrepreneurs, international organizations,
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and structural constraints in the shaping of the IWRM-inspired water policy reforms
in the two countries. Despite the apparent uniformity of the IWRM paradigm, the
qualitative comparison of the policy change process in the two countries shows that the
reforms, as well as the national ‘ownership’ of these reforms, are significantly distinct.
The idiosyncrasies of the reform dynamics and ownership largely depend on the agency
displayed by individual policy entrepreneurs.
The last empirical article (chapter 8) traces the network of actors that sustained the
emergence of the IWRM paradigm in the multilateral sphere two decades ago and the
implementation of IWRM in Mali through governmental and non-governmental develop-
ment aid. The article displays the most advanced level of theorizing in the dissertation,
as it found inspiration in Actor-Network Theory to describe how actors enroll each other
in an alliance that makes the paradigm work. Non-human actors —e.g. the typical aid
financing mechanism, the Dublin Principles, the organization GWP, or the Niger river—
have proven to be important anchorage points for the alliance. Yet, the alliance that once
was so strong, seems to be disintegrating now, and actors are compelled to renegotiate
IWRM by drawing in ‘climate change’. In resonance with Chapter 6, Actor-Network
Theory proves helpful in showing that the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the paradigm depends
on the strength of the alliance, not the strength of the paradigm.
All chapters in Part II were originally conceived as stand-alone articles (some of which





determinism in development aid
discourses
We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sen-
timent, particularly the noblest and most disinterested,
has a history.
Michel Foucault — Nietzsche, Genealogy, History
5.1 Introduction
Point four of president Harry Truman’s inaugural address, pronounced on 20 January
1949 in front of the US congress, has been indicated by many scholars as emblematic mile
stone in —or even starting point of— international development cooperation.1 Truman
(1949) stated the following:
we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of un-
derdeveloped areas. [. . . ] For the first time in history, humanity possesses the
knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people.
Nearly half a century later the World Bank published the 1998/1999 World Development
Report, entitled Knowledge for Development. The report opened with this statement:
Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can easily travel the world,
enlightening the lives of people everywhere. Yet billions of people still live in the
darkness of poverty unnecessarily. [. . . ] Poor countries —and poor people— differ
1Although laden with different connotations, ‘development aid’ and ‘development cooperation’ are
used interchangeably in this article.
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from rich ones not only because they have less capital but because they have less
knowledge. Knowledge is often costly to create, and that is why much of it is
created in industrial countries. But developing countries can acquire knowledge
overseas as well as create their own at home. (World Bank, 1998, p.1)
Although half a century lies in between the two statements, the similarities are striking.
Both quotes display an unconditional trust in Western-like scientific and technological
knowledge.
This article does not involve itself in the post-colonial debate about a presumed West-
ern cognitive hegemony (as in Escobar, 1995; Mehta, 2001; Anderson, 2002; To¨bbe Go-
nalves, 2006). Instead, it scrutinizes the Western idea that ‘development’ and ‘develop-
ment aid’ are related, in some way or another, to ‘knowledge’ and ‘technology’. A brief
genealogy lays bare, first, that knowledge and technology (K&T) have always been inte-
grally part of the very idea of ‘development’, ever since the emergence of this Western
concept during Enlightenment. Second, the genealogy shows that the entire history of
‘development cooperation’ is characterized by a long struggle of trying to find the right
role for K&T in development. Many different and conflicting roles have been allotted
to knowledge or to technology for the sake of development, with deterministic and less
deterministic interpretations often existing along each other.
Before sketching the genealogy in the third section, I first introduce the terms ‘tech-
nological determinism’ and ‘technology transfer’, and define the new term ‘epistemic
determinism’. These concepts are used in the fourth section to analyze the genealogy.
5.2 From Technological to Epistemic Determinism
5.2.1 Technological determinism
The widespread idea that technological advances would be a major driver of social change
is called ‘technological determinism’. Scholars agree that a full-blown technological de-
terminism ideology is composed of two different but complementary ideas (Kline, 2001;
Wyatt, 2008). The first idea is that technology would evolve independently from society,
following its own inherent, uni-linear, incremental logic. The second idea is that this
technological change would drive —or determine— social change.
Despite its discursive omnipresence, historians and sociologists of science and technol-
ogy have demonstrated that the ideology of technological determinism does not mirror
reality (Bijker, 1995; Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2008). The ideology has been described as
“intellectually poor and politically debilitating” (Bijker, 2010, p.71). Indeed, there does
not exist a unidirectional causal link between technological change and social change —as
technological determinism suggests— nor does technology develop along its own inherent
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goal-directed path. Society and technology co-evolve in an intimate, but complex, way
(Bijker, 2010).
5.2.2 Technology transfer
If technology intimately evolves with society, and technological change does not produce
social change in an unequivocal way, then the transfer of technology from one social
context —say, the Western world— to a completely different social context —say, a
country in the Global South— in order to prompt some kind of social change —say,
‘development’— is also very problematic. Again, two sub-ideas underlie the technology
transfer ideology. First, it supposes that technology can be detached from its social
context and can be re-implemented without much trouble in a new context. Second, it
assumes that a technology, implemented in a new social context, will recreate the same
social and economic configurations (e.g. ‘economic development’) as in the original social
context.
Again, these assumptions have proven to be unrealistic. The idea that technology can
unproblematically be transferred has been criticized in various ways: first, for overlook-
ing the importance of the tacit knowledge component (Rosenberg, 1970; Reber, 1993),
second, for underestimating the social, cultural and organizational barriers that hamper
the transfer (Argyris and Scho¨n, 1978; Carlile, 2004), and third, for being insensible to
social justice (Visvanathan, 2001).
5.2.3 Epistemic determinism
Since all knowledge —everyday knowledge, technological knowledge, and even scien-
tific knowledge— is produced and reproduced by humans, social scientists now generally
agree that knowledge is necessarily partial and profoundly embedded in its specific so-
cial context. This idea was already present in the work of nineteenth century continental
philosophers, such as Nietzsche, who rejected the possibility of a non-perspectival knowing
subject (Nietzche, 1967 [1887]). After the post-modern turn, Donna Haraway’s concept
of ‘situated knowledge’ found most resonance (Haraway, 1988). As a result, claims of uni-
versality in knowledge production are now considered naive, and where they do appear,
these claims can be deconstructed as strategies that seek to overrule other perspectives
(Foucault, 1980; Thompson, 2001).
In analogy with technological determinism, ‘epistemic determinism’ can be defined as
the two-headed ideology that (i) knowledge is an immaterial good that can be detached
from the social context, and (ii) that this immaterial good can be transferred, without
much effort, to another social context where it will have similar meanings and effects as
in the original social reality.
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Whereas technological determinism does not acknowledge that technology and society
co-evolve, epistemic determinism does not recognize that all knowledge is situated. In the
rest of the article, knowledge and technology —and by extension the transfer of knowledge
and the transfer of technology— will be treated as two closely related concepts (K&T).
5.3 A genealogy of K&T in development
The following genealogy highlights the principal historical invocations and manipulations
of K&T for the sake of development. It is not an account of a continuous evolution
towards ‘better practices’. Instead, following the Nietzschean-Foucauldian tradition, it
pays attention to parallel discourses, overturns in vocabulary, and the external forces at
work in these changes (Foucault, 1991b).
Enlightenment
The genealogy of K&T in/for development is closely related to that of the ‘development’
idea itself. ‘Development’ seems a universal feature of nature and human nature, and
therefore it is believed to be isomorphically applicable to societies and economies. Noth-
ing, however, is further from the truth. The idea of ‘development’ as socio-economic,
uni-linear, cumulative and unlimited phenomenon, is the brainchild of a Western world
view that emerged during Enlightenment (Escobar, 1995; Rist, 1996). It is closely related
to the enlightened view on ‘knowledge’.
Classical philosophers such as Aristotle saw nature as cyclic, developing through the
stages of birth, growth, decline and death, without ever reaching the perfect state. Chris-
tianity and Saint Augustine linearized growth and added a telos to development: every-
thing was believed to develop according God’s plan towards the inevitable end of the
world (Rist, 1996). However, there was no trace yet of the idea that knowledge, technol-
ogy and social organization develop in a cumulative manner. The knowledge produced
by the classical Greek and Roman thinkers, for instance, preserved an insurmountable
status until Enlightenment (Rist, 1996).
Only in the xvi and xvii century, with Bacon, Descartes and Pascal, this insur-
mountable status of Ancient knowledge was challenged. Descartes stated, around 1628,
that “we should not give great credit to the Ancients on account of their antiquity [. . . ]
For the world is older now than it was then, and we have a greater experience of things”
(Descartes, 1974, p.204). Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle wrote that “a great, savage mind
is, so to speak, composed by all great minds of all preceding centuries; [. . . ] mankind will
never degenerate and the sane voices of all the great minds that follow will always add
one to another” (Fontanelle, 1752 [1688]). Knowledge started to acquire an accumulative
character: every generations can benefit from the body of knowledge that has been built
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up, and can add its own bit to it. A decline of knowledge and science was believed to be
impossible. According to (Rist, 1996) this enlightened idea of the cumulative character
of knowledge is in clear opposition to, on the one hand, the Ancients’ aversion of infinity,
and, on the other hand, the Augustinian faith in the inevitable end of the world.
The supposed accumulative character of knowledge and its beneficial effects were
contested by only a minority of thinkers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, David Hume
or Adam Ferguson. Hume wrote that “when the arts and sciences come to perfection in
any state, from that moment they naturally, or rather necessarily, decline, and seldom or
never revive in that nation where they formerly flourished” (Hume, 1854 [1752], p.146).
Despite the dissident voices, what is left by the end of the eighteenth century is the
hegemonic idea of uni-linear progress and infinite growth in our knowledge of the natural
world. Smith (1994) argues that the Enlightenment also lodges the cradle of the tech-
nological determinism ideology. All streams of thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth
century —the enthusiastic as well as the critical— held that science and technology were
powerful agents of social change. So, if knowledge was believed to be accumulative, then
also the complexity of technology would be accumulative, and so would be the sophisti-
cation of socio-economic organization.
The first enlightened voices that called to export the European ‘progresses’ to the
colonies invoked precisely Europe’s epistemic superiority as justification. Condorcet, last
of the Encyclope´distes —and a fervent critic of slavery— wrote in 1793 that:
The Europeans [. . . ] will disseminate, in Africa and in Asia, the European principles
and example of freedom, of the enlightened, and of reason. [. . . ] [The colonies] are
just waiting for our help to become civilized, and are waiting to find brothers among
the Europeans, in order to become their friends and pupils. (Condorcet, 1795 [1793],
p.335, translation and emphasis by the author)
Apparently a teacher-pupil relationship —with Europe in the role of the teacher— was
already part of the progress ideology by the second half of the eighteenth century.
Stages in knowledge, stages in development
The rise of social evolutionism in the nineteenth century molded Western thinking con-
cerning development and development aid in an important way. All societies of this
planet were believed to pass through a number of stages of evolution, from savagery to
civilization. Moreover, the path was said to be universal, hence identical for all societies,
and this created a unifying bond amongst all peoples. This also meant that the savage
tribes in the colonies were believed to lead the life that our ancestors had led some mil-
lennia ago and that evolution would inevitably transform their society in a society similar
to the European.
The successive stages of social evolution were characterized by increasing complex-
ity in social organization, technology and knowledge. In this sense, social evolutionism
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added two meanings to K&T in development. First, August Comte argued that human
thought “passes successively through three different theoretical conditions: the theolog-
ical or fictitious; the metaphysical, or abstract; and the scientific, or positive— (Comte,
1975 [1830], p.71). As a consequence, the Western society was presented to have supe-
rior knowledge —in an absolute manner— with respect to non-European societies, since
Europe was in the utmost advanced stage of evolution. Second, the type of K&T that a
society possessed, such as its agricultural techniques, tools, writing system, etc., were a
measure of the evolutionary stage it found itself in (as in Morgan, 1974 [1877]).
By the nineteenth century Europe felt a new urge to colonize (the ‘Scramble for
Africa’), which was justified by the need to find new markets for the expanding European
industry (Arndt, 1987). Social evolutionism, disguised as philanthropy, was a helping
hand in selling the new colonialism to the broad public. Jules Ferry for instance, French
minister of external affairs at the end of the nineteenth century, sustained that “superior
races have rights over inferior races, because they also have obligations towards them;
they have the obligation to civilize the inferior races” (Ferry, 1885, translation by the
author).
It needs to be underlined that the objective of civilizing the ‘inferior races’ was, at that
time, still completely detached from the idea of stimulating their economic development
(Arndt, 1987). Economic development was only reserved to the European economies.
Social evolutionism was also reflected in the philosophy behind the League of Nations,
founded in 1919. The Covenant of the League of Nations is the first official document that
mentions the concept ‘development’ and the idea that nations and peoples can ‘develop’
over time. Article 22 of the Covenant, that regulated the Mandatories (i.e. mandated
control) of some member nations over others on behalf of the League, defended these
Mandatories in terms of the different stages of development that nations found themselves
in.
Technical Assistance for economic development
President Harry Truman“s inaugural address of 1949, partly cited in the introduction of
the chapter, was a milestone in development cooperation, for distinguishing ‘developed’
countries from ‘underdeveloped’ ones (Escobar, 1995) in a more clear-cut way than the
League of Nations did. The developed peoples needed to help the underdeveloped in
their economic development, Truman stated. The scope: maintaining world peace. The
means: the transfer of scientific knowledge and industrial technology.
By proposing such a transfer as trigger of development, Truman merely expressed
the Zeitgeist. David Landes recalls the British groundnut scheme, implemented in Tan-
ganyika over the period 1946-54, as “the mother” of all technology transfer projects (1998,
p.501). This program had to show what the British government was capable of when it
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implemented modern Western technology and expertise in their colonies. Although the
peanuts were destined for the British market and not for the African, it was argued that
the local farmers would learn from the large-scale industrialization in agriculture and
successfully copy it. The project turned into a blatant fiasco; in eight years the project
had worsened the socio-economic situation of the local farmers —due to bad planning,
a lack of local capacities, and adversary ecological conditions (Havinden and Meredith,
1993, p.276-83).
Through 1947 and 1948 the term ‘Technical Assistance’ (TA) was coined to indicate
the official help that was offered by the UN Economic Affairs Department. In 1949, under
impetus of Truman’s Point Four, an Expanded Program of Technical Assistance was
created (which in 1965 became the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP).
TA was initially a program of unidirectional knowledge transfer, in the hands of Western
experts and coloured by evolutionist thinking. Local knowledge or traditions were seen as
obstacles: “rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient
philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate” (UN, 1951,
p.4). The TA program of the UN and loans of the World Bank were aimed at offering
‘tech-fix’ assistance and giving ‘the big push’ to underdeveloped countries, mostly in the
form of large infrastructure and technology works, in an attempt to start weaving the
network of economic activity. Social well-being would follow automatically.
The absolute power of Western science and technology, and the conviction that this
scientific knowledge was a global good, still set the tone in 1963 at the first UN Conference
on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas
in Geneva. The conference was taken as a scientific rather than a political meeting.
Scientists and technical experts dominated the Geneva conference, 84% of them coming
from the developed world (Standke, 2006).
Surprisingly, David Owen, chairman of the UN Technical Assistance Board and gen-
erally well aligned with the US government, anticipated already in 1950 much of the
criticism on TA that would grow in the 1960s and 1970s (Owen, 1950, p.110, emphases
by the author):
An economic mission from any one of the great industrial powers, no matter how
benevolent the intentions, may [. . . ] be met with charges [. . . ] that its purpose is
to bring the country under some form of foreign economic domination [. . . ]
Moreover, even if the good intentions of the mission are fully appreciated, there
remains the danger of a one-sided approach to the solution of the technical prob-
lems which the mission encounters. It is only natural that technical experts from
any one country will be inclined to recommend a duplication of the institutions,
organization, and techniques which have proved successful in their own country,
though in many cases these solutions are not necessarily compatible with the social
and political structure of the recipient.
The discussions about TA, anticipated by Owen but growing widespread throughout
the 1960s, mostly evolved around the effectiveness of TA. They did not question the
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epistemological premises of the unidirectional transfer of K&T from the West to the
underdeveloped world.
Technical Assistance for poverty alleviation
Criticism culminated in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the emergence of the De-
pendency School, a group of critical scholars and policy-makers based in Latin America
(e.g. Frank, 1969). They argued that the ‘center’ of the world (the West) had developed
at the expense of the ‘periphery’ (the ex-colonies). They blamed development aid for
perpetuating this unequal relationship, and technology transfer for creating dependency.
The global political context was changing and a less economicist wind started to
blow in the World Bank with the appointment of Robert McNamara to its leadership in
1968. Attention started to shift to equity and the needs of the very poor. Although the
agencies continued to finance large infrastructure to some extent, the World Bank and
UNDP started to be primarily concerned with rural development, poverty alleviation,
and the reinforcement of local organizations. The development support was increasingly
directed to grassroots development (Nolan, 2002).
One expression of this attention to the poorest was the search for new forms of ‘appro-
priate’ or ‘alternative’ technologies, more adaptable to the local contexts in underdevel-
oped regions. In the early 1970s, Schumacher (1973) and others elaborated on the idea of
‘intermediate technologies’ for development: technologies that float somewhere between
traditional village techniques and advanced capital intensive technologies of the Western
world. The term was soon replaced by ‘appropriate technologies’, indicating any tech-
nology that is small-scale, labor intensive rather than capital intensive, energy efficient,
environmentally sustainable, and controlled and maintained by the local community of a
developing region (Murphy et al., 2009).
The concept of appropriate technology and some sensibility of local knowledges were
gradually adopted in World Bank models of technology transfer (Visvanathan, 2001),
in order to improve the technology transfer. There was no attempt yet, within the
development agencies, to question the ideology of K&T transfer itself.
It should be noted that the attention to the rural poor was not entirely new. For
instance, in the 1940s, the Rockefeller Foundation had founded in Mexico a research cen-
ter dedicated to develop high yielding wheat and maize varieties for the Mexican market
(Ross, 2003). Research in this and in similar research centers triggered the ‘Green Revolu-
tion’ of the 1960s and 1970s. However, this early attention to the poorest —also surfacing
in Truman’s speech— mostly stemmed from a concern about the rise of communism. Se-
cure food production, it was said, was essential to keep the poor rural populations in
developing countries ‘happy’ and keep them away from communism (Ross, 2003). In any
case, until the late 1960s the main scope of development aid was, without doubt, eco-
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nomic growth and the production of material goods. Along with economic growth, rural
poverty would decline. Only towards the end of the 1960s this relation was revised.
Building Science and Technology Capacities in the South
In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s the world also witnessed the increasing bar-
gaining power of the developing countries —or ‘non-aligned’ countries— at the interna-
tional political stage (Rist, 1996). Along with a ‘New International Economic Order’,
they claimed a better access to science and technology (S&T).
The World Plan of Action for the Application of Science and Technology for Develop-
ment, presented in 1971 by the UN Advisory Committee on Science and Technology for
Development (ACAST), reflected this new political climate by proposing the following
targets (UN 1971):
• developing countries should increase their domestic S&T output;
• developed countries should intensify their aid to build up the S&T capacities in
developing countries;
• a portion of the R&D in developed countries should be focused on the specific needs
of developing countries.
The instrumental and deterministic role attributed by ACAST to scientific output was
criticized by a group of scholars in the so-called Sussex Manifesto (Singer et al., 1970) —
a document that was initially meant to be the introductory chapter of the World Plan
of Action. The Sussex Group left behind all discourses about ‘catch-up’ or about ‘the
troubles in technology transfer.’ Instead they sustained that development was about im-
proving the local capabilities2 (Shah, 2009). They contended that development “depends
on people with outlook, knowledge, training and equipment to solve the problems posed
by their own environment, and thus control their environment rather than be controlled
by it” (Singer et al., 1970). It is noteworthy, however, that the radical Manifesto still
sustained ‘economic production’ as ultimate aspiration for the developing countries.
Later during that decade, the UN organized a second Conference on Science and
Technology for Development in Vienna in 1979. Contrary to the first one in Geneva,
this conference was political, rather than technical. The participants were governments,
not scientists. Under pressure of the non-aligned countries the discussions were more
about the ‘equitable access’ to S&T rather than about ‘technology transfer’ (Standke,
2006). Despite this shift in attention, discussions about ‘equitable access’ still adhered
the mainstream philosophy that any injection of S&T would lead to development. Critical
voices questioning Western S&T were kept out of the conference (Shah, 2009).
2The Sussex Manifesto extensively wields the word ‘capability’, a concept that became notorious a
decade later through the work of Amartya Sen (1985). In the Sussex Manifesto the concept is used only
to refer to domestic S&T capabilities.
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Whereas until the 1980s the UN has made strong efforts to give the field of S&T a
highly visible role in its deliberations, today the UN is no longer seen as a prime actor in
this field (Standke, 2006). The World Trade Organisation, founded in 1995, has partly
taken over the negotiations about access to technology and scientific knowledge.
The cutback of aid in favor of the market
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of the neo-liberal ideology in development and a
laudation of the beneficial forces of the free market. Towards the turn of the millennium
the market was abandoned again in favor of a stronger state and civil society (Nolan,
2002). Poverty alleviation and the poor returned at the center stage. Banners of this
battle against poverty are the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Millennium
Development Goals (established in 2000).
Together with this renewed attention to the poor, another, completely new tendency
emerged: knowledge started to be given an explicit role in development, although many
visions spawned on what that role exactly should be.
Developing the Knowledge Economy
Simultaneously with the abandonment of the free market as panacea for underdevelop-
ment, there was a growing interest from scholars and development agencies in the role
of knowledge as economic good (for an overview, see King and McGrath, 2002). The
observation that knowledge-based activities generate increasingly high returns, has led
to the emergence of a ‘New Growth Theory’. This theory’s primary recommendation
for developing countries is to bet on human capital and education, in order to generate
growth from knowledge-related activities (Cozzens et al., 2008).
The 1998/1999 World Development report Knowledge for Development (World Bank,
1998), whose opening statement was quoted in the introduction of this article, was inter-
woven with the Knowledge Economy discourse. This discourse is, however, much more
explicit in later World Bank publications such as World Bank (2007).
R&D and Innovation for Development
Rooted in another strain of thought, but closely related to the Knowledge Economy
paradigm, is the theory of Innovation Systems (amongst others, Freeman, 1982; Edquist,
1997). This theory inscribes the generation of science, technology, innovations, and devel-
opment, into a networks of interrelated actors: the innovation system. The three typical
categories of actors in an innovation system are: research institutions (both public and
private), governmental bodies, and private enterprises (Edquist, 1997). The concept re-
flects an important shift in the understanding of technological production: the linear
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chain of invention-innovation-diffusion, has been replaced by a dynamic process of non-
linear learning between multiple agents. Development policies that adhere the Innovation
System theory seek to identify and promote the political configurations and strategical
investments that are needed to initiate or accelerate the process of innovation and tech-
nological development in the innovation system at stake.
Innovation Systems have the merit of having drawn the attention to the wider and
plural milieu of knowledge production. Whereas TA was still primarily concerned with
one-to-one knowledge transfer, Innovation Systems has made clear that the actual dy-
namic of knowledge production is many-to-many (Wilson, 2007b).
Knowledge Management for Development
When Wolfensohn was appointed president of the World Bank in 1996, he declared that
the Bank had to become a ‘Knowledge Bank’ (Wolfensohn, 1996):
We have been in the business of research and disseminating the lessons of develop-
ment for a long time. But the revolution in information technology increased the
potential value of these efforts by vastly extending their reach. [. . . ] We need to
[. . . ] enhance our ability to gather development information and experience, and
share it with our clients. We need to become, in effect, the Knowledge Bank.
The 1998/1999 World Development Report, an immediate product of this new line of
thought, mingles elements of ‘Knowledge Economy’, ‘Knowledge Management’ and ‘ICT
for Development’.
Knowledge Management aims to convert the tacit knowledge of individual experts or
employees into explicit, manageable knowledge (Evers et al., 2009). King and McGrath
(2004) distinguish two tendencies. The first or ‘technological’ approach is the one that
tries to capture, store and distribute by means of ICT the knowledge that already exists
among experts in an organisation. The second or ‘social’ approach focuses more on
putting people together in teams, in order to take advantage of their tacit knowledge.
Wolfensohn, by stating that the World Bank had to become a Knowledge Bank,
clearly harnessed the technological approach. For this purpose, the World Bank cre-
ated the Global Development Network. A public web portal, the Global Development
Gateway, collects and disseminates development-related knowledge, covering topics as
varied as economics, aids, natural resources management, etc. UNDP created a similar
system, called SURF (Evers et al., 2009). Other development agencies have supported
independent networks such as Eldis or the Open Knowledge Network. This approach to
development knowledge diffusion has been criticized for having severe limitations (Mehta,
2001; Evers et al., 2009).
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ICT for Development
The Knowledge Management credo places much hope in modern information and telecom-
munication technologies (ICTs). However, ICTs have been invoked for development in
many different ways:
• development-related knowledge can be transferred via the internet or satellite, “at
virtually no cost” (World Bank, 1998, 130);
• ICT will bridge the digital divide between the information-rich and the information-
poor, in order to instruct the information-poor and empower their civil society;
• ICT as instrument or as economic good in the Knowledge Economy.
The first has been discussed in the Knowledge Management section. The second and
third usually constitute the ‘ICT for Development’ (ICT4D) discourse. The ICT4D sector
has an ambiguous relationship with technological determinism. Mansell (2011) sustains
that the grand ICT4D theories of the UN and World Bank rely on ICT as an exogenous
factor for development. Although the 2001 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2001)
states that ICT “enable development” because technological innovation and development
are “mutually reinforcing, creating a virtuous circle” (UNDP, 2001, p.28), Avgerou (2003)
finds that the report emphasizes by large only one side of that virtuous circle: that ICT
innovation will generate development.
The hopes for the ICT4D sector are high, but many projects fail. The literature
on ICT in developing countries has accumulated a substantial amount of qualitative
data that confirms the situated manner in which ICT4D projects need to take shape
(Avgerou, 2003). Practice-based approaches in the field show that ICT can play an
endogenous role in development but these grassroots initiatives cannot adequately bridge
power inequalities (Mansell, 2011).
Capacity Building
Throughout the 1990s, the Capacity Building discourse emerged as an explicit opposition
to the technological determinism in TA and other K&T transfer practices. From the 1940s
through the 1970s TA had exclusively relied on the employment of Western experts, and
its failure was no longer ignorable by the end of the eighties. Criticism to TA was growing
within the major development organizations themselves (for an overview, see Fukuda-Parr
et al., 2002). A UNDP assessment report (Berg and Seymour Whitaker, 1993) argued
that TA had proven effective in getting the job done, but less effective at developing local
institutions or building local capacities. Instead, TA had fostered dependence on foreign
experts, and had distorted national priorities.
The concept ‘capacity building’ was picked up from this report by Edward V.K. Jaycox
(1993), the then vice-president of the World Bank’s Africa section. Berg and Jaycox’s
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message was that TA had to rely much more on local expertise, not foreign experts. In
this way, TA would stimulate and build up the local capacities.
A subsequent UNDP publication (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002) was the real trigger for
the spread of the capacity discourse in all development agencies. The document com-
pletely rejected TA and proposed capacity building as the “new solution to old problems”.
Fukuda-Parr et al. (2002) argued that capacity needs to be developed at three levels: the
individual, the organizational, and the societal. In fact, the agency of an individual or
organization to apply its capacities depends on the capacities of the society as a whole.
In other words, the document explicitly recognized that knowledge is always embedded
in a specific social context.
Since the nineties the capacity discourse has gained a hegemonic status within devel-
opment cooperation (Ku¨hl, 2009). It is not surprising that the concept, which is on the
lips of most development actors nowadays, has acquired multiple and often conflicting
meanings3 (Baser and Morgan, 2008; UNDP, 2009).
5.4 Discussion
5.4.1 Disentangling the different discourses
Enlightenment and evolutionism highlighted knowledge, science and technology as en-
dogenous characteristics of civilization. Western scientific knowledge was the expression
of the most advanced evolutionary stage a society could attain. From Condorcet, over
nineteenth century colonizers, to the League of Nations, they all invoked the superiority
of Western knowledge and civilization as moral justification to civilize the ‘inferior races’.
The role that Truman and TA assigned to K&T was radically different: it had to
tackle the economic poverty of the underdeveloped world and harness Western K&T
as exogenous tool for the generation of economic growth. Industrial technology and
large infrastructure would generate economic development. The (scientific) knowledge
surrounding these Western technologies was embodied by the Western experts who were
sent out for TA. There was a heavy focus on the transfer of technologies but there
were no particular efforts to foster knowledge production in the beneficiary society itself.
Knowledge as endogenous factor of development seemed to be abandoned in favor of
material production as endogenous motor of development.
Since the late 1990s, knowledge has again assumed an endogenous role in development,
as can be deduced from the rise of the discourses on Knowledge Economy, Innovation
Systems or Capacity Building. By extension, other recent discourses, like ICT4D, harness
3See also chapter 6 in this dissertation, which shows, drawing on empirical data, that different actors
interpret the Capacity Building paradigm in different ways.
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Period Role of K&T in development Goal of K&T transfer
century XVII K&T endogenous to Enlightenment civilize
century XIX K&T endogenous to evolution civilize
1940s-1960s T exogenous tool to development generate growth
1970s T exogenous tool to development alleviate poverty
1990s-2000s K endogenous to development empower, generate growth
Table 5.1: Some of the roles allotted to K&T in development,
from the Enlightenment until today
technology as an instrument in development rather than goal, and confirm that the focus
is now on knowledge as endogenous factor in development.
Moreover, K&T have been invoked for development with varying intentions. In the
pre-Truman era, it was invoked for the civilization of the colonies. During the 1950s and
1960s it was invoked for producing goods and economic growth. In the 1970s the role of
K&T was alleviating poverty. Nowadays, K&T is said to empower the people and to
reinforce their capacities, while others see it as the motor in a Knowledge Economy.
It is important to emphasize that different discourses about K&T for development
have existed along each other. Some of these discourses are mutually supportive while oth-
ers defend completely opposite messages. This is especially true in the first decade of the
twentieth century. When scrutinizing the credo ‘Knowledge for Development’, brought
forward by the 1998/1999 World Development Report (World Bank, 1998), we note that
this flag covers a number of different cargoes. It includes elements of the Knowledge
Economy, Innovation Systems, Knowledge Management and ICT4D paradigms. UNDP,
from its side, also supports ICT4D and online Knowledge Management initiatives, but
it is also a strong promoter of Capacity Building. Finally, the genealogy of section 5.3
shows that at any point in history the reigning paradigm was always contested, to some
minor or larger extent, from inside or outside the authoritative organizations.
5.4.2 Epistemic and technological determinism
As explained earlier, the technological determinism ideology ignores the intense co-evo-
lution of technology and society, whereas the epistemic determinism ideology ignores
that all knowledge is situated and embedded in its particular social context. Apart from
the different roles that have been assigned to K&T in/for development, the degree of
epistemic and technological determinism in the interpretations has also varied widely.
Some discourses are particularly prone to epistemic and technological determinism, such
as Technical Assistance, the ICT4D, Knowledge Management, and Knowledge Economy
paradigm. That does not mean that they are imperatively deterministic. More and less
deterministic views exist along each other.
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 sketch the rise and fall of the main discourses on K&T in devel-
opment 4. In addition, each discourse is measured against two scales. The first scale (the
vertical scale in the grids of figures 5.1 and 5.2) measures the degree of technological/-
epistemic determinism:
1. K&T presented as completely independent from the social context (indicated as
‘indep’);
2. K&T presented as independent from social context, but some adaptation to the
local context will favour their effectiveness ;
3. K&T presented as embedded in the social context, but the discourse still relies on
the idea that one party learns from the other;
4. K&T presented as completely embedded in the social context; no transfers, as
learning and innovation must happen in the social context (indicated as ‘emb’).
The scale focuses on only one of the two underlying ideas of technological and epistemic
determinism: the one that undergirds the conviction that K&T can be transferred.
The second scale (the horizontal scale in the grids of figures 5.1 and 5.2) evaluates
what K&T are invoked for; it measures the degree of ‘economic determinism’ in the
discourse:
1. K&T exclusively invoked for social development, or for the empowerment of the
people (indicated as ‘soc’)
2. K&T invoked for social development; the social development will also lead to a
more productive society
3. K&T invoked for economic development; this economic development will also lead
to social development
4. K&T exclusively invoked for economic development (indicated as ‘econ’).
4All timelines in figures 1 and 2 are retrieved from the Google Books database (Michel et al., 2011).
The timeline of ‘Capacity Building’, for instance, shows for each year from 1940 until 2005 the relative
occurrence of the 2-gram ‘Capacity Building’ among all possible 2-grams in the books published in that
particular year. The graphs have been smoothed by floating ±1 averages and splines. The timelines
are included in this article to show relative tendencies, not absolute values. The author judged that the
four n-grams of figure 5.1 have very precise meanings and can be confronted in one single graph. The
n-grams of figure 5.2 have broad meanings and it is senseless to compare their timelines.
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Figure 5.1: The rise and fall of K&T discourses, and their characteristics.
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Figure 5.2: The rise and fall of K&T discourses, and their characteristics (continued)
5.4.3 Beyond capacity building
Few has been said about whose K&T counts. All K&T discourses described in the
genealogy favor Western knowledge. Capacity Building does try to harness local expertise
in order to build up local capacities but Wilson (2007b) remarks that Capacity Building
—like TA— still focuses on “learning things that are already known by one of the actors.”
Wilson distinguishes ‘learning from’ and ‘learning with’. The former still reigns de-
velopment aid, while there is a need to focus more on the latter. The ‘learning with’
is inspired by Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation,’ where different knowledges are equally
valued as possible source of creative learning and new knowledge production (Wilson,
2007b). ‘Learning with’ would be a mode of cooperation that fully transcends epistemic
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determinism.
As far as indigenous knowledge is concerned, there is some increasing attention from
scholars, especially in natural resources management and conservation (e.g. Dove, 2006;
Berkes, 2009), but this has had little resonance in the major development agencies.
5.5 Conclusion
The genealogy sketched in section 5.3 shows that discussions on the role of K&T in/for
development have an age-long line of descent. The ideas that K&T are cumulative and
that they underpin development emerged during Enlightenment. Since Enlightenment
until today, many different roles have been allotted to K&T in development: once ex-
ogenous to development, then endogenous; once the instrument, then the goal. They are
also invoked for different purposes: for civilizing the ‘inferior races’, as motor of economic
development, for poverty alleviation, for empowerment, etc.
The genealogy reveals two transversal constants. First, each discourse emerged from
a different intellectual and political background; it includes certain values and conveys
specific views on the organization of social and economic life. In sum, none of these
discourses is neutral. Each is based on a specific world view and a specific idea about the
role that K&T play in this world.
Second, although more deterministic and less deterministic views on K&T have al-
ways existed along each other, the genealogy has shown that at any moment in history the
one or the other extreme prevailed. Capacity Building, for instance, the currently hege-
monic discourse in development cooperation, is no more than the latest non-deterministic
discourse concerning K&T in development.
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Chapter 6
Implementing the Capacity Building
paradigm: a matter of translations
Boloko`ni kelen te se ka be`le` ta`.
One single finger cannot pick up a stone.
Bambara proverb
6.1 Introduction
Throughout the history of development aid,1 the expert communities have displayed a
continuous effort to ‘get the development policy right’, thereby unceasingly promoting
new concepts and theories to adjust preceding policies that failed to deliver (Mosse, 2004;
Thorbecke, 2007; Kremer et al., 2009b; Nederveen Pieterse, 2010). Failure to deliver is
invariably attributed either to the misconception of the previous policy, or to an un-
intended gap between policy formulation and implementation (Strang and Macy, 2001;
Mosse, 2004; Ku¨hl, 2009).
‘Capacity building’ (CB) —also indicated as ‘capacity development’— is such a cur-
rently prominent theory (Eade, 2005; Ku¨hl, 2009; Clarke and Oswald, 2010), concerned
with ‘getting the aid right’. It claims that traditional ‘technical assistance’ failed, and
argues that development policies need to focus on the improvement of the knowledge,
skills and capabilities of the aid-receiving individuals, organizations, and governments
(Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a
prominent promoter of CB, believes that “there is now emerging agreement in the de-
velopment community that capacity development is the engine of human development”
(UNDP, 2009, p.5) — it even claims that “capacity is development” (ibid., p.6).
1Although laden with different connotations, ‘development aid’ and ‘development cooperation’ are
used interchangeably in this article.
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The idea that the failure of a policy derives from the misconception of the previous
policy, or from an unintended gap between policy formulation and implementation, stems
from an instrumentalist view on the policy process. The classic ‘stagist’ view on policy
making (Easton, 1965; Jenkins, 1978), as well as the more recent ‘evidence-based’ ap-
proach to policy making (Nutley et al., 2000; Sanderson, 2002), both assume that the
policy process goes through a number of sequential stages: a problem emerges; a policy
is created to cope with the problem; the policy is implemented; impact is measured;
the policy is evaluated. Whereas both approaches assume that the realm of policy mak-
ing is independent from the realm of implementation, the evidence-based approach also
assumes that objective measurements are possible in the realm of implementation, and
that they can feed back into the realm of policy making. Both assumptions are highly
problematic, not in the least because development is a multi-dimensional phenomenon
whose measurement is always indeterminate (Rottenburg, 2009). However, the continu-
ous quest for better policies that permeates development aid continues to rely on these
two instrumentalist views on policy making (Kremer et al., 2009a).
I challenge the idea of unidirectional links between separate realms, as well as the
existence of a gap between those realms, and contend that the link between a policy and
its implementation exists only by virtue of numerous mediators and intermediaries, that,
perforce, ‘translate’ the abstract concepts and policies into something that makes sense
in the context of their position in the network. Without the intention to propose an
alternative theory of the policy process, this article employs the concept of ‘translation’,
borrowed from Actor-Network Theory (Callon and Law, 1982; Callon, 1986), to describe
that actors embed their own interests in their interpretation of a new policy or paradigm,
in order to reaffirm themselves —their knowledge and their position in the network— as
essential to the interest of the other actors and the network.
To demonstrate my thesis, I observed various development actors and their interpre-
tations of CB. The actors under scrutiny were: the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(the donor), the headquarters of the Belgian non-governmental development organiza-
tion WaNGO,2 the field office of WaNGO in Mali, six Malian municipalities that are
partner of WaNGO, and two Malian grassroots organizations that are contracted by the
municipalities. These actors are all connected in a direct manner and endorse CB in one
way or another. Most actors are exclusively active in the water sector, hence, the CB
described in this chapter mostly refers to the capacity to effectively manage water. For
a more complete methodological discussion of this multi-sited ethnography, see chapter
10. The data consisted of eight months of participant observations (in 2010), interviews
with key individuals (in 2010-2012), focus group discussions (in 2010-2011), and official
policy documents and reports.
The six municipalities of the study are located in Mali’s Inner Niger Delta (IND). The
2This is a pseudonym.
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IND is a landlocked wetland in the Malian Sahel where the Niger river annually floods an
area up to 35 000 km2. Around 1 million people make a living in this fertile area, from
agriculture, fishing and animal husbandry (Zwarts, 2010). Since 2004, WaNGO assists
a number of municipalities in the IND in developing their capacities to manage water
(drinking water, water for agriculture, sanitation).
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the next section I describe alternative,
anthropological views on the policy process and I introduce the concept of ‘translation’,
before describing the CB paradigm in the third section. In the fourth section I report
the data of the multi-sited ethnography, describing what the interests of each of the five
actors are in water management and what their interpretation of CB is. I end with a
discussion of the data, in which I formulate three statements about the implementation
of the CB paradigm.
6.2 Theories of the policy process
The ‘instrumentalist’ or ‘stagist’ view conceptualizes policy making as a process of ratio-
nal problem solving that is staged in a series of sequential phases (Easton, 1965; Jenkins,
1978). Problems emerging from the field are first dressed in a scientific-technical vocab-
ulary, then “brought to the [policy maker] for solution; the [policy making] institutions
formulate alternatives and select policy solutions; and those solutions get implemented,
evaluated, and revised” (Sabatier, 2007a, p.3). This view is based on two positivist as-
sumptions. First, it takes for granted the duality of a policy making realm and a realm
of implementation. Second, it assumes a unidirectional link between both realms, or at
best a unidirectional cycle.
‘Evidence-based policy making’ is a variant of this instrumental view that is on the
rise in the development sector. Evidence-based policy making supposes that the effects
and impacts of a new policy can be ‘measured’ and that these measurements can pro-
vide objective feedback to the policy makers. The approach is not new but it became
the official policy making strategy of the UK government in the late 1990s (Young and
Mendizabal, 2009). Unlike the previously mentioned ‘stagist view’, the evidence-based
approach acknowledges that the policy process is not linear (Young and Mendizabal,
2009). However, this approach, too, assumes the duality of a policy making realm and
an implementation realm. Moreover, it supposes that science and objective impact mea-
surements can inform the policy making in an objective and independent fashion. This
is again a problematic assumption (Forsyth, 2003; Latour, 2004).
Building on the assumed disconnection of the realms, the instrumentalist view upholds
that it is possible to steadily work towards ever better policies, based on ever better evi-
dence from the field (Kremer et al., 2009a). This pursuit of the ‘best’ policy characterizes
development aid since its inception after World War II. Arguebly, development organiza-
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tions are gearing up this rationalization and scientification of development policy making
(for recent examples, see Carden, 2009; Nallari et al., 2011), nurturing the boom of the
evaluation industry as well (Leeuw, 2009).
A number of policy theorists have added constructionist nuances to these instrumental
views on the policy process, by describing the roles of advocacy coalitions, discourse coali-
tions, or epistemic communities (Sabatier, 2007b), but the realms of policy making and
implementation principally remain separate. Actually, the policy making organizations
discursively widen and exploit the distance between the two realms. They typically base
their proposal of a new policy on the alleged gap between the actual state of affairs —cast
in a language of failure— and the desired state of affairs —whose success is guaranteed
by the new policy (Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006).
A considerable counterflow from anthropology —and in particular from the ‘anthro-
pology of policy’ (Shore and Wright, 1997)— challenges these deterministic, instrumental
views, and promotes a constructionist, actor-oriented view on the policy-practice process.
A first problem with the instrumental views, numerous critics argue, is the positivist epis-
temology (Chambers, 1997; Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Bryld, 2000; Cooke, 2004; Kothari,
2005; Wilson, 2007a,b). The instrumental views imply that progress in development can
be measured by confronting an objective set of data with an unbiased set of policy ob-
jectives. Rottenburg (2009) believes, following Luhmann, that the mere act of setting a
development objective already conceptually orders the reality according the one specific
mental framework in which the observer stands — and so does the collection of evidence.
For Roe, an adherent of literary theory, policies are above all narratives. Even when con-
fronted with contradicting empirical data, the narrative does not yield, as it “continue[s]
to underwrite and stabilize the assumptions” of the policy maker, undeterred by uncer-
tainty, complexity, and polarization (1994, p.2). Policy-informing evidence is therefore
often self-validating, first because the evidence is set in the same mental framework as
the one in which the policy itself is set (Rottenburg, 2009), and second, because it can be
bent by the narrative in any sense (Roe, 1994). In effect, the narrative can always avail
of the gap between policy making and implementation: “higher water prices, more trees,
or more training would have done the job but unfortunate circumstances limited the full
realization of the intended or expected benefits” (Molle, 2008).
The second observation directly derives from the previous point: it is very hard to
determine whether a project or a policy has failed, or whether it is succeeding. Of course,
there exists a huge and still growing evaluation industry that produces measurements
of the ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’ or ‘sustainability’ of each development project and each
program, but the data collection is inevitably set in the same framework of thinking as the
project itself (Rottenburg, 2009). Therefore, an increasing number of scholars sustains
that the success (or failure) of a project or program is determined by the support and
validation (or lack of it) by the wider network of actors involved, rather than by objective
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measurements (Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006). As a result, a new policy does not emerge from
the accumulation of disillusioning measurements from the field —the evidence will support
the policy as long as the actors support the policy— but from the reluctance of actors to
continue their support for the preceding policy or project (Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006).
The last problem with the instrumentalist view are the deterministic links between
the different phases. A development intervention designed in an office is never verbatim
implemented by field professionals. Instead, a development intervention is staged by a
vast and complex network of heterogeneous actors with very diverse interests that enacts
the intervention as an “ongoing, socially constructed and negotiated process” (Long and
Long, 1992), at a number of geographically distant but politically interconnected stages.
Negotiation and maneuvering prevail not only at the stage of the policy making organi-
zations (de Vries, 1992; Lewis, 1998; Stirrat, 2001; Lewis et al., 2003; Lewis and Mosse,
2006a; Mosse, 2011a), and the implementation stage (Torres, 1997; Arce and Long, 1999;
Bierschenk et al., 2000; Rossi, 2006), but they reign every connection in the network
(Long and Long, 1992; Arce et al., 1994; Grillo and Stirrat, 1997; Olivier de Sardan,
2005).
Recently, a number of ethnographers of aid (notably Mosse, 2004, 2005a; Lewis and
Mosse, 2006b) have signaled the usability of Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) for the de-
scription of the aid architecture and its dynamics. In this article I use the idea of ‘trans-
lation’, taken from ANT in the version of Callon and Law (1982) and Callon (1986), to
describe how actors need to negotiate each link with each other, by ‘translating’ their
own interests into something that is acceptable and useful to the other actors. It are
these translations that construct and maintain the entire network.
Without the intention to substitute the instrumental view on the policy process by
an ANT view, I found the concept of ‘translation’ a very powerful metaphor to describe
my observations at the different points in the network. The concept of ‘translation’ is
central to understand how the ‘promoters’ of a development policy connect with the
‘implementers’ and the ‘consumers’.
In my description of the data I reserve the term ‘interpretation’ for the discourse that
each actor actually utters in support of the new policy, and the term ‘translation’ for
the actual coupling of the own interest to the interests of the other actors by means of a
well-targeted ‘interpretation’. It is important to note that according to Law and Callon’s
view on ‘translations’ neither the interests nor the position of the actors in the network
are static —they constitute each other reciprocally and are negotiable.
6.3 Capacity Building
OECD defines capacity as “the ability of people, organizations and society as a whole
to manage their affairs successfully” (2006, p.12). OECD-DAC emphasizes that their
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definition avoids any judgment on the objectives that the people choose to pursue, and
on what counts as successful management. Capacity development, then, is “the process
whereby people, organizations and society as a whole unleash, strengthen, create, adapt
and maintain capacity over time” (ibid., p.12). UNDP’s definition is very similar (UNDP,
2009, p.5). Both organizations prefers the term capacity development over capacity build-
ing, as the former term suggests that capacities are already present, and that capacities
can be developed without the involvement of external ‘builders’. I use the CB acronym
to indicate both.
CB is a curious concept: although omnipresent in contemporary development practice
and in the gray literature of development agencies and consultancies (Eade, 2005; Baser
and Morgan, 2008; UNDP, 2009), the scholarly development literature remains remark-
ably silent —with some exceptions such as the special issue of the IDS Bulletin (Clarke
and Oswald, 2010)— when it comes to critically analyzing the CB models and the CB
concept in itself. Moreover, despite their omnipresence, the descent of the capacity and
CB concepts remains unclear.
Descent
I detected three lineages whose cross-fertilization led to the advent of CB in development
aid in the early 1990s, and to its hegemony in the 2000s. First, according to the devel-
opment agencies themselves, CB is the successor of the ‘New Institutionalism’ approach
in the 1980s, ‘Human Resources Development’ in the 1970s, ‘Institution Development’ in
the 1960s, and ‘Institution Building’ in the 1950s (OECD-DAC, 1999; Lafontaine, 2000).
CB is thus presented as the ultimate solution that combines all preceding approaches
in one coherent framework, interlinking interventions at the societal, organizational and
human resource levels (Ku¨hl, 2009).
The CB concept did not appear suddenly in the development sphere. A review of
the managerial and public administration sciences —the second lineage— shows that the
term CB was already coined in the 1970s (e.g. Burgess, 1975) and eagerly picked up by
public administrations. The US Bureau of Community Health Services invoked “capacity
building” (sic) already in the early 1970s as strategy to improve the health service quality
in under-served areas in the US (Wilson and Myers, 1972; Tolbert, 1977). Targeting
seven areas —such as ‘financing’, ‘developing consumer knowledge’ and ‘procedures for
the evaluation of objectives and outcomes’— the Bureau’s CB strategy bore already much
resemblance to the CB models that are used nowadays in development aid.
Third, CB has profited from the lexical and semiotic resemblance with the concept
of ‘capability’. Proposed in the late 1960s by science policy researchers at the Univer-
sity of Sussex, the capabilities literature insisted that the local science and technology
capabilities, in the poor countries themselves, had to be developed. A simple transfer of
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science and technology would not ignite economic development (Singer et al., 1970). The
concept of capabilities was further expanded in the 1980s towards welfare economics in
general, most famously through the work of Amartya Sen (1985; 1999). He elucidated
the crucial role of ‘freedom’ and ‘entitlements’ in people’s livelihoods. The capabilities
approach has had a concrete application in international development in the form of the
Human Development Index (Anand and Sen, 1994).
By non-economists the confusion of capacity with capability was easily made. A
report by the National Academy of Sciences —requested by US president Ford in the
aftermath of the first World Food Conference in Rome in 1974— willingly or unwillingly
hitched the concept of capacity to that of capability: “Although it is clear that inter-
national cooperation of many kinds is required to solve global nutrition problems, each
country ultimately must develop the institutional capability to deal with its own nutrition
problems including policy and planning capacity, monitoring and surveillance, research
and training [...], and program and operational skills” (Handler, 1977, p.14). Nowadays,
many CB models by leading consultancies and agencies consider ‘capacity’ to be the
hypernym, or overarching idea, and ‘capabilities’ to be the functional building blocks.
Whatever the exact descent, the CB discourse definitely entered the development
sector in the early 1990s as an explicit opposition to the technological determinism un-
derlying Technical Assistance (TA) (see also chapter 5). By that time, criticism to TA
had already cumulated within the major development organizations themselves (for an
overview see Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002). A UNDP assessment report (Berg and Sey-
mour Whitaker, 1993) argued that TA had proven effective in “getting the job done,”
but less effective at developing local institutions or building local capacities. To the con-
trary, TA had fostered dependence on foreign experts, and had distorted priorities in the
aid-receiving countries. The concept ‘capacity building’ was picked up from this report
by Edward V.K. Jaycox (1993), the then vice-president of the World Bank Africa section.
By the turn of the millennium the most forward-looking agencies had already raised CB
to a priority status (Lafontaine, 2000).
Another UNDP publication (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002) was the real trigger for the
spread of the CB approach in the 2000s: it completely rejected TA and proposed capacity
building as the “new solution to old problems.” Capacity building has now become one
of the leading paradigms in current development practice. Donors and agencies have
developed policies concerning CB; implementing agencies and partners are specifically
screened for their performance in CB; and beneficiaries state that they need more of it.
Models
The number of theories and models for CB in development seems to have grown along
with the popularity of the concept. The most influential models, such as Kaplan (2003),
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(b) The ECDPM model (Baser and Morgan, 2008)
Figure 6.1: Two theoretical models of capacity
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Lipson and Hunt (2008), Baser and Morgan (2008), or UNDP (2009), are published in
the gray literature of development agencies, consultancies and think tanks (the latter two
models are shown in Figure 6.1). Despite their proliferation, the many CB models do
share a number of consistent similarities.
First, most models concur that capacity is spread over different levels : the individual,
the organizational, and the societal. In fact, the agency of an individual or organization
to apply its capacities depends on the capacities of the society as a whole. In other words,
the CB theories acknowledge the social dimension of capacities.
Second, all theories agree that capacity is about the successful functioning in the own
environment. To achieve that, a number of functional capacities need to be developed at
individual and organizational level: the capacity to engage with other actors, the capacity
to assess a situation and define a vision, the capacity to develop a strategy, the capacity
to manage and implement the strategy, and the capacity to evaluate (Baser and Morgan,
2008; UNDP, 2009).
And third, capacity is relational ; it is about the individual relating with others within
the fertile environment of a well-functioning organization, and about the organization
relating with others in a fully transparent multi-actor setting.
6.4 The network of translations
Considering CB to be a currently hegemonic paradigm in development cooperation, I
approach it as a broad common discourse adopted by a group of actors to give meaning
to their own actions and to achieve organizational legitimacy, rather than as a concrete
managerial guiding principle that is based on one specific CB model or theory (as in
Shore and Wright, 1997; Brunsson, 2003; Ku¨hl, 2009). In the following five sections I
describe, for each of the observed actors, (i) the position in network and the related
interests, and (ii) how the actor translates his or her interest by means of a position-
specific interpretation of CB.
6.4.1 The donor’s interests and translation
In 2010 the official development aid (ODA) disbursed by Belgium amounted to 0.64% of
its gross national income, making it the sixth most generous OECD donor in relative terms
(OECD-DAC, 2012). The distribution of the ODA over the different aid channels (table
6.1) shows that the support of the Belgian government to national non-governmental
development initiatives almost equals the direct bilateral cooperation. The Belgian de-
velopment NGO sector is one of the largest in Europe, ranking third after Germany
and France in terms of total number of employees (OECD-DAC, 2010b). Moreover, the
Belgian development NGOs appear to be highly dependent on governmental co-funding:
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Budget line % of total
Bilateral governmental cooperation 15.4%
Bilateral debt cancellations 18.4%
Multilateral contributions (incl. European Commission) 20.2%
Multilateral debt cancellations 12.4%
Co-funding of non-governmental cooperation 10.5%
Co-funding of private sector investments 5.2%
Other (incl. emergency aid, refugee aid, administration costs) 17.9%
Source: adapted from DGD (2011)
Table 6.1: Distribution of the Belgian Official Development Aid in 2010
53% of their combined budget derives from governmental sources, while this portion is
38% in France and 32% in Germany (OECD-DAC, 2010b). The governmental co-funding
of NGOs is administered by the Directorate-General for Development (DGD), which is
part of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In addition to the volume, Belgian non-governmental aid is highly fragmented and
scarcely aligned with the direct governmental aid (Molenaers et al., 2011b). On the one
hand, there is ‘internal’ fragmentation because the government supports a large number
of development NGOs that significantly differ in approach, focus and size — half of the
supported NGOs manages a total budget of less than AC2 million, whereas the largest NGO
operates on an annual budget of AC200 million (NGO-Federatie, 2012). On the other hand,
this motley of NGOs operates in over 92 countries, only 18 of which are official partners
of the direct governmental cooperation. As a result of this ‘external’ fragmentation, an
NGO spends on average only AC360,000 per recipient country (Molenaers et al., 2011b).
Not surprisingly, government officials and the NGO federations often lament the lack
of harmony and the high transaction costs in the NGO sector (Molenaers et al., 2011b).
Various halfhearted reforms in the funding schemes have tried to align and harmonize
the fragmented Belgian aid. In 1991 the government decided to provide the largest and
most professional NGOs with programmatic (non project-based) funding3 for activities in
those countries4 and sectors that are also addressed by the official bilateral cooperation.
Since the last reform in 2008, half of all NGOs receive programmatic funding, but the
administrative burden for the NGOs to preserve that funding remains very high.
The governmental development institutions —the minister of development coopera-
tion, the DGD, and the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC)— are pressed to improve
the coherence and effectiveness of the Belgian aid from various sides. They are, first, held
accountable by the national parliament and national media. It is telling that, despite
the adverse global financial climate and despite some reductions in aid expenditure, the
current Minister of Development Cooperation was careful not to reduce the spending on
3In the period 1991-2007 the programmatic funding covered periods of 5 years. Since 2008 the pro-
grammatic funding covers blocks of 6 years, but subject to yearly evaluation and mid-term reformulation.
4Currently 18 countries, including Mali.
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public communication concerning development aid, given that “polls show that also the
Belgian public opinion is becoming more critical of development cooperation” (Magnette,
2011).
Since 2003 the accountability to the parliament has taken a very formal shape, with
the creation of the completely independent ‘Special Evaluation Office Development Co-
operation’ (SEODC). Each year this office evaluates a different aspect or channel of the
Belgian development aid, and it reports the findings directly to the parliament. In 2010
the SEODC examined the extent to which the Belgian NGOs pay attention to CB.
The heaviest pressure on the Belgian federal development institutions, however, comes
from the multilateral level.5 This pressure is transmitted through multilateral agreements
such as the Paris Declaration or the Accra Agenda (OECD-DAC, 2005/2008),6 through
efforts of the European Commission to harmonize the aid of the European member states
(European Commission, 2007), through independent rankings of aid effectiveness such
as CGD (2011), and not in the least through the periodic evaluations conducted by the
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.
These 5-yearly evaluations have recurrently highlighted the lack of coherence in the
Belgian aid over time and over the different aid channels (OECD-DAC, 2005). The latest
evaluation of DAC, however, acknowledges the presence of a new momentum for reform
in the Belgian aid, driven by international commitments and a process of self-reflection
(OECD-DAC, 2010a). Indeed, the policy notes of the past two ministers (Michel, 2008;
Magnette, 2011) strongly pressed on increasing the price/quality ratio of Belgian aid and
therefore committed to two major international initiatives: alignment with the Millen-
nium Development Goals and implementation of the Paris Declaration.
Interpretation of CB Molenaers et al. (2011a) concur with the latest OECD-DAC
evaluation that the Belgian development aid is decisively turning towards the ‘new aid
approach’ promoted by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (OECD-
DAC, 2005/2008). The Accra Agenda for Action encourages (i) the transfer of aid own-
ership to the South, (ii) inclusive partnerships that put donors, countries from the South,
and civil society together, and (iii) a focus on results. The development of capacities
is put forward as crucial in each of the three actions (OECD-DAC, 2005/2008). The
increased attention of the Belgian government to CB needs to be inscribed in this global
trend that is propelled by the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda. In 2008 the minister’s
policy note stated (Michel, 2008):
5Interview with the director and an employee of the Special Evaluation Office Development Cooper-
ation (SEODC), 26 April 2012.
6In February 2005 more than 100 signatories —from donor and aid-receiving governments, multilateral
agencies, and regional development banks— endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The
five core principles of the declaration are: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results,
and mutual accountability. The follow-up meeting of 2008 in Accra took stock of the progress and
translated the Paris Declaration into a concrete Accra Agenda for Action.
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The lack of sufficient national capacities is one of the key elements to take into
account in trying to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Indeed, the efforts
deployed in numerous developing countries will only have effect if a sustainable
development of the capacities receives more attention.
In other words, since a couple of years the Ministry and the DGD equate ‘sustainability of
ODA’ with ‘development of capacities’ in the South, and with the ‘transfer of ownership’
to the South.
The ‘new aid approach’ presses also the Belgian NGO sector to shift the focus to CB.
The minister and the NGO sector agreed in 2009 that NGOs would increase their CB and
advocacy operations, and reduce the delivery of services. The delivery of services —in
other words, a Belgian NGO directly providing services in the aid-receiving country—
was to be limited to exceptional circumstances only: (i) when the target community is
extremely weak and no local service providers are available, (ii) in fragile states, and
(iii) in emergency aid.
However, resistance amongst NGOs to follow this new approach remains high, for
two reasons. First, due to the various halfhearted reforms from the past, the federal
government and the DGD in particular do not enjoy much credibility amongst NGOs as
catalysts of change (Molenaers et al., 2011a). Second, many NGOs (mostly small ones)
prefer to continue focusing on the delivery of services in the Global South rather than on
CB, as this gives them more visibility to the broad public in Belgium (Molenaers et al.,
2011a).
In 2008, before the agreement between the minister and the NGO sector, SEODC
had taken already the initiative to evaluate the Belgian NGO sector with respect to their
CB activities. As explained earlier, SEODC is a completely independent entity, and
hence, the decision to evaluate the CB activities of the Belgian NGOs was also taken
in complete independence by the SEODC director. The decision was motivated by the
rise of the CB concept at the international level, on the one hand, and by the desire to
understand what this concept meant to the NGOs, on the other hand.7 The evaluation
showed that only one third of the larger NGOs were endowed with operational strategies
for CB (SEODC, 2010). DGD, which manages the governmental co-funding of the NGOs
and evaluates their funding eligibility, declared after the SEODC study that the DGD’s
selection criteria were not to be adjusted, given that they took already CB into account
(SEODC, 2010). The reality, however, was different, as explained in the next paragraph.
6.4.2 The NGO’s interests and translation
WaNGO is a mid-sized development NGO with headquarters in Belgium and water de-
velopment projects in 9 countries in Africa and Latin America. It is one of the 58 NGOs
7Interview with the director of SEODC, 26 April 2012.
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Funding source % of total
Governmental co-funding 82%
European Commission, project-based funding 38 %
Federal government, programmatic funding 37 %
Federal government, project-based funding 4 %
Regional government, project-based funding 3 %
Non-governmental funding 18%
Source: WaNGO Annual Report 2010
Table 6.2: Funding sources of WaNGO in 2010
selected to receive programmatic funding from the Belgian government—which covers
37% of WaNGO’s total budget (table 6.2). In total 82% of WaNGO’s AC9 million budget
derives from a range of governmental sources and only 18% from private donations. The
latter constitute the obligatory matching funds required by both the Belgian government
and the European Commission—and 18% is very close to the imposed minimum. As
a result, the NGO belongs to the top quintile of most government-dependent NGOs in
Belgium (NGO-Federatie, 2012). Moreover, 45% of WaNGO’s budget was obtained by
responding to calls-for-proposals that were issued by the Belgian government and the
European Commission. Calls-for-proposals can unlock substantial funding but are very
demanding: writing a complete proposal for the European Commission, for instance,
takes up to 2 personmonths,8 while the rate of acceptance is lower than 15% (European
Commission, 2011).
In the competition to obtain governmental funding (both from the national govern-
ment as the European Commission) it is important to show the added value of the NGO
to the donor.9 Therefore, WaNGO attaches great importance to its status of professional
and highly specialized NGO.10 Indeed, in an attempt to secure this added value, the NGO
decided in 2001 to exclusively concentrate on water (drinking water supply, sanitation,
small scale irrigation, small scale river basin management). This strategic decision, and
the subsequent idea to mainstream the principle of ‘Integrated Water Resources Manage-
ment’ (IWRM) in all its projects, have endowed WaNGO, according to some employees,
with a “comparative advantage over other NGOs—definitely at the national but to some
extent also at the European level.”11 The strategic choices to focus on water and IWRM
have been rewarding, seeing that WaNGO’s budget and number of personnel have tripled
over the past decade.
The construction of a professional and specialized profile requires the organization,
amongst other things, to formalize and make explicit the field intervention procedures. By
2010, WaNGO had developed explicit operational strategies on: IWRM, the ‘articulation
8Observed in the occasion of the European Water Facility call of 2010.
9Interview ex executive director of WaNGO, 17 Apr 2012.
10Personal communication of several WaNGO employees, February - July 2010.
11Interview with the IWRM focal point of WaNGO, 30 June 2010.
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of actors’ in the countries of intervention, the ‘municipal ownership of works’ (in French:
‘Maˆıtrise d’Ouvrage Communale’, MdO), and a number of country-specific operational
strategies. The professionalization drive also requires the organization to keep up with the
latest evolutions in development. Although development professionals themselves readily
mock the overpowering but transitory attraction of bandwagon concepts in international
development, and the necessity to “speak the right language at the right time” 12 it is
commonly accepted that by carefully adhering new theories or concepts an organization
can anticipate criticism and position itself as avant-garde (Brunsson, 2003; Ku¨hl, 2009).
Whether transitory or not, the increasing focus on CB is such an important evolution in
development.
Since CB was already transversally —but implicitly— part of WaNGO’s operational
strategies concerning the ‘articulation of actors’ and MdO, the organization was reluc-
tant to develop a separate operational strategy on CB. In 2010, however, two events
coincided: first, the NGOs receiving programmatic funding from DGD had to submit
an updated 3-year planning, and second, SEODC published its sector-wide evaluation of
the CB practices by Belgian NGOs. SEODC had positively evaluated the implicit CB
activities of WaNGO, but DGD nevertheless made clear to WaNGO, via official way and
in informal audiences, that it expected WaNGO to describe its capacity building strategy
more explicitly in the updated 3-year planning. “The situation has become dramatic,”
one independent consultant stated, “the term has to appear on every page [of the pro-
posal].”13 Besides complying with this request to make CB more explicit, WaNGO also
started developing a complete operational strategy on CB, which forcibly had to included
many elements of the existing operational strategies on IWRM, on the ‘articulation of
actors’, and on MdO.
Interpretation of CB WaNGO anyhow remains hesitant to use the term CB, as the
employees consider it to be very ‘workshop-oriented’ and to include a paternalistic view
on knowledge transfer.14 Therefore, WaNGO never considered itself to be a ‘capacity
builder’.15 Until the late 1990s, WaNGO usually implemented its projects in the Global
South by selecting one apt local NGO partner and offering it technical assistance in the
planning, execution, financing and maintenance of infrastructure and services. Only in
the late 1990s WaNGO developed a more articulate view concerning the roles of the many
actors active in the field. In the current approach WaNGO inscribes itself into the official
institutional structures of the country —this happens for instance in Benin and Mali—
and focuses on assisting the different decentralized administrative bodies in assuming their
12Uttered in various occasions by external consultants, governmental officials, NGO employees.
13Interview with independent Belgian consultant, 17 April 2012.
14Interview with one of the WaNGO directors, on 29 June 2010, and interview with the ex managing
director of WaNGO, 17 April 2012.
15Answer of WaNGO to the SEODC questionnaire about CB, end 2009.
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Figure 6.2: The ideal ‘articulation of actors’ in Mali, according to WaNGO.
legal responsibilities. This approach, which WaNGO calls the ‘articulation of actors’ at
‘meso’ level, reduces WaNGO’s own role to that of ‘catalyst of change’, and raises the
role of the municipality to that of ‘contractor and owner of works and infrastructure’ (in
French: ’Maˆıtre d’Ouvrage Communale’). The key word in this ‘articulation of actors’ is
not ‘capacity’ but the French word ‘compe´tence’. This word conveys the idea that the
actors not only need ‘skills’ but also the ‘legal competence’ to be able to play their role.
Although WaNGO remains reluctant to define their approach as CB, their way of
working suits the donors’ preoccupation very well: the transfer of responsibilities and
ownership to the official structures in the aid-receiving countries.
WaNGO’s advanced scheme of interaction strips the local NGOs —the former direct
partners— of their pivotal role and exclusively ascribes them a role of ‘social intermedia-
tion’ (SI-NGOs). They assist WaNGO in building the capacities of the municipalities, as
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well as the capacities of the water management committees and water user committees
at the village (or ‘micro’) level.
Of course the views on CB of the WaNGO empolyees are not uniform. Within the
organization, personal interpretations of CB range from a materialistic extreme —“we
only develop the capacities of the municipalities because our final aim is to deliver infras-
tructure that works”— to the processual extreme —“WaNGO supports the local actors
in playing their role; the quality of infrastructure is secondary to the learning process.”16
Despite this divergence, all employees agreed during focus group discussions that CB
has an important role in the operations of WaNGO, and agreed that their CB activities
should remain confined to the water sector only.17 They also agreed that, like in the
theoretical CB models (see page 87), WaNGO intervenes at three different levels: WaNGO
calls them ‘micro, meso, macro’ instead of ‘individual, organizational, societal’.
WaNGO equally affirms that they are concerned with the development of the func-
tional capacities of the municipalities —those functional capacities that embody the mu-
nicipal MdO— such as long-term planning, publishing and managing tenders, monitoring
and evaluating the construction of water infrastructure, delegating the management of
water infrastructure, accounting, etc. The WaNGO headquarters still have no clear idea,
however, which steps they actually take in building those functional capacities, and hence
their CB efforts remain under the radar. In the current state of affairs WaNGO is only
able to monitor and evaluate the results of their CB activities.18
6.4.3 The field office’s interests and translation
WaNGO intervenes in Mali since 1994. In the first years it assisted 2 local NGOs in
improving irrigation infrastructure and drinking water supply. In 2002-3 the WaNGO
headquarters started planning an innovative and long-term program in the IND, that
would unify existing and new interventions under the IWRM principle, and that would
abandon the local NGOs as principal partners in favor of the municipalities. A permanent
WaNGO-Mali office was created in the IND in 2004 and the IWRMIND program19 took
off in 4 IND municipalities. The program gradually expanded, and the fourth phase
(2011-2013) now covers 18 municipalities. The first three phases drew on project-based
funding from the Belgian government and the European Water Facility. By the time
the fourth phase started, the IWRMIND program was inscribed in the DGD-sponsored
programmatic budget line of WaMGO (cf. section 6.4.2).
As put forward by WaNGO’s operational strategies on the ‘articulation of actors’ and
16Focus group discussion, 5 May 2010.
17Ibid.
18Focus group discussion, 5 May 2010, and interview with the director of Southern Operations, 29
June 2010.
19This is a pseudonym.
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MdO, WaNGO supports the decentralization process in Mali. Indeed, initiated by the
decree 93/08 of 1993, the Malian central government has been delegating policy making
competences and public ownership to the lower administrative levels (the 8 regions, 49
cercles, 1 capital district, and 703 municipalities). In matters of water infrastructure,
the Malian law (Malian decree 95-401/P-RM) identifies the municipality as the exclusive
decision-making body, as well as the contractor and the owner of the infrastructure (i.e.
the MdO). The 2002 Water Code (law 02-006) confirmed this. Mayors and municipal
councils were elected for the first time in 1999.
According to the National Investment Agency of Local Governments (ANICT, 2005),
municipal MdO implies that the municipality (i) hears the needs of the population and
plans all interventions in their territory in a communal Plan for Social, Economic and
Cultural Development (PDSEC); (ii) publishes public invitations to tender for the design
and construction of the infrastructure; (iii) follows up and evaluates the works; (iv) man-
ages the infrastructure or delegates the management to other legal entities.
Besides decision-making and public ownership, the decentralization process also fore-
sees a transfer of the technical services20 of the various ministries to the regional and
cercle level. The National Water Directorate (DNH) —technical service of the Ministry
of Energy and Water— officially transferred (Law 99-023) part of its competences to the
8 Regional Water and Energy Directorates (DRHEs). One of the duties of the DRHE
units is to deliver technical support to the municipalities in terms of planning and design
of the infrastructure and evaluation of the outsourced works.
The CB activities of WaNGO-Mali need to be read against the background of this
complex network of decentralized actors (as in figure 6.2), in which WaNGO-Mali tries
to be a catalyst that stimulates all actors “to play their roles.”21 There is, however, a dis-
crepancy between, on the one hand, what is stated by WaNGO in the Logical Framework
(logframe),22 and on the other hand, what WaNGO-Mali actually does.
Interpretation of CB All activities of WaNGO-Mali in the IND are, in the first
place, determined and constrained by the IWRMIND logframe (and the related planning
and budget), exactly as it was formulated by the WaNGO headquarters and approved
20In francophone Africa, the term ‘de´centralisation’ is reserved for the transfer of decision-making
competencies from the national to lower levels, whereas ‘de´concentration’ is used to indicate the transfer
of the technical services (part of ministries) from the national to regional or lower levels. In English this
distinction is not made.
21The wording used by the WaNGO personnel to refer to the ‘articulation of actors’.
22The Logical Framework (logframe) is a format used to describe the layout of a project and to facilitate
the monitoring and evaluation of it. Central in the logframe is the envisaged outcome of the project.
The logframe breaks up the project in a large number of autonomous activities, that lead to a small
number of results. All results together culminate in the one project outcome, which contributes to a
long-term impact. The logframe was first used by USAID in the early 1970s. Soon after, the logframe
was required by most donors for the formulation of development projects. The European Union and the
Belgian government are no exception.
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by the donor. In the logframe all CB activities are programmed under ‘Result 1’, which
annunciates that “the different actors are capable of assuming their respective role that is
conferred to them by the legal dispositions of the Malian decentralization.” Still according
to the logframe, Result 1 will be attained through 11 activities, but WaNGO-Mali is only
in charge of those that directly involve the municipality. All CB activities involving
subjects other than the municipalities, are, according to the logframe, delegated: the CB
of user committees and management committees of the infrastructure is outsourced by the
municipality to local SI-NGOs, and the CB of the SI-NGOs is left to other international
organizations. The decentralized DRHE and the cercle authorities get implicated in
meetings and are encouraged to “play their role,” but they do not receive CB support.
As various scholars observed, the enforcement of the fixed logframe format easily
leads to the rigidification of activities and indicators, with a focus on countable results
(Gasper, 2000). Particularly in CB, a dimension of aid that aims at altering relational
agency rather than producing countable results, the activities and indicators programmed
in the logframe pose in se a barrier to CB (James, 2010; Ortiz Arago´n, 2010; Woodhill,
2010). Indicators of CB progress in the IWRMIND logframe are equally output-oriented
and stated in quantified terms: “all municipalities have autonomously managed at least
5 steps of the MdO,”or “80% of the management committees respect the delegation
contract with the municipality.”23
In practice, these quantified indicators and outputs seem out of touch of the CB ac-
tivities of WaNGO-Mali, which are continuous, gradual and process-oriented rather than
output-oriented. As the capacities of the rural municipalities are generally considered to
be very low (see section 6.4.4), the CB strategy consists of continuous and close support
in each step of the MdO process —“we check every call-for-tenders, and sometimes need
to write them”24— and ad hoc trainings. Nor does WaNGO-Mali exclusively focus on the
municipalities, although they do constitute “an entry point [. . . ] to articulate and sensi-
tize all actors.”25 WaNGO is the binding glue of all actors in the program and omnipresent
in the network. The SI-NGOs for instance, grassroots NGOs with respectable capacities,
work under the close guidance of WaGNO-Mali, while on paper they are contracted by
the municipalities.
Nevertheless, compliance with the logframe —the timely delivery of reports, infras-
tructure, and disbursements— formally remains the field office’s most compelling worry.
The inability to disburse payments due to delays in the execution of works, for instance,
is counterintuitively of greater concern to WaNGO-Mali than a hypothetical inability
to disburse due to a lack of liquidity. Therefore, WaNGO-Mali heavily weighs in on all
links in the network and all steps in the projects —“the opinion of WaNGO-Mali is al-
23Stated in the logframe of IWRMIND-3.
24Interview with former project manager of IWRMIND, 30 June 2010.
25Interview with IWRMIND-3 manager, 19 September 2010.
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ways preponderant”26— in order to produce the verifiable output that was stated in the
logframe.
WaNGO’s field employees are aware of the discrepancy between the actual CB activ-
ities of WaNGO-Mali and what WaNGO states in the logframe as output:27
The [immaterial] results are never as nice as what you write in the project proposal.
That’s simply a characteristic of development cooperation. It is also a matter of
obtaining funding: you have to aim high [. . . ] I saw the new proposal of IWRMIND-
4 and it was just a copy of IWRMIND-3 —which I had written— because half of
it was not achieved. Well, probably the number of wells was achieved, but not
the IWRM and CB objectives. You simply don’t know when you will achieve the
objectives, because you are in the treadmill of project after project after project.
6.4.4 The municipalities’ interests and translation
Many actors —national and international— are active in the water supply and sanitation
sector in the IND.28 In 2010 the governmental DNHE agency was constructing water sup-
ply and sanitation infrastructure in 18 municipalities of the IND, with French bilateral
aid. However, the number of wells constructed in the IND by non-governmental organiza-
tions was many times higher than the number of wells constructed by DNHE. According
to the decentralization law, the municipality remains the privileged interlocutor for all
these interventions—whether governmental or not.29
The municipal development plan (PDSEC), which the municipalities are supposed to
develop each 5 years with the involvement of the population, should be the central tool
in coordinating the actions of the different interveners in the municipal territory (Law
95-034), as it should define the needs of the municipality in different sectors and make a
budget estimation of the required interventions. The respect of the various external part-
ners for the PDSEC, however, varies significantly. One large American NGO-consortium,
for instance, active in 26 municipalities in the Mopti region, was heavily criticized by other
interveners for choosing the location of new wells according its own criteria, regardless
the planning in the PDSEC.30 “Some interveners impose their program,” or “sometimes
they do not even inform the municipality, or only very late.”31 Also the governmental
program in 18 IND municipalities suffered from the same ills. As wells were used as
currency in a horse trade of political favors, a conflict rose between the French and the
Malian consultancy companies about the selection of the most ‘needy’ municipalities and
villages.32
26Personal communication independent consultant, 24 September 2010.
27Interview with former project manager of IWRMIND, 30 June 2010.
28In 2010 there were two governmental and six non-governmental programs at work that each invested
at least AC500,000 in the water supply and sanitation sector in the Mopti region.
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All parties, including the municipalities themselves, agree that the municipalities are
too weak to manage or steer this diversity of actors intervening in their territory. The
external actors see three important reasons for this.33 First, as Mali is weighed down by an
average illiteracy rate of 75% (which is even higher in the rural IND and higher amongst
adults than youngsters) there is very little technical capacity available (at individual
level) amongst the municipal council members and the mayors. “The municipalities
simply don’t master the propositions made by external interveners.”34 In some rural
municipalities all MdO capacities of the municipality are concentrated in one person.
Second, with each new election —municipal elections have been held in 1999, 2004 and
2009— there is a high renewal of council members, and the effects of the trainings and
other CB efforts get significantly reduced. “Basically you need to repeat each kind of
training at least every 5 years.”35 Third, due to a lack of political will within the central
ministry to really decentralize the technical services to the regional DRHE units,36 the
latter lack the financial and human resources to provide the municipalities with technical
assistance.
The lack of capacity at municipal level is experienced by the external interveners
—WaNGO as well as others— as a “waiting attitude” on the part of the municpalities.
“The municipalities or the DRHE rarely claim their legal role vis-a`-vis the external inter-
veners.” As a result “the identification of needs is done by the interveners instead of the
municipalities.”37 This “waiting attitude,” however, is observed at any level in the admin-
istration and society. Designated as a symptom of deeply rooted aid-dependency, foreign
aid professionals claim that the “waiting attitude” towards the donors is particularly
strong in Mali, stronger than in any neighboring country.38 In practice, the municipal-
ities welcome virtually any external intervener in their territory with open arms, and
accept any imposition from them. When needed, the municipality adapts the PDSEC ex
post facto, according the wishes of the intervener.39
Interpretation of CB In closed focus group discussions,40 the municipal council mem-
bers invariably invoke the need for more interventions in their territory, and the need for
33Evaluation by the European Commission, January 2010; focus group discussion, 24 September 2010;
various personal communications.
34Focus group discussion, 24 September 2010.
35Personal communication of IWRMIND-3 manager, 20 September 2011.
36Uttered by numerous foreign development professionals and consultants in Mali, as well as a high-
ranked Malian employee of the Belgian embassy in Mali, 16 September 2010.
37Focus group discussion, 24 September 2010.
38Stated by a French technical assistant with over 25 years of experience in West Africa, 20 Sept 2010;
stated by the WaNGO-Mali head, 16 Sept 2010; stated by a Belgian technical assistant with over 25
years of experience in West Africa, 24 Apr 2012; also stated in Dante et al. (2002) and Bergamaschi
(2009).
39Focus group discussion, 24 September 2010.
40Six different focus group discussions, held in September 2010 and in October-November 2011, in six
municipalities that were partner in the IWRMIND-3 project.
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more and improved infrastructure, such as “more water wells with hand pump, the deep-
ening of the channels, more dykes, the deepening of the individual and collective fishing
ponds.”41 Any of these infrastructures is usually financed for 90% by the intervener, 5%
by the municipality, and 5% by the villagers through the delivery of labor.
The municipalities always rely on external organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental, to take the initiative to construct this infrastructure. “The technical ser-
vices and the NGOs have done much already to construct infrastructure and build the
capacities in Soye´. But there is still a water supply network to be constructed, as well as
dykes, water level regulators, the deepening of the ponds [. . . ].”42
The municipalities are aware that they show little initiative in constructing the needed
infrastructure and that they hardly take up their role as MdO in the water sector. “We
lack the capacities to play our role as MdO.”43 “We are poor and we need, above all,
guidance.”44 Moreover, given that the Malian law obliges all interveners to cooperate with
the municipality, the municipality cannot cope with the high flux: “we don”t manage to
canalize all interventions in our territory.”45
They believe that this lack of capacity can be coped with in two ways. One the
one hand, they ask more training from the intervening NGOs. According to the council
members of virtually all municipalities, capacity building is indeed a synonym of trainings
and workshops. On the other hand, they also ask a more significant involvement of the
technical services, which have remained achingly absent: “We don’t know DRH, we don’t
know who they are, we have never seen them.”46 In principle, assisting the municipalities
in the technical matters of MdO is one of the tasks of DRH—but they rarely assist rural
municipalities.
6.4.5 Intermediating NGOs
The municipalities can contractually delegate the management of drinking water infras-
tructure to “any physical or moral person, public or private” without renouncing to the
legal ownership of the infrastructure (Water Code, Law 02-006). Usually the management
of a well or any other small-scale infrastructure is delegated to a management committee
created ad hoc at village level. In the articulation of actors envisaged by WaNGO, the
SI-NGOs are charged with (i) assisting the management committees of a well, latrine, or
a sewerage systems, in managing the infrastructure and collecting payments, (ii) assist-
ing the user committees of the infrastructure, (iii) sensitizing the population on hygienic
practices and on the correct use of the infrastructure.
41Focus group discussion with the council members of Ke´wa, 27 Oct 2011.
4221 Oct 2011
43Focus group discussion, 24 September 2010.
44Focus group discussion with the council members of Togue´-Mourrari, 26 Oct 2011.
45Focus group discussion, 24 September 2010.
46Focus group discussion, 26 October 2011.
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The SI-NGOs are contracted because they are well-anchored in the local context
—their work radius is usually limited to a small number of municipalities— and be-
cause their employees are educated to such a level that they can translate the ‘technical-
scientific’ world view (and francophone concepts) of the external development actors into
the world view (and language) of the local populations (Olivier de Sardan, 2005). They
do not exclusively collaborate with WaNGO-Mali, but are usually involved in various
projects and programs.
In the current state of play, WaNGO-Mali assists the municipalities in recruiting SI-
NGOs through an open call for tenders, at the beginning of each new phase of IWRMIND.
Obviously, thanks to their highly specialized experience, the three SI-NGOs selected in
phase 1 and 2 were reselected in phase 3. During IWRMIND-3, six SI-NGOs operated
in the 14 municipalities. Given that phase 3 of IWRMIND foresaw 98,000 people to
benefit from drinking water infrastructure, and 50,000 from improved sanitation, these
six SI-NGOs had a huge task to accomplish.
The organizations labeled by WaNGO as ‘SI-NGOs’ are, however, not necessarily
specialized capacity builders, but rather versatile grassroots NGOs. In fact, during the
planning phase of IWRMIND-1, back in 2002-2003, WaNGO had resolved to directly
assist seven grassroots NGOs in 4 municipalities, according the habitual approach (cf.
the period 1994-2003). Eventually WaNGO decided to partner the 4 municipalities them-
selves rather than the local NGOs—this was actually more in line with the Malian decen-
tralization process and with WaNGO’s new ‘articulation of actors’ approach. The NGO
partners in the field, to the contrary, experienced this change in strategy at the advent
of the IWRMIND program as “a turn of 90 degrees.”47 While the 4 municipalities “were
the winners”48 of the new approach, there was “high uncertainty amongst the losing
NGOs” about their employment, despite WaNGO having promised them a role as social
mediators.49
Interpretation of CB According to the SI-NGOs,50 their CB activities aim at the
“improvement of the quality of services in the field.”51 They believe that knowledge is
the crucial element to achieve a higher quality: the public needs to know about correct
hygienic practices, the villagers need to know how to set up and elect a management
committee for the new infrastructure, the management committee needs to know how to
47Interview with the head of Southern Operations, 29 June 2010
48Interview project manager of IWRMIND-1, 4 November 2011.
49Ibid.
50The data reported in this section derives from focus group discussions with two SI-NGOs that were
contracted during all phases of IWRMIND. The first, a Malian NGO etablished in 1980 with a technical
profile, used to be one of WaNGO’s two privileged partners in Mali, in the early years before the existence
of the IWRMIND program (the period 1997-2004). The other, a Malian NGO established in 2001 with
a focus on natural resources management in the Sahel, entered the scene at the start of IWRMIND-1.
51Focus group discussion, 21 September 2010
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keep account of the payments, etc. “CB is about expanding the basic knowledge that is
already present.”52
The SI-NGOs therefore employ sensitization campaigns (‘animations ’) to inform the
public, organize trainings for the management committees, and closely follow up on the
committees by means of regular visits. According to them, their work has been successful
when (i) people use the infrastructure in a correct and hygienic manner, (ii) the infras-
tructure is working and well maintained, and (iii) the management committee meetings
and service payments are duly documented in the books (‘cahiers ’).
The view of WaNGO-Mali on the CB tasks of the SI-NGOs does slightly differ from
that of the SI-NGOs themselves. WaNGO-Mali spurs the SI-NGOs to focus more on
processes —such as the election and voting procedures in the committees, the relation
of the committees with the users, the villagers’ readiness to pay for the service, etc.—
rather than to concentrate on what is actually written in the cahiers. The diverging use
of the word ‘tool’ (or ‘outil ’ in French) is telling. WaNGO-Mali considers the election
procedure of the committee, or the contract between the committee and the municipality,
important ‘tools’, whereas the SI-NGOs use the word ‘tool’ in a more material sense, in
particular to indicate the cahiers.53 In a large number of rural villages the high illiteracy
rate impedes the management committee to duly update the cahiers —for the SI-NGOs
an indicator of low capacity— but it does not impede the committee to organize regular
committee meetings—for WaNGO-Mali an indicator that the committee does possess
some capacities.54
The fact remains, however, that the donor conveniently evaluates the effective func-
tioning of the management committees by checking the status of the cahiers rather than
the frequency or quality of non-registered meetings. A critical mid-term evaluation of
IWRMIND-3 by the European Commission in 2010 exemplified this.
6.5 Discussion
Since the turn of the millennium the CB concept is a top priority to virtually all devel-
opment organizations, at the multilateral, bilateral, and non-governmental level (Eade,
2005; Ku¨hl, 2009; Clarke and Oswald, 2010), but despite the hegemonic usage of the
term, the exact meaning remains unclear. As argued above, the influential models share
important features, and so do the policies of the donors and multilateral agencies, but the
interpretations by the many other actors in the network —that links the policy makers
with the field professionals, and the donors with the rural villages— differ significantly.
From the data described in previous section, I have derived three statements concern-
52Focus group discussion, 21 September 2010
53Ibid.
54WaNGO-Mali employee, 21 September 2010.
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Actor Interests Interpretations of Interpretations of
‘capacity’ ‘capacity building’
Donor account to multilateral
organizations, account to
the national media and
the parliament




WaNGO show level of profession-
alism and specialization,
show that donor’s desires





all actors “play their
role”








in each step of MdO,
with focus on skills
Municipalities secure more and better
infrastructure
channel and overview all





SI-NGOs win contracts from exter-
nal interveners
improved quality of ser-






port, with focus on
outputs
MdO = Maˆıtrise d’Ouvrage Communale = Ownership of works and infrastructure
Table 6.3: Interests of the actors, and their interpretations of capacity and CB
ing the network of actors that links —or spans the ‘gap’ between— policy making and
implementation in CB.
First, each actor’s interpretation of CB is unavoidably a translation of the own in-
terests, and therefore, through his or her interpretation of CB, the actor reaffirms the
relevance of the own position in the network (see Table 6.3). This statement does not
pretend to uncover an alleged opportunism amongst the actors, yet claims the constructed
character of the network of actors that sustains the paradigm.
The network of actors described in section 6.4 has a long history: WaNGO receives
funding from the Belgian government since the late 1970s; the organization is present
in Mali since 1994; it started supporting two local NGOs in the IND in 1997; and the
municipalities, officially created in 1993, were included in WaNGO’s IWRMIND program
from 2004 on. Rapid reconfigurations of this vast, multi-continental network are unlikely,
as actors usually have more interests in maintaining the configuration than in changing
it. Moreover, the formal competencies and highly situated but complementary knowledge
that each actors in the network possesses are essential for the network as a whole to achieve
the goals.
The donor, pressed to harmonize the ODA spending from different sides —by mul-
tilateral engagements, the parliament, the national media, and the Belgian NGO sector
itself— eagerly calls upon CB as the paradigm par excellence to comply with the Paris
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Declaration, and thrusts this paradigm on the NGO sector.
WaNGO, a mid-sized NGO that almost entirely relies on governmental funding, care-
fully presents itself to the donors as a professional and specialized NGO that supports
the ‘articulation’ of decentralized actors, with a particular focus on the municipal owner-
ship or ‘MdO communale’ of water infrastructure. Although CB was already implicitly
present in the operational strategies, and although there is a certain reluctance to label
the own actions as CB, WaNGO started elaborating an explicit CB strategy at the time
that it needed to present an updated 3-year planning to DGD in 2010.
The executive branch of WaNGO in Mali tries to operationalize the ‘articulation of
actors’ and MdO through the close follow-up of all actors, especially the municipality,
focusing on skills and processes such as planning and the management of calls-for-tenders.
The logframe, however, forces WaNGO-Mali to ultimately shift the focus from processes
to countable outcomes (such as the number of trainings and meetings organized, or the
number of tenders successfully managed), given that the logframe is also used by the
donors as evaluation basis.
The municipalities’ principal interest is to have external partners constructing infras-
tructure (wells, dams, channels, ponds) in their territory. There is no lack of external
interveners—to the contrary, the municipalities admit that they lack the capacities to
channel and overview all interventions. They believe that regular trainings of the munici-
pal council members and a better support from the (not very well) decentralized technical
services can improve this lack of capacities at municipal level.
And finally, the grassroots NGOs in the IND, which were ‘degraded’ by WaNGO from
privileged partners to service provider, are now contracted in the capacity of SI-NGOs to
assist the management committees at village level. The SI-NGOs usually work in a small
number of municipalities and collaborate with different international organizations at the
same time in their territory. They set themselves up as crucial to make the connection
with the local populations. In the case of IWRMIND, the SI-NGOs heavily focus their
work on outputs, such as: correct hygienic manners, or cahiers that are kept up to date.
Each of these actors, from donor over NGO to the municipalities, employs the CB
vocabulary in abundance, without being tackled about their interpretation of it. Indeed,
rather than a precise policy, CB supplies the actors with a lingua franca to display their
highly situated knowledge of the situation and their highly situated role in the situation.
Or as Mosse (2004, p.651) observed, “development interventions are driven not by policy
but by the exigencies of organizations and the need to maintain relationships.”
The second conclusion is that there is no gap between policy making and policy-
implementation, since neither policy making nor policy-implementation exist as self-
contained realms. One can hardly sustain that one of the donors acted as a authori-
tarian policy maker that imposed a specific CB vision. Various theoretical CB models
have been discretionarily adopted by different donors, agencies and NGOs. The Belgian
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government, for instance, has never selected a particular CB model as the ‘correct’ one.
Also SEODC, although it used the Baser and Morgan (2008) model as benchmark for
the 2010 evaluation, positively evaluated a plethora of different CB approaches.
Shifting the focus to the NGO, there is no reason to believe that the CB paradigm
was ‘imposed’ on WaNGO by one single policy making body. The CB paradigm entered
the organization steadily,55 in the first place through the calls-for-proposals published
by the European Water Facility56 (“the calls-for-proposals of the European Commission
influence us more than the [Belgian] DGD”57), later in a more explicit way through
the SEODC evaluation and the pressure exerted by DGD. On the other hand, WaNGO
is also convinced that they themselves have been influential to some extent in steering
DGD’s policies —concerning MdO in particular— given that WaNGO personnel has been
contracted a number of times by the DGD and the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC)
to outline BTC interventions in the field.58
In brief, there does not exist a policy making realm separated from a policy-implemen-
tation realm, nor does there exist a gap between both. That the Minister of Development
Cooperation inscribes CB in the framework of the Paris Declaration, and that the SI-
NGO interprets it in terms of updated cahiers, does not mean that there is a gap between
policy making and policy-implementation. Quite the contrary, there need to be numerous
but sufficiently small translations from one actor to another, as each actor needs to bridge
the small gap in interests and knowledge that exist between him or herself and the closest
ally, by means of a mutually intelligible translation. Policy making and implementation
are supported by the same network of actors—but of those actors, no one controls the
entire network.
Finally, interests and interpretations mutually constitute each other and are subject
to constant renegotiation; this is how the network manages to support new paradigms.
That the new paradigm is eagerly adopted by actors to redress the own discourse with
new vocables, and to re-translate the own interests, does not mean that a new paradigm
cannot change anything. The trend to shift the focus from infrastructure to capacities,
and from partnering local NGOs to developing the administrative bodies in the country, is
coming through since at least a decade. Although actors do control their interpretation of
new paradigms and the translations of their interests, they are nevertheless “on a wave”59
that carries them in a certain direction. For instance, the decentralization process and
the CB paradigm—they are hard to tear apart in Mali— did change WaNGO’s approach
55A manual on MdO, published by WaNGO in 2011, mentioned “capacity” 15 times per 100 pages,
whereas a similar manual on MdO in Mali, dating from 2007, used the term only 2 times per 100 pages.
56The call guidelines of the European Water Facility (first call in November 2004, second call in March
2006) listed capacity building actions as 1 of 3 fundable types of intervention.
57Interview with a former IWRMIND manager, 30 June 2010.
58Interview with one WaNGO director, 29 Jun 2010, and interview with ex executive director, 17 Apr
2012.
59Interview with a former IWRMIND manager, 30 June 2010.
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in the field: the municipalities were promoted to the status of principal partner, at the
expense of the local NGOs.
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Chapter 7
Water policy changes in West Africa,
between structure and agency
To exist is to differ
Gabriel Tarde
7.1 Introduction
The extent to which donors have implicitly or explicitly used official development assis-
tance to promote donor-aligned policy changes in recipient countries has varied consider-
ably during the history of development aid (Crawford, 2001; Pronk, 2003). The gradual
shift from structural adjustment programs in the 1990s to poverty reduction strategies
was presented as a renunciation to donor-driven aid conditionality in favor of the owner-
ship of aid and development. In the 2000s, the ownership agenda was further formalized
by the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action at a global level, and re-
lated Poverty Reduction Strategies or Growth and Sustainable Development Strategies
at national level.
Nevertheless, many scholars cast doubts on the ownership discourse’s veracity (Whit-
field and Fraser, 2009; Booth, 2011). Whitfield and Fraser (2010) for example, demon-
strate that a government’s degree of ownership of reforms and projects correlates with
geopolitical and macro-economic conditions, independently from international agreements
such as the Paris Declaration. Indeed, the cases adduced by Whitfield show that highly
aid-dependent African governments are more likely to write proposals that align with the
ideas of donors. Moreover, although most Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have their
own national development strategies, donors still have a long way to go to actually align
their aid to these plans (Wood et al., 2011). A survey of Clay et al. (2009) confirms that
‘ownership’ is indeed perceived differently by different actors; where donors declare their
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aid as untied, recipient governments still perceive the largest portion of the incoming aid
as tied.
In this chapter1 we take the discussion of ownership of policy reforms to a more fun-
damental level, as we claim that this question can be linked to the century-old quandary
of agency versus structure. Comparing water policy reforms in two neighboring West
African countries, Burkina Faso and Mali, we demonstrate how the dynamics of the re-
forms and the levels of ownership result from a complex interplay between individual
agency —displayed by policy entrepreneurs in the national sphere as well as in the sphere
of the donors and international organizations— and structuring forces —embodied by
institutions and hegemonic discourses.
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) constitutes our entry point for the
description of water policy changes of in both countries. IWRM is defined by its principal
global advocate, the Global Water Partnership (GWP), as “a process that promotes the
coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources, in order
to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (GWP, 2000a). In practice, the
implementation of IWRM supposes a cross-sectoral management of water resources as
well as a vertical integration of different decision-making levels (GWP, 2000a; Conca,
2006).
IWRM became the hegemonic paradigm for water managers worldwide in the early
1990s, when it started being promoted by the United Nations (Conca, 2006). Agenda 21
—the influential action plan that was the outcome of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992— invited all nations in the world to develop national IWRM plans (UN, 1992a).
This call was repeated in 2002 at the follow-up summit in Johannesburg.
Despite the fact that, today, nearly two thirds of all countries in the world have
national IWRM plans (UN-Water, 2012), and despite the omnipresence of IWRM in
water-related development literature, there is little understanding of how these IWRM
plans actually come into being in highly aid-dependent countries. Given the paramount
attention to ownership, what is the relative weight of international development actors
and of national decision makers in their creation? This chapter contributes to filling this
gap through a case study of two West African countries, Burkina Faso and Mali.
Burkina Faso and Mali have IWRM plans in place since 2003 and 2008, respectively. In
both cases the IWRM-inspired water policy reforms were promoted through high-profile
national-level programs that received financial and technical support from international
1This chapter is based on an article co-authored by Jean-Philippe Venot of IWMI-Burkina Faso (see
Appendix G). Jan Cherlet provided the data to describe the global and regional level, and to describe
the Malian case; Jean-Philippe Venot provided (most of) the data concerning Burkina Faso. Around
80% of the entire article was originally written by Jan Cherlet. Both authors contributed to revising and
editing the entire article.
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aid agencies.2 However, although the two neighboring countries evince many systemic
similarities (amongst the 15 least developed countries of the world, heavy reliance on
external aid, a large bureaucracy constituting the backbone of public action and authority,
and little developed water resources), the water policy reforms are characterized by very
distinct dynamics, levels of ownership, and outcomes. The two countries thus provide for
an interesting and complementary inquiry into water policy making in West Africa.
The following section provides the analytical framework of the study. We draw from
the fields of political science and anthropology of development to shed light on the equi-
librium between structure and agency that characterizes the interactions between donors
and national governments at times of policy change. The third section describes the
emergence of IWRM at the international level. In the fourth section we provide a de-
tailed account of the emergence and implementation of IWRM plans in Burkina Faso
and Mali. After describing the commonalities and differences between the two cases in
the fifth section, the conclusion infers implications for future policy changes in water and
natural resources management in African LDCs.
7.2 Structure and agency in development processes
In accordance with contemporary social thought, we subscribe to individual agency and
social structure as being two ontological dimensions that reciprocally constitute each
other (King, 2004). Our use of the word ‘structure’, however, transcends particular
theories and corresponds in broad terms with the set of rules that is imposed upon
individuals and that ensures social order. In the case of development aid these rules
are embedded in institutions (such as bureaucracies), in the politico-economic relations
between actors (including the donor-recipient relationship), in hegemonic discourses, and
they are embodied by the individuals themselves as governmentality or habitus. ‘Agency’,
in turn, refers to the capability of actors to navigate these structuring rules, generate
social change despite the structuring rules, and rewrite the rules.
The development literature has agonized over this agency-structure duality with dif-
ferent schools of thought emphasizing one or the other side of the duality. Some political
science scholars who give priority to the structural dimensions of development in their
analyses have shown how, at different points in time, the community of development
professionals have framed development problems in different terms. Hence, at different
historical moments, the development community backed different “blueprint” solutions or
“panacea” (Roberts, 2004; Thorbecke, 2007; Ostrom et al., 2007). Still at the structural
end of the spectrum, anthropologists of development that are inspired by Foucauldian
2It is estimated that more than 80% of all investments in the Burkinabe´ water sector during 1996-
2001 were funded by external actors (Gouvernement du Burkina Faso, 2003). In Mali, this percentage
amounts to nearly 90% (DNH, 2008).
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discourse theory analogously claim that, at any given historical moment, specific dis-
cursive regimes make certain development practices appropriate and others unthinkable.
Ferguson, for example, believed that the structural power of development discourses even
curbs the agency of central policy makers such as the World Bank: “the thoughts and
actions of ‘development’ bureaucrats are powerfully shaped by the world of acceptable
statements and utterances within which they live” (Ferguson, 2007 [1990], p.18).
This vision, which gives the primacy to development models and discourses in ex-
plaining development processes, has informed a critical body of literature in the water
sector (e.g. Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Molle, 2008; Barnes, 2009; Gupta, 2009; Ingram, 2011).
These scholars notably highlight that technical answers have simply given way to a socio-
engineering approach whereby a series of institutional arrangements, underpinned by
discourses that emerge from the outside, have been presented as tools to change society
in a deterministic fashion. Gupta, for instance, believes that development cooperation
has been “a driving factor in changing [water] policies and policy frameworks in the de-
veloping world” (Gupta, 2009, p.52), first in promoting large infrastructure works and
irrigation schemes, then by experimenting with different forms of local governance and
privatization.
At the agency end of the spectrum, other scholars from political sciences and an-
thropology of development pay tribute to the role of individuals in triggering or steering
development processes. Models of individual policy agents implicitly rely on the idea of
boundedly rational individuals (Schlager, 2007). Different scholars have theorized that
individuals can trigger or sustain policy change, when multiple interests converge in the
form of an ‘advocacy coalition’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) or ‘discourse coalition’
(Hajer, 1995), when a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ is destabilized (Baumgartner and Jones,
1991), by exploiting a ‘window of opportunity’ (Kingdon, 1984), or by knitting ‘policy
networks’ (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Kriesi, 1994) (see Table 7.1). In the field of an-
thropology, the Foucauldian approach has been criticized for reducing individual actors
to cogwheels in an agency-annihilating machine (Rossi, 2004). Therefore, ethnographers
have tried to describe development policy making and implementation as a concatenation
of continuous negotiations between different social worlds. Agency in the development
policy process is not limited to the ‘rule makers’. It appears at any interface where
different social worlds interact (Long and Long, 1992) and is embodied by development
‘brokers’ or ‘intermediaries’ at those interfaces (Bierschenk et al., 2000; Lewis and Mosse,
2006a).
That individuals play a crucial role in water policy change has been demonstrated in
many instances. Scheumann et al. (2010) collected numerous cases of supposedly donor-
driven policy-reforms that were seized upon by powerful local actors to serve their own
interests. Rap (2006) describes the role of a national technocratic network in making the
World Bank driven irrigation management transfer policy a success in Mexico. Drawing
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Individual strategies Underlying theories of policy change
Promoting ideas Punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991)
Discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995)
Multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984)
Building coalitions Advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993)
Discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995)
Policy networks (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Kriesi, 1994)
Recognizing and exploiting win-
dows of opportunity
Multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984)
Shopping for venues Punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991)
Policy networks (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Kriesi, 1994)
Orchestrating networks Policy networks (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Kriesi, 1994)
Adapted from Huitema et al. (2011)
Table 7.1: Strategies of water policy entrepreneurs and the classic policy change theories
that underpin their strategies
on qualitative data concerning radical water policy change in 15 countries worldwide,
Huitema et al. (2011) identified five strategies that are commonly harnessed by “water
policy entrepreneurs” and that echo the policy change theories described earlier (cf. Table
7.1). The five strategies are: promoting new ideas, building coalitions, recognizing and
exploiting windows of opportunity (i.e. the leverage of external events to open up a policy
void and to promote new policy ideas), shopping various venues (different governmental
levels and ministries, media, international networks and forums, multiple donors), and
orchestrating a wider network of formal and informal actors involved in the policy domain.
The above literature review shows that structural conditions such as development
discourses and institutions condition the behavior of individual actors. Notwithstanding,
individual actors have been able to generate social change in numerous occasions, includ-
ing in the water sector. Grasping the balance between individual choices and structural
determinants and the relative importance of national and international policy entrepre-
neurs appears key to the understanding of how water policy changes come into being.
This is what this chapter intends to do with regards to IWRM, first at the global level,
then in the two neighboring countries of Burkina Faso and Mali.
7.3 Emergence of IWRM in the multi-lateral sphere
Until the 1990s, international and national donor agencies largely ignored the need for
water resources management, as their financial and technical support to the water sector
was focused on the provision of drinking water and sanitation (Conca, 2006). Indeed, the
first United Nations Water Conference, held in 1977 in Mar del Plata, largely focused on
drinking water supply and laid the ground for the International Drinking Water Supply
and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) in 1980-1990. Towards the end of the 1980s, uneasiness
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grew in the community of water professionals and academics notably within the Inter-
national Water Resources Association (IWRA)—on the ground that the cross-sectoral
dimension of water was being ignored in most development interventions.
Building on their first-hand experience that IDWSSD projects were severely limited
by their sectoral approach, a number of senior water advisors of the Danish International
Development Agency (Danida), which had been an important sponsor of IDWSDD, sug-
gested Danida to establish a Nordic Freshwater Initiative (NFI).3 The NFI had the ex-
plicit objective to feed operational guidelines for integrated water resources planning and
management to the forthcoming United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Jønch-Clausen, 1992). Thanks to two key
events —the first Stockholm Water Symposium of 1991 and a subsequent informal con-
sultation with high-level water professionals from multi-lateral agencies in Copenhagen—
a small cluster of Nordic IWRA professionals, united in the NFI, managed to inject into
the Rio process a Copenhagen Statement and Report that advocated two core principles
for good water management: (i) water needs to be managed at the “lowest appropriate”
decision-making level, and (ii) it needs to be managed as “a finite resource with an eco-
nomic value” (NFI, 1992). The Copenhagen Report is the first document known to use
the phrase “integrated water resources management” (NFI, 1992).
In January 1992, 28 UN agencies and 58 other organizations met in Dublin for the
International Conference on Water and Environment (ICWE) —the last preparatory
meeting UNCED in Rio the Janeiro— and agreed on the so-called Dublin Principles,
which directly followed from the Copenhagen Statement. At UNCED later that year wa-
ter did not attract the high-level regime-building negotiations that surrounded climate,
forest and biodiversity (Conca, 2006), but the action plan that was published afterwards,
Agenda 21, dedicated an entire chapter to water. Agenda 21 is the first inter-governmental
policy document to use the phrase “integrated water resources management”. Explicitly
endorsing IWRM, Agenda 21 suggests that all states “could [have] designed and initi-
ated costed and targeted national action programmes [. . . ] and appropriate institutional
structures [for IWRM] by the year 2000” (UN, 1992a).
Danida perceived UNCED as a major success and renewed its engagement in water-
related development for reasons clearly articulated by one of our key informants: “the
Danish government was very happy with the Copenhagen and Dublin Statements and
with the impact they had [in Rio], because that is what governments and donors care
about: to have a strong footprint. So, Danida got very keen on this IWRM”.4 An earlier
presence in Uganda and the involvement of senior Ugandan decision makers in the NFI
prompted Danida to choose this country as a pilot case for the development of a national
Water Action Plan (1993-1994). This plan can be considered the first African IWRM
3Interview with senior Danida advisor, 4 January 2012
4Ibid.
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plan avant la lettre. The Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI), a not-for-profit research
foundation that was and still is the long-standing partner of Danida in water affairs, and
whose Water & Environment division was led by the former NFI chair, proved pivotal in
the development of this plan.
The vision that UNCED and Agenda 21 constituted a success was not shared by all
water professionals, some of whom highlighted, first, a shift away from the more technicist
approach of the Dublin principle towards a more developmentalist agenda and, second,
the fact that Agenda 21 constituted “a long list of unreachable and unfundable targets,
with no fewer than 184 activities advocated in the [water] chapter alone” (Briscoe and
Garn, 1994, p.29). In that context, the Dublin Principles, not Agenda 21, continued to
inspire the World Bank, OECD, and the French and Nordic bilateral agencies in water
matters (Briscoe and Garn, 1994). This partly explains why the global call for elaborating
IWRM plans did not find the hearing that was hoped for.
The Danida/DHI tandem engaged in replicating the Ugandan experience in Central
America (1997-99) and Burkina Faso (1998-2001), and co-organized with the Burkinabe´
government a regional IWRM conference (in Ouagadougou in 1998) where 11 West-
African heads of state marked their commitment to the development of a regional and
national IWRM plans. At the global level, the institutionalization of IWRM continued
with the establishment of a World Water Council (WWC) and a Global Water Partnership
(GWP).
GWP was created upon the initiative of the World Bank, the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP), and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
in 1996. It is a global network organization, with relays at regional and national levels,
which advocates the implementation of IWRM plans and institutions around the world.
Upon its creation, GWP was closely linked to Danida and DHI. The same Danida water
professional who had led the NFI became the first chair of the GWP’s technical com-
mittee, and DHI became GWP’s technical secretariat. Also in 1996, the World Water
Council (WWC) was created, jointly by IWRA and the French utility company Suez-
Lyonnaise des Eaux. It is a membership organization for private companies, government
and development agencies, whose main activity is the organization of the triennial, highly
influential World Water Forum (WWF). This forum has been repeatedly used to advance
the IWRM agenda at global level, as was the case in 2000, when GWP presented a
Framework for Action that again spurred the world to have comprehensive policies and
strategies for IWRM in process of implementation in 75% of countries by 2005 and in all
countries by 2015 (GWP, 2000b).
IWRM reached its pinnacle at global level at the World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment, held in Johannesburg in 2002, ten years after Rio. Effective lobbying of Denmark,
Sweden and Germany through the European Commission and of GWP through its highly
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ramified network put IWRM on the Johannesburg agenda.5 Governments were urged,
once more, to develop national IWRM plans.
The insistent call rallied new organizations and donors in support of IWRM. On the
one hand, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) created the so-called
IWRM 2005 Programme to support IWRM planning in over 60 countries and 10 regions
of the world between 2005 and 2008. Danida was the main sponsor, and the UNEP-DHI
Centre for Water and Environment was in charge of the implementation. GWP, on the
other hand, attracted sponsorship from the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) for its new Partnership for Africa’s Water Development (PAWD), which aimed
at developing IWRM plans in five African countries, including Mali.
7.4 IWRM-inspired water policy changes in Burkina
Faso and Mali
This section gives a detailed account of the formulation and implementation of a set of
water policy reforms inspired by IWRM in Burkina Faso and Mali since the mid-1990s.
Burkina Faso: Local entrepreneurship in a precursor country
Burkina Faso formulated its first national policy after the great drought of 1973-74, with
the support of international donors and notably the French cooperation. The policy
laid the ground for state-led infrastructure development programs and was revised twice
during the 1980s but did not change in essence (Gouvernement du Burkina Faso, 1998;
van der Schaaf, 2001). In 1992, under the Structural Adjustment Program, a major
adjustment was made to the policy in order to reduce the involvement of the State in the
water sector and to increase the responsibility of the users.
The next significant policy shift in the Burkinabe´ water sector took place in the mid-
1990s, posing Burkina Faso as a precursor in the promotion and adoption of IWRM
principles in the West African region. According to the head of the then General Di-
rectorate of Hydraulics (DGH), which oversaw the water sector at that time, several
concomitant conditions can explain such a shift.6 First, there was a growing disenchant-
ment, at national level, with the IDWSSD approach that was focused on infrastructure.
Second, the merger of the Water Ministry and Environment Ministry (in 1995) brought
the issue of water management to the fore in addition to that of water development.
Third, the international and national water communities were looking for a practical
5Interview GWP employee, 22 August 2012, and interview with senior advisor to Danida, 4 January
2012.
6Interview key Burkinabe´ water policy maker, 19 April 2012
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translation to Agenda 21. Fourth, the Burkinabe´ government and Danida shared an
interest in expanding their long-standing cooperation in the water sector.
Leaving aside structural explanations, the shift was actually shouldered by a small
team of committed individuals. As one of the key informants stated, “[the reform] boils
down to individuals [. . . ] I found a small group of people who were keen at the idea
of change and could defend it vis-a`-vis the [minister’s] advisors who do not like change
much.”7 Alongside this small team of Burkinabe´ individuals, key members of Danida and
DHI (who had been very active at the international level; see previous section) were very
supportive of the change. Together they engaged in a review of the water sector which
led to the formulation, in 1998, of the Water Policy and Strategies and the first IWRM
Program (cf. Table 7.2). The implementation of the latter started in 1999, under the
authority of the DGH with the Nakambe` pilot project as its flagship.
The revision of the legal and policy framework continued and led to the adoption
of a new water law in 2001 (the Water Framework Law). In the meantime, the first
IWRM program laid the basis for the development of a national IWRM action plan
(PAGIRE)—still with Danida funding. The PAGIRE was approved in 2003 and provided
an overarching planning framework for the water sector at the horizon of 2015, in two
main phases. A permanent secretariat (SP-PAGIRE) was set up to monitor and evaluate
its implementation. Concomitantly with the development of the PAGIRE, in 2002, a
ministerial reorganization resulted in the creation of a super ministry of Agriculture,
Water and Fisheries (the MAHRH) under the authority of an influential minister. A new
General Director (of DGRIH, which replaced the DGH and would become the DGRE
in 2006) was appointed and proved influential in shaping the next steps of the policy
reform, as the SP-PAGIRE was put under his direct authority. Although new individuals
appeared on the stage for the development and implementation phase of the PAGIRE, the
few policy entrepreneurs who had initiated the reform process in the mid-1990s remained
highly influential, both at national and regional level. Until 2004, the former Director
General of DGH acted as the chair of the West African Technical Advisory Committee
(WATAC), a regional satellite of GWP that guided the development of the West African
Water Vision in the run-up to the second World Water Forum. That one of his close
collaborators became the director (at interim) of the Water Resources Coordination Unit
of ECOWAS in 2008 further illustrates the influence of Burkinabe´ policy entrepreneurs at
regional level. Others former policy entrepreneurs have become highly influential private
consultants, as highlighted by several key informants.8
7Ibid.
8Interview with senior technical consultant, 23 April 2012; interview with senior foreign technical
assistant, 24 April 2012.
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Shouldered by key policy entrepreneurs, the PAGIRE attracted the commitment of
other development partners. Swedish SIDA notably began contributing to the PAGIRE in
2005. Organizationally speaking, the development and implementation of Phase 1 of the
PAGIRE (2003-2008) was dominated by the DGRIH (later the DGRE). This Phase 1 was
riddled by a polarized debate whether the SP-PAGIRE should continue reporting to the
DGRE or be instituted as a transversal organization directly under the general secretary
of the ministry. The latter option, favored by the donors, won the case, precipitating the
departure of the Director General of DGRE.9
The first phase of the PAGIRE centered on institutional building at the national level
and on pilot activities in the Nakambe` Basin. Simultaneously, from 2002 onwards, the
European Union funded the VREO project under the MAHRH as a follow-up to the pre-
ceding RESO program (1993-1999). The VREO became the main conduit through which
the PAGIRE was be implemented in the West of the country but not without some fric-
tion. Indeed, the VREO was a decentralized project, with a separate management team
in Bobo-Dioulasso and was strongly owned by a few individuals who saw the PAGIRE as
yet another framework imposed to them from Ouagadougou.10 It operated rather inde-
pendently from the DGRE, notably because “of the human nature of individuals [and of]
donor agencies that are all looking for visibility.”11 The VREO team eventually became
the technical wing of the Mouhoun Basin Agency.
Describing the processes of policy formulation at the national level and the interplay
between donors and several government departments or ministries only gives a partial
picture of the policy process. Local actors (such as policy entrepreneurs, independent
consultants and small scale consulting companies) significantly weighed on the shaping
of policy, especially in the setup of new organizations such as Local Water Committees
(CLE) and river basin agencies. In principle, the task of setting up CLEs was the re-
sponsibility of the DGRE. The guiding principles, however, had been conceived by a few
national consultants — the same individuals who had driven the reform process in the
mid-1990s. CLEs were initially devised to manage water at watershed level but eventually
CLEs were mostly set up to manage the productive exploitation of well circumscribed wa-
ter bodies (e.g. by means of irrigation) — a key objective of the MAHRH. This illustrates
how an international water policy model (IWRM) was de facto adjusted to the national
priorities embodied by a specific government department. In the case of the CLEs, local
consulting companies contracted by the DGRE, or the deconcentrated structures of the
MAHRH themselves, had a tremendous impact on the unfolding and operationalization
of IWRM.
9The Director General of DGRE joined the African Development Bank in 2008. He argued that the
creation of an SP-PAGIRE under the authority of the secretary general was a wrong move, as it would
“remove the teeth” of a program already criticized for its lack of practical outcomes in the field.
10Interview key Burkinabe´ water policy maker, 19 April 2012
11Ibid.
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Mali: donor-driven reforms, highly owned by very few nationals
In Mali, cabinets are often reshuﬄed and ministerial competences redistributed — eight
times between 2000 and 2012. This is also the case in the water sector. Since 2000, six
different ministers have held the water portfolio, first, as part of a broader mandate in the
Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water (until 2009), then within the Ministry of Energy
and Water (2009-2012), and now under the Ministry of Environment (since April 2012).
In practice, as was the case in Burkina Faso, strategic planning and project imple-
mentation are carried out by ‘directorates’ —the executive arms of ministries— whose
delineations have remained relatively stable over time. The National Hydraulic Direc-
torate (DNH), which reports to the minister in charge of the Water and Energy portfolio,
is responsible for the planning and management of water supply and IWRM projects.
Heir of a similar structure from the colonial era, the DNH was officially created in 1999.
It is the main entry point for donors interested in water-related cooperation and can
count with a number of permanent Western technical assistants in its ranks virtually
since its creation (Matz, 2010). The National Directorate of Sanitation and of Pollution
and Nuisance Control (DNACPN), under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Environment
and Sanitation (now Minister of Environment), has an important secondary role in water
supply and sanitation projects, but cannot rely on the same technical and managerial
experience as the DNH (Danida, 2010).
Until 1991 the predecessor of DNH was the sole responsible for the planning, con-
struction and management of water infrastructure in Mali. After the installment of a
multi-party democracy and since the adoption of decentralization laws in the mid-1990s,
municipalities have been entrusted with the ownership and responsibility of water infras-
tructure development and management. Concurrently, the technical directorates of the
Ministries have also been deconcentrated in the view of providing technical assistance to
municipalities. The water legislation, however, was lagging behind the decentralization
laws and, in 1998, the French Development Agency (AFD) in collaboration with UNDP
supported the Malian government in the elaboration of a national Water Code (cf. Table
7.2). Adopted in 2002, the Water Code confirmed the decentralized ownership of water
supply and irrigation infrastructures, and instituted basin agencies (Agences de bassin)
and local water committees (CLEs) as the appropriate structures for water management
on the basis of hydrological boundaries.
AFD, which was very keen to promote the ‘French model’ to water management,
also promoted the creation of a Malian Niger River Basin Agency (ABFN), which was
put under the direct jurisdiction of the Minister of Environment in 2002. This move
threatened the position of DNH as the main interlocutor of development partners in
the water management sector (Matz, 2010). Following a regional conference on IWRM
in Ouagadougou (COA-GIRE+5) in 2003, and with the support of the World Bank
121
7. Water policy changes in West Africa, between structure and agency
sponsored National Rural Infrastructure Project (PNIR, 2001-2007), the DNH replicated
in setting up an IWRM unit.12 A senior hydrologist, who had been acting as the DNH
focal point to the Niger Basin Authority and who was one of the promoters of the IWRM
unit, was appointed as its new head. Already known to GWP as the Malian focal point
for the elaboration of the West African Water Vision, the same person became the chair
of the Malian Country Water Partnership (PNE-Mali) set up by GWP in 2003. Highly
regarded by donors,13 he became the central pivot for IWRM projects in Mali. ABFN,
to the contrary, has never attracted water management projects of the same level.14
Between 2004 and 2007, GWP guided Mali through the process of developing a na-
tional IWRM plan within the context of its Partnership for African Water Development
(PAWD). CIDA, which had agreed to sponsor PAWD, heavily influenced the outline of
the partnership, handpicking the 5 African beneficiaries —one was Mali— and turning
PAWD into a project-like intervention with limited duration.15 GWP identified DNH and
PNE-Mali as lead organizations for the implementation of the PAWD project in Mali.
PAWD took off in 2004 with the development of a road map for IWRM planning that was
owned by a broad section of water stakeholders thanks to the involvement of PNE-Mali
(Patterson, 2008). After a quick diagnosis of the water sector, this road map yielded a
National Water Policy in 2005 and a national IWRM plan (PAGIRE) in 2007.
Although many stakeholders considered the process as more inclusive than those
adopted in other projects (especially with respect to the World Bank PNIR project),
the finalization of the PAGIRE was centralized within the IWRM unit of DNH (Patter-
son, 2008), under the impetus of its director who also chaired PNE-Mali. The double
mandate held by this single policy maker also meant that local stakeholders had diffi-
culties in distinguishing PNE-Mali from the governmental IWRM Unit. This hindered
PNE-Mali in playing the role of independent watchdog. Therefore, the ownership of PA-
GIRE was eventually limited to a few people in DNH, whose sense of ownership was very
high.16
Concurrently with the PAWD project, which sustained national policy change in a
direct manner, the Dutch government ran an applied IWRM program in the Upper Niger
basin (GIRENS), from 2004 to 2010. Building on an earlier project on integrated envi-
ronmental management in the same region (GHENIS, 1995-2002), the practical GIRENS
project included a component for the creation of basin and sub-basin agencies as well as
local water committees. For historical reasons the GIRENS program was not managed by
12Interview with senior foreign technical assistant, 24 April 2012
13Interview with former GWP employee, 29 February 2012; interview with senior private consultant,
23 April 2012; interview with senior foreign technical assistant, 24 April 2012.
14Interview with senior foreign technical assistant, 24 April 2012.
15Interview with former GWP employee, 29 February 2012.
16Interview with senior private consultant, 23 April 2012; interview with senior foreign technical as-
sistant, 24 April 2012.
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the IWRM unit of DNH, but by its Hydrology Division.17 When the PAGIRE was being
developed, the two units competed one with another, partly because of antagonisms of
a personal nature but also because of the lack of collaboration between donors.18 The
rivalry appeased towards the end of the PAGIRE process and most of the GIRENS action
plan was eventually included in the PAGIRE, mostly as practical recommendations on
the development of CLEs and sub-basin agencies.
The PAGIRE plan was officially adopted in April 2008 but the implementation of the
plan —the actual work— was not guaranteed by any donor. However, the aid landscape
of Mali’s water sector had started changing with the arrival of Denmark as a new donor
in 2006, which triggered the donors to negotiate a new but deliberate division of tasks. In
line with the Paris Declaration, Denmark chose to support the embryonic attempt of DNH
and DNACPN to develop a program for sectoral budget support to water and sanitation
(PROSEA). Danida supported the creation of an inter-ministerial Cell for Planning and
Statistics (CPS) in 2008. This cell has gradually assumed the authority over PROSEA
but heavily depends, to date, on Danish technical support. At a donor round-table
organized by the head of the IWRM Unit of DNH and the senior technical assistant
of GIRENS in February 2009, Denmark, Sweden and the African Development Bank
pledged to support PROSEA. The PROSEA finally took off in 2010 and identified the
implementation of PAGIRE as one of its four objectives. The program partly succeeded in
aligning the strategies of international development partners and multiple governmental
structures.19
7.5 Discussing water policy reforms
Structural context
Policy reforms in Burkina Faso and Mali went through comparable stages. Before the
development of a national IWRM action plan started, donors first focused on broad
institutional and policy reforms that lasted between 4 to 6 years and that led to the
Water Framework Law (2001) and to the Water Code in Mali (2002). This initial period
was also characterized by tentative IWRM activities such as the IWRM program in
Burkina Faso and the creation of a Malian Niger River Basin Agency. In a second phase,
national IWRM action plans (PAGIRE) were developed. This lasted 2 years in Burkina
Faso (2001-2003) and 4 years in Mali (2004-2007). The third phase —the implementation
of the national IWRM action plans— started in 2003 in Burkina Faso and in 2010 in Mali.
17Now called the Division for Water Resources Monitoring and Management.
18Interview with senior foreign technical assistant, 24 April 2012.
19Interview key Malian policy maker, 21 August 2011; interview senior foreign technical assistant, 24
April 2012.
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Other structural resemblances are due to a similar administrative culture and habitus
in both countries. First, the water policy reforms have been dominated by the technical
directorate of the ministry in charge of water (DGRE in Burkina Faso and DNH in Mali),
despite the participation of wide national stakeholder platform in the process. Second, a
similar organizational change has taken place in both countries with the PAGIRE now
being under the authority of a directorate-independent cell (the SP-PAGIRE in Burkina
Faso and the CPS in Mali) even though the historical directorate remains very much
involved in the implementation of the PAGIRE. This move echoes broader calls for, and
support to, a programmatic approach to development aid and marks the recognition that
IWRM is cross-sectoral in nature.
One important structural difference stems from the different relations between the
national governments and their respective donors. The Burkinabe´ story shows much more
continuity than the Malian. The reforms in Burkina Faso started in the mid-1990s with
funding from Danida, which was already a long standing donor to the Burkinabe´ water
sector and, since then, consistently supported the elaboration and implementation of the
PAGIRE. In Mali, on the contrary, the early donors in water management (AFD, the
Netherlands, the World Bank, CIDA) adopted a project rather than a sectoral approach
and have steered the process of reform according to their own and sometimes conflicting
visions of IWRM. While there is currently an attempt to harmonize approaches within
the framework of the sectoral PROSEA program, with the support of SIDA and Danida,
the director of DNH in Mali still laments that too many foreign consultants are coming
in, each of them bringing their own ideas.20 This lack of continuity on the donor side
in Mali was mimicked by frequent ministerial changes, whereas in Burkina Faso the one
single influential minister oversaw most of the reform process between 1996 and 2008.
The role of individual policy entrepreneurs
Despite structural similarities, our accounts have shown that individual policy entrepre-
neurs played a central role at all levels and all phases. For one thing, IWRM did not
become the hegemonic paradigm worldwide in a disembodied or deterministic fashion.
The prominence of the IWRM paradigm in the sphere of multi-lateral organizations and
development agencies is the result of the unrelenting work of a small number of dedicated
water professionals and organizations. In correspondence with the concepts adduced in
Table 7.1, a small group of individuals took advantage of the ‘window of opportunity’ at
the end of the IDWSSD decade when a ‘problem stream’ (the overly sectoral approach
of IDWSSD) joined a ‘solution stream’ (in the form of IWRM) and a ‘policy stream’ (in
the form of the Rio and Johannesburg conferences). In order to advocate IWRM they
also ‘shopped for numerous venues’ in the international sphere and ‘knit a very tight
20Interview with key Malian policy maker, 21 August 2011.
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network’ of IWRM-inspired organizations including GWP, WWC, IWRA, Danida, DHI,
DHI-UNEP, and many others.
At national level, too, the IWRM-inspired reforms were embodied in individual policy
entre-preneurs, who assumed different types, forms and levels of engagement, hence yield-
ing distinct reform dynamics and outcomes. In Burkina Faso, the head of DGRE played
a pivotal role, which explains the paramount importance of this technical directorate in
shouldering the reform process (even though there had been a long debate on instituting
the SP-PAGIRE as a cross-sectoral independent entity). Beyond the centrality of DGRE,
many individuals (Burkinabe´ and Danish) have played a pivotal role in ‘promoting new
ideas’ at different points in time. Their key position in the Burkinabe´ water bureaucracy
allowed them to ‘orchestrate a policy network’, which make them, still today, highly in-
fluential both at national and regional level. Indeed, the Burkinabe´ IWRM network can
count on a large pool of competent national consultants,21 who often are former civil
servants. These consultants are an integrally part of this ‘policy network’; they are piv-
otal in shaping the practice of policy as they are regularly contracted by governments
and regional organizations to draft terms of reference of studies and projects, and policy
implementation guidelines. Furthermore, Burkinabe´ decision makers ‘shopped regional
and international venues’ provided by the Danish cooperation and international networks
such as GWP. They notably ‘orchestrated a regional network’, in order to influence water
reform processes at the regional level. This was deemed key to ensure that ECOWAS
would promote an approach to water management similar to the one adopted in Burkina
Faso22 Such pro-active engagement at international forums has not been observed in Mali
In Mali, the strong appropriation of the IWRM process by the technical DNH direc-
torate was the result of an organizational and personal rivalry. In 2003, one year after
AFD had supported the creation of a Malian Niger river basin authority and had linked
it to the Minister of Environment, DNH created its own IWRM unit. This was possible
because a few DNH water professionals recognized a window of opportunity when the
‘problem stream’ (the non-existence of a water resources unit at DNH) encountered a
‘funding stream’ (the World Bank PNIR project and the upcoming PAWD project). An-
other ‘window of opportunity’ appeared when Danida entered the scene and was willing
to sponsor the sectoral budget support program (PROSEA). The high visibility of the
IWRM unit and its head impeded the ABFN to play any noteworthy role in the water
sector.
21Interview with senior private consultant, 23 April 2012; interview with senior foreign technical as-
sistant, 24 April 2012.
22Interview with key Burkinabe´ water policy maker, 19 April 2012.
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Qualitative differences in ownership
The long-standing Danish-Burkinabe´ partnership appears to be the result of a continu-
ously renegotiated ‘coalition’, which tied together Burkinabe´ decision makers (civil ser-
vants and independent senior consultant alike) with their counterparts in the Danish
cooperation. Rooted in this coalition, a small number of individuals in different organi-
zations managed to orchestrate a policy network that nowadays extends to the regional
and international level. This network is both the expression and warrant of a broad
Burkinabe´ ownership of the water policy reforms.
Malian policy makers, on the contrary, are regularly criticized for not assuming owner-
ship, but for awaiting assistance and for “accepting all external aid that is being offered”
(Bergamaschi, 2009). The story told in this chapter showed that this interpretation is too
easy. In a structural context of weak ministerial leadership and highly fragmented spon-
sorship, a few policy entrepreneurs effectively employed a pro-active strategy of drawing
together the streams of donor support. The ownership of water policy reforms in Mali is
narrowly vested, but in a cardinal manner, in a small number of water policy makers at
DNH (and a few long-serving Western and Malian technical assistants).
7.6 Conclusion
The commitment to work towards higher development ownership in the South, made by
donors and aid agencies in Paris and Accra, tacitly assumed that aid recipients in the
South possess enough agency to assimilate the ‘ownership’ of their development (Booth,
2011). This chapter engaged with this tacit assumption and tries to open up the ownership
black-box by framing it as the product of an interplay between agency and structure.
To do so, the chapter adduced empirical data concerning the emergence of the IWRM
paradigm and policies at the global level and in the neighboring countries Burkina Faso
and Mali. Although some critics have described IWRM as just another “nirvana concept”
(Molle, 2008), we showed that this “hegemonic paradigm” (Conca, 2006) has been shaped
by the relentless work of individuals and has acquired different realities in Burkina Faso
and Mali. The differences are, in the first place, due to differing structural determinants
such as bureaucratic layouts and idiosyncrasies, the relationships between the government
and international donors, and the cultures or habitus of national policy makers in engaging
with these donors. Within these different structural contexts, water policy entrepreneurs
have also displayed dissimilar forms of agency. In Burkina Faso they mostly engaged in
knitting a broad water policy network that extends to the regional level, while in Mali
they mainly took advantage of windows of opportunity when the donor stream connected
to the national problem stream.
If donors and aid agencies really want to contribute to an increased ownership of
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development in the South, they will first need to reflect upon the fact that their own
actions —e.g. the choice to engage with one policy entrepreneur rather than another—
and structural conditions —e.g. the history of their own relation with the recipient—
have direct repercussions on the form and level of ownership that the recipient can and
will assume.
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Chapter 8
Describing the emergence of IWRM
with Actor-Network Theory
what to the local tribes of the originating place is ordinary
sorcery, practised by men, becomes, when looked at from a
great distance, and from an alien tribe, a non-human agency,
endowed with such super-normal powers
Bronis law Malinowski—Argonauts of the Western Pacific
8.1 Introduction
Since the inception of development aid after World War II, the development expert com-
munities have displayed a continuous effort to ‘get the development policy right’, thereby
unceasingly promoting new concepts and theories to adjust preceding policies that al-
legedly failed to deliver (Mosse, 2004; Thorbecke, 2007; Kremer et al., 2009b; Nederveen
Pieterse, 2010). Also the field of water-related development is characterized by a similar
intellectual ferment (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Ingram, 2011; Molle, 2008).
Obviously, the water expert community does face impressive and very diverse chal-
lenges that do not have one miraculous solution (UNDP, 2006; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008;
UN-Water, 2012): between 1.4 and 2.1 billion people currently live in water-stressed
or over-exploited river basins (IPCC, 2008); floods affect 140 million people each year
(IPCC, 2008); and nearly 800 million people still lack access to safe drinking water
(WHO-UNICEF, 2012). Just like in any other sector of development, however, the al-
leged failure to achieve the desired progress in addressing these challenges is invariably
attributed either to the misconception of the preceding policy, or to an unintended gap
between policy making and implementation (Mosse, 2004; Rap, 2006). Therefore, new
ideas, theories, technologies, management schemes, policies and eventually new overarch-
ing paradigms are incessantly proposed to correct the preceding policy or to reduce the
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gap between policy and practice. To name only one such trend, the water community
has produced over the past fifty years policies that emphasized first public, then pri-
vate, then community-based, and then mixed private-public institutions as key to water
management (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Ingram, 2011).
To the critical observer, these constant conceptual renewals appear as ‘fads’, ‘fashions’,
‘bandwagon concepts’ or ‘buzzwords’ (Cornwall, 2007). Thanks to their discursive and
disembodied power they engross the whole community of development professionals (as
in Ferguson, 2007 [1990]). At best they are promoted by a global epistemic community
and multi-lateral agencies (Haas, 1992; Stone, 2003) or an advocacy coalition (Sabatier
and Weible, 2007).
To the contrary, in the positivist observer’s view, these constant conceptual renewals
reflect the quest towards better and refined practice-informing policies. This view is
largely grafted on the ‘stagist’ theory of the policy process (as in Easton, 1965; Jenkins,
1978), which supposes that it is possible objectively formulate the problem, make a well-
informed policy making, straightforwardly implement the policy, and objectively evaluate
the policy (Kremer et al., 2009b).
Both views are highly problematic. The first ignores the role of individuals and
networks of individuals in the shaping and framing of the concept, in making them work,
and in keeping them alive (Shore and Wright, 1997; Rossi, 2004; Molle, 2008). The second
view relies on an overly positivist epistemology (Chambers, 1997; Crewe and Harrison,
1998; Bryld, 2000; Cooke, 2004; Kothari, 2005; Wilson, 2007a,b). I argue, in line with
the growing number of ‘ethnographers of aid’ (e.g Gould and Marcussen, 2004; Mosse,
2005b,a) and ‘anthropologists of policy’ (e.g. Shore and Wright, 1997), that both the
critical and the positivist view derogate the agency of individuals, the political struggles
in policy making, and the complex relation between policy making, implementation, and
real-world impact. We need ethnographies that challenge the epistemological assumptions
of these grand theories (Wedeen, 2010) and that actually observe and describe the role
of actors in the emergence and implementation of these putative ‘fads’, ‘fashions’ and
‘bandwagon concepts’.
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is one such concept —I will call
it a ‘paradigm’1— that is currently ubiquitous in the sphere of water management and
water-related development aid. IWRM holds the promise of a fair and sustainable man-
agement of water resources. It recognizes that water is key to different and often com-
peting goals: human health, economic development, and environmental sustainability.
Therefore, IWRM advocates a cross-sectoral management of water resources —covering
the agricultural sector, industry, energy, domestic life, the environment— as well as a
vertical integration of the different decision-making levels —national government, river
basin, municipality, community (GWP, 2000a; Conca, 2006). To reach this horizontal
1See sections 2.2 for the reasoning behind this and section 2.5 for a definition.
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Survey categories as mentioned in the survey respondents
IWRM plans IWRM plans IWMR plans
or strategies or strategies or strategies
in process in place being implemented
GWP, 2006 53% 21% n.a. 95
water laws IWRM plans IWRM plans
being changed in place being implemented
UN-Water, 2012 81% 64% 34% 125
Source: Adapted from UN-Water (2008, 2011)
Table 8.1: Countries with IWRM-inspired laws and management plans,
auto-declared in surveys.
and vertical reconciliation of sectors and levels, IWRM counts on some form of Haber-
masian communicative rationality: actors reach, through consensus building, a common
understanding of the problems and the desired actions (Mehta et al., 2007; Saravanan
et al., 2009).
Scholars concur that over the past two decades the IWRM paradigm has attained
a hegemonic status in water policy making and management worldwide (Conca, 2006;
Saravanan et al., 2009; Orlove and Caton, 2010). Over 80% of countries worldwide
now have the IWRM principles in their water laws and two thirds have developed a
national IWRM plan (see Table 8.1). This success is surprising in two ways. First, water
governance is highly scattered at international level (Gupta, 2009) and IWRM is not
endorsed by any international agreement like the one on trans-boundary waters (Conca,
2006). Second, despite being on the lips of many, there is still much debate about the
practical value of IWRM (van der Zaag, 2005; Merrey, 2008; Quevauviller, 2010), given its
malleability and the lack of concrete guidelines for implementation (Gooch and St˚alnacke,
2006; Saravanan et al., 2009; Orlove and Caton, 2010).
I argue that IWRM does not derive its hegemony from being a woolly “nirvana con-
cept”, as stated by Molle (2008), or for being a widely spoken “lingua franca” (Ingram,
2011), or “discursive construct” (Orlove and Caton, 2010). Instead, in the next section I
show the crucial role of actors in supporting the emergence of the IWRM paradigm in the
sphere of multi-lateral organizations towards the end of the 20th century, and in routing
the IWRM paradigm towards Mali during the first decade of the current century. I trace
the myriad major and minor connections that actors knit amongst each other in order
to establish a firm network that can make other actors do something. These connections
can take the form of organizations, agreements, principles, or any other hybrid artifact.
In my tracing of this network I try not to invoke presupposed discursive powers or social
structures, nor to artificially separate ‘policy makers’ from ‘policy takers’. I only trace
links.
This way of describing the emergence and the hegemony of IWRM is very innovative.
With a few exceptions such as Conca (2006), very few scholars pay attention to the
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loads of work that was required from actors and their network to make the paradigm
emerge, and the loads of work that continues to be required from actors to maintain
the paradigm alive and prominent. My way of describing ‘the social’ is based on Actor-
Network Theory (Latour, 2005), a tool for the description of social data that is rooted
in science and technology studies but that has been finding its way to other domains of
the social sciences as well (Latour, 2000). I will show that a paradigm such as IWRM
appears to be ‘successful’ precisely because a well-built network sustains it.
The data presented in this article is based on policy documents, 48 interviews with
key people, 21 focus group discussions, and 13 months of participant observation at three
different sites in the network of development actors, to wit, at the headquarters of the
Global Water Partnership (2011), at the headquarters of a non-governmental development
organization (2010), and in Mali’s Inner Niger Delta (2010-11).
The article is structured as follows. In the next section I describe the network of
actors that underpinned the emergence of IWRM in the multi-lateral sphere as well as
the implementation of IWRM in Mali through inter-governmental and non-governmental
cooperation. The article does not evaluate nor judge these processes — it limits itself to
description. In the third section I thoroughly introduce ANT and I discuss the suitability
of the ANT vocabulary to describe the ups and sufferings of the IWRM paradigm. In
the fourth section I reflect on the meaning of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of a paradigm.
8.2 Tracing the IWRM network
8.2.1 Before the IWRM paradigm emerged
The history of IWRM dates back to at least the early 1900s (Viessman and Welty, 1985;
Muckleston, 1990), when for the first time in modern history administrative units were
established for the integrated management of natural resources in an area defined by a
water body. Watershed Conservancy Districts were created for the Ohio river in 1913 as
well as for the Muskingum and Miami rivers; the pioneering Tennessee Valley Authority
was founded in 1933 (Mitchell, 1990).
The United Nations Water Conference of 1977 in Mar del Plata, Argentina, is gener-
ally considered as the first attempt to tackle water problems globally (Conca, 2006). “For
the first time the range and complexity of the problems of water development confronting
mankind were being taken up in their totality by a world forum in a systematic and com-
prehensive manner” (UN, 1977, p.555). In reality, the conference was narrowly focused
on water supply and sanitation, and the sovereignty of nations over water resources in
their territory was not under discussion. In the wake of the conference, the UN declared
the 1980s as the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD).
Throughout the 1980s, water continued to be neglected as a cross-sectoral finite re-
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source. The landmark Brundtland report Our Common future limited its discussion of
‘water management’ to ‘irrigation’, touching solely upon the problems of water pollution,
salinization, and rapidly lowering water tables (Brundtland, 1987, p.134).
The Abidjan Accord of 1990, agreed in the framework of an assessment of the progress
in water supply in Africa after one decade of dedicated efforts, argued that the increasing
demand for finite water resources needed to be addressed through “an integrated approach
to water resources management”. According to this Accord, an integrated approach sup-
posed “a detailed consideration of supply, demand, conservation and protection” (World
Bank, 1991).
The New Delhi Statement of the same year, which was issued at the conclusion of the
IDWSSD, was more forward-looking in stressing the need for stronger local institutions
and community management, and in recognizing that water resources and liquid and
solid wastes needed an integrated management (UN, 1990).
The Brundtland report, the Abidjan Accord, and the New Delhi Statement all advo-
cated the most basic form of ‘integrated’ water management (Mitchell, 1990): they did
pay attention to both surface water and groundwater, as well as water quantity and qual-
ity—but did not yet link water to land (erosion, floods) and the environment. The latter
would be, according to Mitchell, the second interpretation of ‘integrated’ water manage-
ment. The third and broadest interpretation of ‘integrated water management’ considers
water as a finite resource that is central to social and economic development in the broad-
est sense, and hence needs to be managed in a cross-sectoral manner. ‘IWRM’advocates
the latter.
The International Water Resources Association (IWRA), a membership organization
of water professionals founded in 1972, was very influential in shaping and promoting the
IWRM paradigm (Conca, 2006), given that the organization, unlike other professional
associations, positioned itself form the start as interdisciplinary (Falkenmark, 2011). Ba-
sically all promoters of an integrated management of water resources in the 1980s and
1990s, including Mitchell himself, were linked to IWRA.
Bringing the third and broadest interpretation of ‘integrated’ water management on
the agenda of multi-lateral organizations in the early 1990s is to a large extent the merit
of a cluster of key Scandinavian organizations and individuals. This is where my tracing
of the IWRM network starts.
8.2.2 Nordic effervescence in the early 1990s
The Scandinavian countries, and Denmark in particular, had been major contributors to
the IDWSSD initiative of the 1980s. Building on the first-hand experience that those
projects had suffered from an approach too sectoral, and with the prospect of the forth-
coming United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio
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de Janeiro in 1992, the Danish International Development Agency (Danida) took the
initiative to establish a Nordic Freshwater Initiative (NFI), with the explicit objective to
feed operational guidelines for integrated water resources planning and management into
UNCED (Jønch-Clausen, 1992). The two key figures in the NFI were the Danish water
professional Torkil Jønch-Clausen the Swedish academic Jan Lundqvist.2 Jønch-Clausen,
who was CEO of the Danish Water Quality Institute in 1993-1997 and secretary general
of IWRA in 2004-6, was contracted by Danida to coordinate NFI. Jan Lundqvist was also
a habitue´ of the multi-lateral scene, as consultant to the Swedish International Develop-
ment Agency (SIDA), Swedish delegate to a number of UN bodies in 1987-92, regional
director of IWRA in 1991-4, and vice president of IWRA in 1998-2000.
The NFI received a global platform at the first Stockholm Water Symposium in Au-
gust 1991 (Jønch-Clausen, 1992). The first chair of the Symposium’s Scientific Program
Committee (1991-2003) was the Swedish professor Malin Falkenmark, only woman on
IWRA’s first board of directors when IWRA was created in 1972. The Symposium, pre-
decessor of the present Stockholm World Water Week and a major platform for water
policy makers worldwide (SIWI, 2012), took stock of everything that was going wrong
in the water sector at that time and ‘problematized’ this as follows: water is a major
constraint to any form of development and hence it needs to be seen as an economic good
rather than as a freely available resource (Stockholm Water Symposium, 1992, p.5-7).
The key message sent to the upcoming UNCED was that water management needed
multisectoral strategies (Falkenmark, 1992, p.27).
Three months later an informal consultation of the NFI in Copenhagen in November
1991 further invigorated the Nordic plea for integrated, cross-sectoral management. Con-
trary to the critical tone of the Stockholm Water Forum, the Copenhagen Statement was
conceived to feed two practical guiding principles for integrated water management into
the UNCED process: (i) water needs to be managed at the lowest appropriate decision-
making level, and (ii) it needs to be managed as a finite resource with ‘an economic value’.
The Copenhagen Statement still used the phrase “integrated water resources development
and management” whereas the report was the first document to use “integrated water
resources management” (NFI, 1992). Not only the term but also the two principles would
prove to live a long life.
In January 1992, another three months later, 28 UN agencies and 58 external or-
ganizations met in Dublin for the International Conference on Water and Environment
(ICWE) —the last preparatory meeting before UNCED in Rio the Janeiro— and agreed
on the so-called ‘Dublin Principles’ (UN, 1992b):
1. Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustaining life,
development, and the environment
2Interview with senior water advisor to Danida, 4 January 2012
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2. Water development and management should be based on a participatory ap-
proach, involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels
3. Women play a central part in the provision, management, and safe-guarding
of water
4. Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized
as an economic good
The Dublin Principles integrally incorporate the two principles that were proposed by
the Copenhagen Statement. That the NFI coordinator was on the ICWE board and that
the participants of the conference were government-designated experts (many linked to
IWRA) rather than diplomats, had facilitated the broad support for the Copenhagen
Statement, its translation into the Dublin principles, and the de facto acceptance of
IWRM.
At the UNCED conference (or Earth Summit) later that year in Rio de Janeiro, which
was a political rather than a technical conference, water did not attract the high-level
regime-building negotiations that surrounded climate or biodiversity and IWRM was not
high on the agenda (Conca, 2006). The ‘action plan’ that was published afterwards,
Agenda 21, nevertheless dedicated an entire chapter to water. Agenda 21 was the first
multi-laterally endorsed political document to use the phrase “integrated water resources
management”. Moreover, Agenda 21 invited all countries to have, by the year 2000,
“costed and targeted national action programmes [. . . ] and appropriate institutional
structures and legal instruments [for IWRM]” (UN, 1992a, Chapter 18).
Danida preceived this as a major success and renewed its engagement in water-related
development:3
The Danish government was very happy with the Copenhagen and Dublin State-
ments and with the impact they had [in Rio], because that is what governments
and donors care about: to have a strong footprint. So, Danida got very keen on
this IWRM.
Uganda was Danida’s IWRM pilot case. Thanks to a strong support from within the
Ugandan water sector4 —the permanent secretary of the Ugandan Ministry of Water,
B.K. Kabanda, was already involved in the NFI and was amongst the subscribers of the
Copenhagen Statement (NFI, 1992)— Danida chose to assist Uganda in developing a
Water Action Plan, between January 1993 and July 1994. This plan can be considered
the first African IWRM plan avant la lettre. The Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI), a
research-based not-for-profit foundation where Jønch-Clausen at that moment served as
director of the Water & Environment division, obtained the contract to develop the plan.
The water professionals of Danida felt that the approach of the Ugandan Water Action
3ibid.
4Interview senior advisor to GWP, 1 November 2011, and interview senior advisor to Danida, 4
January 2012.
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Plan was replicable and started a similar IWRM process in Central America (1997-99),
Burkina-Faso (1998-2001) and Vietnam (2004-05).
The chief of the Water and Sanitation Division at the World Bank, however, lamented
that the Dublin principles, agreed in January 1992 by the technicist ICWE conference,
had disappeared from Agenda 21 (Briscoe and Garn, 1994). Instead, Agenda 21 was
stuffed with “a long list of unreachable and unfundable targets, with no fewer than 184
activities advocated in [the freshwater] chapter alone”. He proved right as not Agenda
21 but the Dublin Principles became the basis for the World Bank’s Water Resources
Management Policy, the OECD’s benchmark for the assessment of water-related devel-
opment, and water-related bilateral aid of France and the Nordic countries (Briscoe and
Garn, 1994). Briscoe himself would play a role in the further institutionalization of the
Dublin Principles (see next section).
Since the UN lacked —and still lacks— an entity dedicated to water that could assist
the developing countries in designing IWRM plans by the year 2000, the impact of Agenda
21 in the water sector was relatively weak. This shortcoming was in part parried by
two initiatives to institutionalize IWRM at intergovernmental level: the establishment
of a World Water Council and a Global Water Partnership (see next section). Both
initiatives were taken by individuals and organizations that had already espoused the
IWRM paradigm.
8.2.3 Anchoring IWRM in new international organizations
Following the appeal of the Rio conference, the World Bank vice president for Environ-
mentally and Socially Sustainable Development Ismail Serageldin, and the Policy Director
at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Anders Wijkman, took the ini-
tiative to create a Global Water Partnership (GWP). The ‘operational team’ to do so
consisted of the earlier mentioned John Briscoe (Water and Sanitation Division at the
World Bank), Roberto Lenton (Director of the Sustainable Energy and Environment Di-
vision at the United Nations Development Programme), Johan Holmberg (SIDA) and
the earlier mentioned Torkil Jønch-Clausen (Danida, DHI).5 GWP was conceived as a
network organization with the objective to advocate the implementation of IWRM plans
and institutions around the world and share expert knowledge. Since its inception, the
Dublin Principles are at the core of its mission.
The first chair of GWP was Ismail Serageldin himself. Torkil Jønch-Clausen was
assigned the chair of the GWP Technical Committee (GWP-TEC). Since he continued
to manage the Water & Environment division of DHI, this organization was selected as
GWP-TEC secretariat. Johan Holmberg, assistant director-general at SIDA, served as
5Interview senior advisor to GWP, 1 November 2011
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first secretary-general of GWP. Since the establishment of GWP until today, the GWP
Global Secretariat is hosted by SIDA in Stockholm.
Through both the general-secretary and the TEC chair, SIDA and Danida continued
to influence the intellectual and political positioning of GWP to a large extent. GWP’s
tripodal framework for IWRM implementation —that builds on an ‘enabling environ-
ment’, ‘institutional roles’, and ‘management instruments’ (GWP, 2000a, p.30)— was
integrally developed years earlier by DHI, in the context of the Ugandan Water Action
Plan, and was imported in GWP through Jønch-Clausen:6
Whatever Danida did concerning IWRM, they always turned to us at DHI. And we
could then link it to the GWP, which is one of the reasons why Danida has always
been one of the key supporters of GWP. You know, it’s very incestuous [sic]. But
this is the way the world works: through networks.
A second initiative to anchor IWRM in a multi-lateral organization was taken by
IWRA, the US-rooted association of water professionals, who felt that UNCED had
“failed to attach much priority or urgency to water” and that Agenda 21 reflected “no
substantive inputs from the [technicist] Dublin conference” (Grover and Biswas, 1993).
Therefore the IWRA president Mahmoud Abu-Zeid (also Egyptian water minister), the
IWRA vice-president Aly Shady (also water advisor at the Canadian International Devel-
opment Agency CIDA), and the vice director of Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux Rene´ Coulomb,
founded the World Water Council (WWC) in 1996. The WWC presents itself as a more
elite membership organization for private companies, government agencies, and develop-
ment organizations (Conca, 2006). Its principal activity has consisted of organizing the
triennial, highly influential World Water Forum (WWF). The WWC, too, had Ismail
Serageldin on its initial board of governors.
In their early years, the two organizations —GWP and WWF— were by many water
professionals seen as competing initiatives. The Water Supply and Sanitation Collab-
orative Council (WSSCC), established by the UN in 1990 to continue the work of the
IDWSSD decade, offered a neutral ground where collaboration between the two organiza-
tions was cultivated. This collaboration was particularly facilitated by three Canadians:7
Margaret Catley-Carlson, who was chair of WSSCC in 1992-1996 and chair of GWP in
2000-2008, William Cosgrove, who was chair of WWC in 2003-2005, and Aly Shady, who
was water advisor of CIDA and co-founder of WWC.
The first WWF, which took place in 1997 in Marrakesh, urged the world to develop
a World Water Vision. Such a Vision was subsequently developed by the ad hoc ‘World
Commission for Water in the 21st Century’, chaired by Ismail Serageldin, and built on
a number of Regional Visions that were gathered through GWP’s network of regional
technical committees. At the second WWF in 2000 in The Hague, WWC released the
6Interview with senior advisor to Danida, 4 January 2012
7Interview ex GWP employee, 29 February 2012.
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World Water Vision and GWP presented a Framework for Action that urged the world
to have “comprehensive policies and strategies for IWRM in process of implementation
in 75% of countries by 2005 and in all countries by 2015” (GWP, 2000b). The WWF
of 2000 firmly established GWP as a key water player at the international and regional
scene (GWP, 2012).
8.2.4 Pressing for national IWRM plans
With the upcoming Rio+10 conference in Johannesburg in 2002 (the World Summit on
Sustainable Development –WSSD), the water community started working again to get
water and IWRM back on the agenda, since “in those large conferences water does not
come in automatically.”8 Through three channels they exerted their influence: the Nordic
countries brought IWRM to the attention of the European Parliament and Commission,
the German government organized the Bonn Conference on Freshwater, and the GWP Re-
gional Water Parnterships and Regional Technical Committees lobbied the governmental
negotiators of the many developing countries.
Co-organized by the German ministries for Economic Co-operation and Development
(BMZ) and the Environment (BMU), an international conference on freshwater in Bonn in
2001 aimed at intensifying the voice of the German government and the water community
in the run-up to Johannesburg. Since GWP had shown leadership at the 2000 WWF,
the then chair of GWP, Margaret Catley-Carlson, was invited as facilitator for the Bonn
conference, and GWP was amply represented at its International Steering Committee.
The building up of the Bonn conference had indeed started many years earlier. Fritz
Holzwarth —deputy director-general of BMU (1996-), head of the German delegation
in numerous transboundary river basins, and negotiator in the EU Water Framework
Directive (EU-WFD)— initiated in 1998, together with the World Bank and the Ger-
man Foundation for International Development (DSE), a series of international high-level
round tables on “transboundary water management” as a “catalyst for cooperation”. Al-
ready the report of the first two round tables, held in Petersberg and Berlin in 1998, stated
that Germany was planning to host an international conference on freshwater in 2001/2
in the run-up to the Rio+10 summit9, with the aim to “examine the implementation of
Agenda 21 ” (DSE, 1998).
In 2000 the European Parliament, too, picked up the IWRM concept as guiding prin-
ciple for water-related development aid, in part through its own experience with the EU-
WFD, but mostly through the continued influence of the Nordic countries. In November
2000, during a public hearing, the earlier mentioned professors Malin Falkenmark and
Jan Lundqvist acquainted the parliamentary Committee on Development and Coopera-
8Ibid.
9The original report stated that the conference would be held in 2002, but in the end it was held at
the end of 2001.
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tion with the IWRM concept, which they had described, together with colleagues of the
Swedish International Water Institute (SIWI), in a commissioned report on Water and
Development in the Developing Countries (Bjo¨rklund et al., 2000). During this particular
hearing, the chair of GWP-TEC, Jønch-Clausen, presented the World Water Vision and
Framework for Action to the parliamentary Committee (European Parliament, 2000).
Note that at that moment, Anders Wijkman, co-founder of GWP, was vice-chairman of
this parliamentary Committee on Development and Cooperation.
The outcome of the Bonn conference —known as the Bonn Recommendations for
Action and the five Bonn Keys (GTZ, 2002)— was endorsed in March 2002 by a com-
munication of the EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid (European
Commission, 2002). As a result, the Bonn conference had two direct impacts on the
WSSD negotiations: an extra Millennium Development Goal on water supply and sani-
tation (MDG 7c) was added to the existing goals, and the WSSD action plan repeated
the call that all states had to “develop integrated water resource management and water
efficiency plans by 2005, with support to developing countries” (UNESA, 2002, Chapter
4).
Like Denmark had had a footprint on UNCED in Rio through the Copenhagen and
Dublin meetings of 1991, Germany influenced the WSSD in Johannesburg thanks to the
Bonn conference in 2001. This strategy was repeated in 2011, when Germany organized
a second Bonn conference on the Water-Food-Energy Nexus, in the run-up to Rio 2012.
In both occasions the driving forces were Manfred Konukiewitz, head of division in BMZ,
and Fritz Holzwarth, Deputy Director General of BMU.10 For the second Bonn conference,
GWP was again amply represented at the International Steering Committee, in the person
of the current GWP-TEC chair Mohamed Ait Kadi, the former GWP chair Margaret
Catley-Carlson, and Bai-Mass Taal, Executive Secretary of the African Ministers Council
on Water (AMCOW)—one of GWP’s strongest African allies.11
8.2.5 Conscripting Mali in the network
After the WSSD in Johannesburg, the insistent call to develop national IWRM plans was
finally heard by a number of organizations and donors. On the one hand, Danida sup-
ported the ‘IWRM 2005 Programme’ of the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP), which ran from May 2005 to December 2008 in over 60 countries and 10 sub-
regions. The implementation of the program happened through the UNEP-DHI Centre
for Water and Environment, which had been established in October 2001 by UNEP,
Danida, and DHI, and is housed in Denmark by the latter. Thanks to this collaboration,
UNEP’s Water Policy and Strategy is integrally based on IWRM. Torkil Jønch-Clausen,
10Interview senior Danida advisor, 4 Jan 2012.
11Observed, May 2011 - September 2010
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then head of DHI Water & Environment, was also UNEP-DHI programme coordinator
and member of its three-headed Steering Committee.
On the other hand, GWP took the initiative to mount a ‘Partnership for Africa’s Wa-
ter Development’ (PAWD), with the aim to develop IWRM plans in five African countries.
Up till that moment, GWP had always acted as a neutral network for knowledge exchange
and advocacy, not as implementer of a development project. The PAWD project, how-
ever, emerged as a bid of GWP to diversify and augment the core funding sources.12 The
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) responded to the needs of GWP
and agreed to sponsor the PAWD-under-construction, but it imposed, much against the
will of the GWP-TEC, a project-like setup of PAWD. CIDA also hand-picked the eligible
countries according their own interests—Mali was one of them.13 The PAWD project
supported Mali from January 2004 to December 2007 in the production of a national
IWRM plan ‘PAGIRE’, which was eventually adopted by the parliament in 2008.
The PAWD project started in Mali when significant reforms were already being made
in the water sector. IWRM was not an entirely new concept anymore, as it had entered
the country already through two doors. In March 1998 Danida and DHI organized a
West African conference on IWRM in Ouagadougou. In effect, Danida had experience
that a similar regional conference in Entebbe had proven effective in initiating regional
cooperation in Eastern Africa. In the occasion of the Ouagadougou conference, the Malian
minister of water signed, together with 11 West African colleagues, the Ouagadougou
Statement, pledging to reform water management at both national and regional level. A
regional secretariat, part of the regional economic union ECOWAS, was established to
follow up on the regional IWRM plan, and Mali’s neighbor Burkina-Faso, IWRM pilot
case of DHI and Danida, started developing its own national IWRM plan (1998-2001).
Moreover, in May 1998 the French Development Agency (AFD) and UNDP had orga-
nized a first concertation workshop in Mali to start developing a national Water Code.14
The Code was set to include references to IWRM and to water as economic resource, in
agreement with the Dublin Principles. The Water Code was eventually adopted in 2002.
In April of 2003, one year after GWP had created a West African Regional Water
Partnership (RWP), this Regional Water Partnership founded a Malian country water
partnership (PNE-Mali). The chair was assigned to Amadou Ma¨ıga Housseini, who had
already collaborated with GWP in the World Water Vision process (1997-2000), and
who served at that moment as focal point of the Niger Basin Authority at the Malian
Water Directorate (DNH). DNH is the operational branch of the Ministry of Water in
Mali. The DNH, which has always been the central hub for donors in the water sector,
nimbly pulled together different donor strings —principally from the World Bank and
12Interview ex GWP employee, 29 February 2012.
13Ibid.
14The creation of the Water Code is the step that preceded the creation of the Water Law and Water
Policies.
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GWP— to create a new IWRM unit within the DNH and put Ma¨ıga Housseini at the
head of this IWRM unit (see chapter 7 for more details).
In December 2003 a memorandum of understanding was signed between GWP, DNH
and PNE-Mali, identifying PNE-Mali and the DNH-IWRM unit as the two focal points for
the GWP-led PAWD program, that was poised to start in January 2004 in Mali. Although
there was an intense consultation of stakeholders (Patterson, 2008), the preparation and
finalization of the IWRM plan was centralized within the DNH-IWRM Unit, whereas
PNE-Mali’s role was limited to sensitize all stakeholders in IWRM matters.15 The fact
that the chair of PNE-Mali and the head of the DNH-IWRM unit were one and the same
person, impeded stakeholders to distinguish both organizations, and hindered PNE-Mali
to play its role as independent watchdog of the policy-process. Or as a permanent staff
member of PNE-Mali formulated euphemistically: “the power of PNE-Mali consists in
that it gets on so well with the [DNH] administration.”16
The PAGIRE plan that came out of the project was adopted by the Malian govern-
ment in April 2008, but no single donor had committed to the implementation of the
PAGIRE. However, the aid landscape of Mali’s water sector had started changing with
the arrival of Denmark as a new donor in 2006. Active in neighboring Burkina Faso since
several decades, Danida had expanded the radius of action of its technical assistants at
Ouagadougou to Mali. Danida, later joined by SIDA, started supporting the embryonic
attempt of DNH to develop a program for sectoral budget support to water and sanitation
(PROSEA). Danida stimulated the creation of an inter-ministerial Cell for Planning and
Statistics (CPS) in 2008. This cell has gradually assumed the authority over PROSEA
but heavily depends, to date, on Danish technical support to manage and implement
PROSEA.
The implementation of PAGIRE was integrally incorporated in the PROSEA. At a
donor round-table in February 2009, organized by Ma¨ıga Housseini of DNH together with
a the senior technical assistant of the Netherlands, a number of donors (Denmark, Sweden
and the African Development Bank) pledged half of the budget needed to implement the
PAGIRE component of PROSEA.
Although the PROSEA program has partly succeeded already in aligning the aid of
the international development partners in the development sector,17 the director of DNH
still laments that too many foreign consultants are coming in, all of them bringing in
their own ideas.18
15Interview PNE-Mali general secretary, 29 September 2010 and interview PNE-Mali chair, 17 August
2011
16Interview with a permanent staff member of PNE-Mali, 29 November 2010.
17Interview key Malian policy maker, 21 August 2011; interview senior foreign technical assistant, 24
April 2012.
18Interview with key Malian policy maker, 21 August 2011.
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8. Describing the emergence of IWRM with Actor-Network Theory
8.2.6 Creating an EU Water Initiative and Water Facility
As mentioned earlier, IWRM had already been discussed in the Committee on Devel-
opment and Cooperation of the European Parliament, in November 2000 (European
Parliament, 2000). In March 2002 the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian
Aid —at the time the Dane Poul Nielson (1999-2004)— released a communication on
“Water Management in Developing Countries Policy and Priorities for EU Development
Cooperation”, stating that the European Commission’s policy on water-related devel-
opment would be “to build strategies based on the overarching principles of Integrated
Water Resource Management”(European Commission, 2002).
At the WSSD in Johannesburg, the European Commission presented the new EU
Water Initiative (EU-WI) to the world. The EU-WI, although supported by different
Directorate-Generals of the European Commission, is not a proper European Commission
institution, but rather an open platform for coordination between the public, private and
civil society actors in water matters. Its creation was in part promoted by European non-
governmental organizations such as the British WaterAid and French PSEau, research
institutes such as the British WECD and Swiss SKAT, and governmental donors active
in the water sector such as Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. These actors had
already been meeting on a regular basis before the WSSD conference in Johannesburg.19
The initiative enjoyed the support of the European Commission and was formalized at
WSSD (Partzsch, 2009).
Obviously, also the EU-WI adhered to the IWRM principles: it declared that it
would “promote better water governance arrangements and good practice centered on
the principles of integrated water resources management” (European Commission, 2003).
The Finance Working Group of EU-WI, in agreement with the World Panel on Financing
Water Infrastructure (WWC, 2003), promoted the creation of a European Water Facility
(EU-WF), in order to increase aid in the water and sanitation sector.20 In January 2004
the DG Development communicated the creation of such an EU-WF, with two goals:
(i) work towards the MDG on access to water and sanitation, (ii) implement IWRM
worldwide. The EU-WF is conceived as a “fully demand driven” body in which the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, along with other civil society actors
from Europe and from the Global South, can define the policy (European Commission,
2004b).
The EU-WF allocates the largest part of its budget through periodic calls-for-propo-
sals. Under the first and second call, of 2004 and 2006, three types of actions were eligible:
(i) improvement of water management and governance, including “the development and
implementation of integrated water resources management,” (ii) co-financing of water
19Interview ex executive director of WaNGO, 17 Apr 2012.
20The Water Facility is a funding channel of EuropeAid, exclusively dedicated to finance activities
that address the MDGs in water and sanitation.
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and sanitation infrastructure, and (iii) co-financing of civil society initiatives that, where
applicable, “lobby governments to address [. . . ] IWRM ” (European Commission, 2004a).
At the call of 2006 the European non-governmental organization WaNGO21 obtained a
grant to implement IWRM at municipal level in the Inner Niger Delta (IND) in Mali.
8.2.7 Conscripting non-governmental aides
WaNGO —an international, non-governmental development organization (NGO)— is
founding member of the EU Water Initiative in 2002 in Johannesburg and a major non-
governmental proponent of IWRM in Mali since 2004. Originally created in the late
1970s to deliver non-governmental technical assistance in a wide range of sectors in Haiti,
WaNGO now works in 9 countries in Africa and Latin America. In the landscape of
myriad development organizations that compete for donor funding,22 WaNGO carved
out its own specific niche in two steps: as of 2001 it concentrates its work in the water
sector, and in 2005 it adopted IWRM as mainstreaming principle for all projects.
As nearly 82% of the WaNGO budget derives from governmental sources (45% project
funding and 37% structural funding), WaNGO attaches great importance to its status of
professional and highly specialized NGO.23 The adoption of IWRM as guiding principle
has endowed the organization, according to the employees, with an additional “compara-
tive advantage with respect to other NGOs, definitely at the national but to some extent
also at the European level.”24 Very few western or grassroots NGOs are conversant with
IWRM:25
Other NGOs don’t care about IWRM. The ones involved in irrigation tend to
work vertically, focusing on the agricultural production chain,26 while we work
horizontally, putting irrigation next to the other uses of water.
The idea to frame all actions of WaNGO within an IWRM framework emerged at the
headquarters, not through discussion with the partners in the field.27 This is common
practice in the organization; strategic innovations usually sprout from the headquarters.
The serendipity of the former executive director, was key in this aspect. The employ-
ees resolutely disaffirm that IWRM sneaked into the organization under pressure of the
donors.28 Conversely, they avow that it is loosely based on the practices of integrated wa-
21WaNGO is a pseudonym.
22Personal communication of WaNGO employee, June 2010.
23Personal communication of several WaNGO employees, February – July 2010.
24Quoted from an interview with the IWRM focal point of WaNGO, 30 June 2010, and confirmed by
the ex director, 17 April 2012.
25Interview with the head of Southern Operations Department, 29 June 2010.
26NGOs working in the agricultural sector tend to focus on the sustainability of the entire production
chain, from seed and fertilizer supply, over irrigation and yield improvement, to the sales on the market.
27Interview with the head of Southern Operations Department, 29 June 2010, interview with the
IWRM focal point, 30 June 2010, interview with ex-director, 17 April 2012.
28Unlike other bandwagon concepts such as ‘capacity building”, see chapter 6.
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ter management and river basin management in the home country, and in the European
Union in general. In 2003 the WaNGO headquarters organized an IWRM conference in
the home country, inviting national water management experts and academics to think
up an IWRM strategy for WaNGO. Two years later, in 2005, the organization adopted
an IWRM strategy that was based on “a mix of external input, own interpretation, and
some experience from the field.”29 The strategy paper credits the WSSD conference and
states that “for WaNGO, IWRM is the strategic reference framework in which all different
actions are inscribed [but] it is not an objective on its own.”30
8.2.8 Conscripting the municipalities in Mali
The Inner Niger Delta (IND) is a landlocked wetland area in the Malian Sahel, where the
Niger river annually floods up to 35 000 km2. Over one million people make a living in this
fertile area, from agriculture, fishing and animal husbandry. Because of its extremely high
natural value the IND is protected as Ramsar site. However, hydro-power dams on the
Niger river, as well as changing rainfall, are affecting the eco-system and the livelihoods
of the people (Zwarts, 2010).
WaNGO had been working in the IND at village level since 1997, in collaboration with
two local NGOs, to provide rural drinking water infrastructure and improve the small
scale rice irrigation and flood control infrastructure. In 2002 it seized the opportunity of
a new donor call to define a clear IWRM project in the IND. WaNGO chose the IND for
the implementation of a pilot IWRM project because “it is an environment that naturally
fits IWRM.” “WaNGO deployed IWRM in the IND because there the visibility would be
higher.”31 The Niger river and the wetland character of the IND were helpful to increase
the visibility of the project, both towards the donors and the beneficiaries:32
People easily understand IWRM when the water is supplied by a gravitational
systems or when they have to share a river. This is different from [our work in]
Benin, where groundwater is the principal source of water.
In 2004, in the same year that GWP’s PAWD took off, WaNGO launched the IWRM
pilot project in the IND, covering 4 municipalities in the cercle of Mopti. Given that the
project acronym IWRMIND33 contains the four letters ‘IWRM’, WaNGO de facto started
profiling itself as an IWRM organization in Mali, in the IND, and vis-a`-vis the donors.
However, rather than implementing a holistic management of water in the IND, the initial
aim of the IWRMIND project was to “combine into one project all the existing activities
[of WaNGO] concerning drinking water supply, sanitation, and irrigation.”34 Interviewed
29Interview with the head of Southern Operations Department, 29 June 2010
30Ibid.
31Interview with the manager of the first IWRMIND project, 4 November 2011.
32Interview with the manager of the first IWRMIND project, 30 June 2010.
33IWRMIND is a pseudonym.
34Interview with the manager of the first IWRMIND project, 4 November 2011.
146
8.2. Tracing the IWRM network
WaNGO employees sustain that the IWRM discourse has changed their way of working,
by streamlining actions that used to be fragmented, but that it did not add new elements.
Indeed, in 2011 the project entered its fourth phase, involving 18 municipalities in the
IND, and the vast majority of the budget is still absorbed by infrastructure works for
water supply, sanitation, and irrigation, rather than by IWRM activities.
As of the third phase of IWRMIND, which was funded by the EU-WF, the national
branch of GWP, PNE-Mali, was drawn in the project to build the capacities of the
council members and local NGOs in terms of IWRM. In the national context, the role of
PNE-Mali is mostly limited to sensitizing different audiences (council members, women,
journalists) about IWRM.35 This is no different in the IWRMIND project. PNE-Mali
has been criticized for delivering theoretical trainings about IWRM whose level is much
too high and whose practical use too low.36
8.2.9 The council members and villagers
In order to check whether the IWRM paradigm had found its way to the municipal council
members and to the beneficiaries in the villages, six municipalities of the IWRMIND
project were subjected to a more profound analysis.
The decentralization process, started in Mali in the early 1990s, transferred to the
municipalities the responsibility to develop a municipal Plan for Social, Economic and
Cultural Development (PDSEC). This is a substantial document that analyzes the needs
of the municipality, sets the objectives, and makes a budget estimation. Since virtually no
municipal councils in the IND (except that of Mopti) have the capacities and resources to
develop a PDSEC, these plans are usually developed by an external (national) consultant
and financed by external (non-governmental) organizations. Of the six municipalities
under scrutiny, four had the latest version of their PDSEC financed by WaNGO and
each of these four included IWRM as a key to socio-economic development (see Table
8.3). The two remaining PDSECs, financed by other organizations, make no mention of
IWRM, despite WaNGO being active in those municipalities.
Municipality PDSEC sponsor PDSEC author IWRM included
Ouroube´-Doude´ IFAD, WaNGO Malian consultant A no
Konna WaNGO Malian consultant B yes
Socoura WaNGO Malian consultant B yes
Soye´ WaNGO Malian consultant B yes
Togue´-Mourrari no recent PDSEC no recent PDSEC no
Ke´wa WaNGO Malian consultant B yes
Source: PDSECs of the six municipalities
Table 8.3: Characteristics of the PDSEC plans of the six municipalities
35Interview general secretary of PNE-Mali on 29 September 2010.
36Mid-term evaluation by the European Commission, January 2010.
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However, PDSECs are said to “never reflect the reality on the ground,” as they tend
to be “ignored by most intervening development partners.”37 Therefore, 12 focus group
discussions in the 6 municipalities were organized; 6 with villager and 6 with the council
members.38 Each of the groups was asked (i) in which ways the high variability of rainfall
and water level throughout the year determined their livelihood and domestic economy,
(ii) to what extent they were able to take control of this variability, (iii) what was needed
to do that, (iv) whether the different uses of water (agriculture, animal husbandry, fishery,
domestic water use) generated tensions between families or groups, and (vi) how that
could be mitigated.
The recurrent answers of the villagers was that they needed more and better infras-
tructure, such as drinking water points, channels and dams, fishing ponds, irrigated areas,
etc. In none of the discussions the villagers alluded to the idea of managing water in an
integrated, comprehensive or participative. This can be explained, on the one hand, by
the fact that the abstract concepts typical of development aid, such as IWRM, never
penetrate into the indigenous languages. (The languages used in the discussions with the
villagers were Bambara, Fula, and Bozo.) This has been ascertained by various scholars
(Olivier de Sardan, 2005, p.178-84). On the other hand, IWRM is not of the issue to the
villagers, as the repartition of land and water amongst different users is regulated by the
customary and still widely applied laws of the Diina (Benjaminsen and Ba, 2008).
Surprisingly, neither during the discussions with the council members (held in French)
the idea of integrated, comprehensive or participative management of water resources
emerged—let alone the concept of IWRM. Some concepts typical of the realm of devel-
opment aid, however, did penetrate into the discourses of the council members; ‘climate
change’ and ‘capacity development’ in particular.39 Again, the enduring rule of the Diina
could explain that council members do not spontaneously think of IWRM. Notwithstand-
ing, the municipality as administrative structure overrules the customary management
of natural resources and its boundaries do not coincide with those of the Diina units.
Only when explicitly asked about IWRM, the discussants subscribed to the concept, but
identified it with the arrival of WaNGO in the municipality, rather than with PNE-Mali
and its sensitization workshops.
8.3 Some experimentions with ANT vocabulary
In the previous section I have described IWRM’s emergence and rise to hegemony by ex-
clusively focusing on the actors, and by tracing the many major and minor links they knit
amongst each other. I consciously employed this strategy in order to navigate between
37Focus group discussion with mayors and NGOs representatives, 24 September 2010
38Held in September 2010 and October-November 2011.
39Focus group discussions, September 2010 and October-November 2011.
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the disembodied ‘discursive’ view and the positivist ‘stagist’ view on the policy process.
The strategy I employed is very affine to Actor-Network Theory (ANT).
At its most fundamental level, ANT claims that there does not exist a given dimension
of reality that can be labeled as ‘social structure’ or ‘social context’. We should, in fact,
not confuse the explanans with the explanandum: it is the social itself that needs to
be explained. The social comes into being as a living assemblage of myriad connections
that actors construct between each other. Connections can be of any nature —material,
semiotic, economic, legal, linguistic, etc.— and they can connect very heterogeneous
actors —human and non. Indeed, any entity that possesses the agency to forge, maintain,
or transform a connection is considered an actor (Latour, 2005).
Actors try to establish connections and assemblages to make other actors do things.
The relations between actors in such assemblages, however, are not causal. One actor
never fully controls an action nor does he fully control other actors — an action is always
‘over-taken’ by the assemblage.
By leaving aside pre-conceived social structures, the analysis should also relinquish
pre-conceived ideas about categories of actors, what their matters of concern are, or
what counts as a social actor and what as a natural actor. These features only become
clear through the tying process; they are defined by the actors themselves and by their
connections. It cannot be the task of the observer to pre-assume these delineations.
One expressive, powerful repertoire that is often used to operationalize ANT is the one
of ‘translation’ and ‘enrollment’, proposed by Callon and Law (1982) and Callon (1986).
Take, for instance, a scientific experiment, a policy, or a paradigm. When actors take
pains to bring these instances into existence, they first have to problematize the situation
and define it in such a way that the interest of other actors is awakened to take part in the
event — this is the phase of interessement. Second, a process of translation starts: if one
actor A can convince another actor B that A’s knowledge is useful for B to achieve B’s
objectives, it is said that A translates his knowledge in order to enroll B. Interests drive
the knowledge-production, but the interests are also iteratively shaped by knowledge.
In this translation of knowledge and interests, the most nimble actors manage to profile
themselves as obligatory passage point. Third, by enrolling others, actors try to build long
chains of associates or allies in order to make the experiment, the policy, or the discourse
work. As said earlier, no distinction is made between a supposed realm of policy making
and a realm of implementation, nor between the social and the natural. The allies in the
chain can be development planners, farmer unions, as well as statistical data, concepts,
legal instruments or a water well. In fact, non-human devices and artifacts are particularly
powerful in anchoring durable associations (Law, 1986; Latour, 2005). Finally, actors can
also grow dissident, which forces the allies to renegotiate the interests. The dissidence
can eventually lead to a break-down of the chain. The scientific experiment, the policy,
or the discourse works or fails depending on the strength of the chain — not the other
149
8. Describing the emergence of IWRM with Actor-Network Theory
way around.
Rather than being a theory that analyzes, ANT is a way of describing the social,
by tracing the translations between actors. This is possible because any translation and
connection leaves physical traces (Latour, 2005, p.132). The previous section collected
the traces left by the IWRM actors. My tracing was of course not an exhaustive coverage
of the entire network. Drawing on the very concise body of data of the previous section,
I demonstrate in what follows that Callon’s vocabulary, which sprouted from science and
technology studies, can equally be applied to a network of development actors.
Problematization, translation, enrollment The origins of the IWRM alliance re-
mount to the initial phase of problematization. In order to make IWRM work as paradigm
in water-related development activities, it needed to be put forward as solution to a prob-
lem that was insolvable without IWRM. In the sphere of multi-lateral organizations such
a problem became obvious in the 1980s when the IDWSSD decade failed to attain its am-
bitious targets. A very select group of water professionals and organizations, described in
the section 8.2.2, increasingly blamed the sectoral management of water and used different
forums to propose ‘cross-sectoral’ or ‘integrated’ management of water as solution.
The problematization is also the act of formulating the problem in such a way that
the other actors, that need to be enrolled in the assemblage, can recognize themselves in
certain roles. The problematization ascribes roles to the to-be-enrolled actors: the multi-
lateral organizations should promote IWRM and urge the development of IWRM plans,
the national governments need to develop national IWRM plans, the experts/consultants
can provide expert knowledge and transfer best practices, the donor agencies should
mainstream IWRM in their water-related aid, etc.
This select group of water professionals and organizations proposed itself as obliga-
tory passage point to reach the solution: they hold the knowledge to solve the problem,
they know how to integrate the unintegrateable. This select group became in effect the
obligatory passage point for the Rio process, for the EU policies concerning water-related
development, for the EU Water Initiative, and for the development of IWRM plans in
developing countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali.
Actors get enrolled in the alliance because the most nimble mediators succeed in
translating the different interests and showing that the IWRM network is of fundamental
use to them. The malleability of the IWRM paradigm has proven to be a strength in this
translation process. Through the Dublin and Bonn conferences the expert community
convinced the multi-lateral agencies that the failure to improve the access to safe water
and sanitation could be overcome by IWRM. The donor agencies (Danida in 1992 and
GTZ in 2002) were told that, thanks to their support to IWRM, they had had an impact at
the Earth Summit (in Rio and Johannesburg respectively). The DNH in Mali understood
that the PAWD program posed the opportunity to create an IWMR-Unit. WaNGO
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realized that IWRM could give them the opportunity to propose a large unified project
rather than fragmented one. The municipalities in the IND learned that IWRM was a
new term to label trainings and investments in water supply, sanitation and irrigation.
ANT does recognize the differential pressures that are brought to bear on the as-
semblage by mediators and intermediaries, the latter simply adding predictability to the
setting, the former shaping and transforming the assemblage in unexpected ways. The
actors that are most nimble in bending the network, or the ones that have knitted most
ties, are the most powerful mediators. Or citing one of the principal mediators of the
IWRM network40:
It always boils down to a few individuals—the champions [. . . ] Like one dictator can
ruin a whole country, a few champions can run a cause. And when they disappear,
the cause disappears with them.
In the early years of the IWRM emergence, principal mediators were Torkil Jønch-Clausen
of DHI and GWP, Ismail Serageldin of the World Bank, and the Swedish/European politi-
cian Anders Wijkman. The organizations GWP and WWC perpetuated their mediating
role.
Devices as powerful mediators Actors do not need to be humans. In fact, non-
human actors can be very effective and persistent mediators of power relations (Law,
1986) —usually much more effective and persistent than human-to-human ties, since the
latter require continuous maintenance. Consider, for instance, the following non-human
devices in the IWRM network: the Dublin Principles, the organizations GWP, WWC,
and DHI, the PAWD project, a national IWRM plan, the Niger river, or the EU-WF
calls-for-proposals.
The Dublin Principles were agreed in the last official preparatory meeting for the Rio
Earth Summit. It took a number of Danida water experts a whole series of efforts in
order to get four principles on the international agenda (these experts had to convince
their government to change water development strategy, they had to establish a Nordic
Freshwater Initiative, and had to convene an informal meeting with partners and multi-
lateral agencies in Copenhagen in 1991). The NFI does not exist anymore and few
people remember the Copenhagen Statement of 1991, but the Dublin Principles are still
omnipresent, still quoted by many, including by GWP, and are still setting the mindset of
many water managers worldwide. Even in 2011 the GWP-TEC chair still declared that
the intellectual role of GWP-TEC is to “develop and implement the actual meaning of
the Dublin Principles. They are the real intellectual background of TEC.”41
GWP, WWC, or DHI-UNEP, too, were created by individuals, many of whom are
not part of the network anymore nowadays, but the organizations themselves are still
40Interview with senior expert to Danida, 4 January 2012
41Statement by GWP-TEC chair, 17 August 2011
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there, continuing to promote IWRM and to tie in new allies. The same applies to major
projects such as PAWD: a small number of nimble mediators managed to forge a project
with international outreach, but once funding was obtained the project was bound to go
ahead, without the involvement of the original devisers.
Strangely enough, also the Niger river has played a role in promoting IWRM. As
explained by a WaNGO employee, the Inner Niger Delta offered an environment that
was particularly apt to IWRM, because the different uses of water interfere in a very
visible way. People realize that they are sharing the same source. In Benin, especially in
the areas where people exclusively rely on ground water as source of water, WaNGO has
a hard time to promote IWRM.
A final and very powerful device worth mentioning is the call-for-proposals — the
prevailing procedure used by donors to assign funding. The calls of the EU-WF, for in-
stance, exactly define which types of development actions will be considered fundable (for
the 1st EU-WF the three fundable actions were: water supply and sanitation, IWRM,
capacity building), which types of actors can receive funding (either state or non-state
actors, either national or international), in what time frame the actions need to be im-
plemented, and how the partners will get paid. The organizations that apply to the call
need to cram their project proposals in a prescribed Logical Framework, breaking down
the project in hierarchical objectives and sequential activities. Moreover, the applicants
and their partners need to be registered in the online database PADOR, which is “used
by the European Commission for evaluating the operational and financial capacity crite-
ria as well as for checking the eligibility of the organizations that participate in calls for
proposals” (European Commission, 2012). This composition of (i) the call-for-proposals,
(ii) the PADOR database, and (iii) the Logical Framework, effectively controls the mind-
set of the competing organizations and mainstreams their modus operandi. Deleuze and
Guattari (1998) call such a powerful composition of extremely well geared socio-technical
tools an ‘agencement ’. The EU-WF agencement was without doubt very instrumental in
promoting IWRM worldwide, as acknowledged, for instance, by the WaNGO employees.42
Dissidence The chain of allies needs continuous maintenance, as actors can grow dis-
sident and break the chain. Over the past few years donors have sent out some initial
signals of IWRM fatigue. There are IWRM-like plans or policies in over 80% of the
countries worldwide, but in most cases the step to implementation has not been made
yet (UN-Water, 2011).
The era of financing ideas is over. We have to give a product. Donors want to see
something tangible [. . . ] We need to be aware of what they want.43
42Interview with a former IWRMIND manager, 30 June 2010.
43Personal communication of a RWP chair, 15 August 2011
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Unless IWRM is renegotiated, donors will retract from the IWRM discourse. In ANT-
terms, renegotiation means the ‘re-translation of interests’.
Also WaNGO employees have been casting doubts on the practical value of IWRM,
especially on the Habermasian idea that a conciliation between different decision-levels
is actually possible:44
It is easy to coordinate the water users at the well—and the strategic regional or
national IWRM platforms work fine, too. But there is a missing link between the
two. In between the strategic platforms and the water users there is nothing.
Again, it might be a matter of translating IWRM into something that is more tangible.
“As long as you work at village level —for drinking water or irrigation— you can really
engage the villagers. But higher levels of IWRM coordination are unworkable [in Africa],
unless real conflicts between sectors emerge.” As long as sector conflicts are not felt at
their cost, actors are hard to mobilize. In other words, this is one point of the network
where it appears hard to translate the interests of potential allies into IWRM terms.
After all, this is how IWRM emerged: “first there were the problems, then the concept.”45
Without conflict or problem, there are few interests to be translated.
Renegotiation of the paradigm Since the early 1990s, the United Nations orga-
nizations have been told that water is a “resource” that is key to any form of “social
and economic development”, and that it needs “cross-sectoral management strategies”
(Stockholm Water Symposium, 1992). Despite this inclusive definition from the onset,
the IWRM alliance constantly needs to re-translate the paradigm —translate them in
the terms and worries that prevail at that particular moment in history— in an effort to
keep IWRM of interest to the existing and future allies. Three fronts of renegotiation can
currently be distinguished:46 (i) ‘Integrated Water and Land Resources Management’ for
‘green growth’, (ii) ‘food security’, and (iii) ‘climate change’.
One of the concerns of the first Stockholm Water Symposium (SWS) was the “large-
scale land degradation in Third World countries.” Therefore the SWS insisted that “water
and land have to be managed together locally” (Stockholm Water Symposium, 1992,
p.7). Now, twenty years later, the IWRM community repeats the message that IWRM is
about much more than water. Skepticism about the (lack of) concrete results of IWRM
is countered by the argument that the deployment of IWRM “has been too much driven
by water ministries and water people”47 and that it, instead, should be mainstreamed
in all national economic development planning. In order to lift IWRM out of the water
box, there is a burgeoning tendency to re-brand IWRM as Integrated Water and Land
44Interview with the IWRM focal point of WaNGO, 30 June 2010
45ibid.
46Observations at the 2011 GWP Consulting Partners meeting, and observations at the 2011 Stockholm
World Water Week.
47Interview senior advisor to Danida, 4 January 2012
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Resources Management (IWLRM),48 and to present water as the medium that will break
or make green growth.49
Another concern at the SWS of 1991 was “rapid population growth” and “how to
feed the new inhabitants with both water and crops.” Twenty years later this aspect of
IWRM is still achingly relevant, with global food prices soaring since 2007 (FAO, 2012b).
However, while the 1991 SWS mostly worried about “rapid population growth”, today
the focus of donors and multi-lateral organizations is on “food security”. Thus, a second
way of keeping the interest of allies alive is by plugging IWRM into the food security
debate. For instance, in 2011 the GWP Secretariat developed an operational strategy
on food security, and GWP-TEC was working on a technical paper on IWRM and food
security. The pressure to address food security was in part donor driven—one sponsoring
partner hesitated to continue its long-standing funding of GWP. But also the partners
in the countries played their role. The regional water partnerships develop their five
year strategy in complete independence and most of them happen to have included food
security. The task of the Global Secretariat is then “to draw together the treads.”50
The IWRM community also needs to swim with the climate change stream. Although
the core IWRM actors believe that “there is nothing new addressed in climate change
adaptation strategies that wasn’t already addressed by IWRM,”51 the IWRM community
finds itself in the position that it has to “talk the climate change talk”, and that it has to
use the forums and instruments of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).52
The GWP Global Secretariat has also found that “climate change is the funding
strategy for the future.”53 Only by explicitly reorienting the activities on adaptation to
climate change, GWP has been able to hitch a third phase to their landmark PAWD
project and obtain funding for it. This third phase was re-branded as the ‘Water, Cli-
mate and Development Programme for Africa’ (WACDEP). In effect, the inception of
WACDEP convinced another long-standing but wavering financial partner of GWP to
continue sponsoring GWP. This financial partner now draws the money from a fund that
it had earmarked for climate change adaptation. The network of actors behind WACDEP,
however, has basically remained the same as the one behind PAWD, with the same re-
gional partners in Africa and the same consultancy companies. The only difference is
that the official ownership of the program is now in the hands of AMCOW.
WaNGO, too, seizes climate change as an opportunity to re-translate and strengthen
its identity. Not only can WaNGO, due to its focus on water, present itself as an NGO
48Observations at the 2011 GWP Consulting Partners meeting, observations at the 2012 World Water
Forum, and also Hoff (2009) and GWP (2011).
49The water-energy-food nexus in green growth was the topic of the 2011 Bonn conference.
50Interview with GWP Executive Secretary, 8 August 2011.
51Public statement by executive secretary of an RWP, Consulting Partners Meeting, 18 August 2011
52Personal communication of several GWP employees, May-September 2011
53Personal communication during GWP observation, 26 July 2011.
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that works in the sector of adaptation to climate change. More importantly, climate
change is a leverage for WaNGO to reinforce its discourse on North-South inequalities.
That the climate is changing due to consumption patterns in the North, whereas the
impacts will be mostly felt in the South, reinforces WaNGO’s revendication that the
Global North is morally obliged to channel development aid to the Global South.54
8.4 Conclusions—the meaning of success and failure
The skeptic reader might rightly wonder whether an ANT description really adds to our
understanding of the development aid architecture. Perhaps, these actors, located at
different points in the network, are very nimble at playing to the donor’s tunes? Doesn’t
the alliance of actors simply align along the already well scoured flows of donor money?
From the ANT description, I deduct the exact opposite: the donor money follows those
alliances that are performing. Taking a different tack than Foucauldian analyses, I argue
that a paradigm such as IWRM derives its success from the loads of work that is being
done ‘behind the stage’ by various actors in order to tie in allies in the assemblage, and to
make the paradigm work. In other words, the paradigm performs because a network of
actors makes it perform. “Only voices speaking in unison will be heard” (Callon, 1986).
An alliance that performs, is also an alliance that attracts donor money. My tracing of
IWRM shows that much effort had to be put in the IWRM assemblage before it attracted
money: the money is an indicator that the chain performs—not the other way around.
And this is exactly happening in the case of GWP’s new WACDEP program. Con-
ceived by an ex-PAWD project manager, building upon a strong alliance with African
partner AMCOW, and using IWRM to address adaptation to climate change, the new
WACDEP program was hailed with interest by bilateral donors when it was presented at
the World Water Week. “Donors prefer to sponsor projects that appear to be working
well already,” one WACDEP manager stated, “they don’t want to run much risk.”55
So, I claim that the IWRM network works. It is, however, hard to tell whether
the IWRM paradigm works in positivist terms. Is water management in Mali better
now? Has the livelihood of people in the IND improved thanks to IWRM? Is water
quality better? It is very hard to collect unequivocal data about that, and even if there
were data available, it would be impossible to attribute it to IWRM alone. But, to the
donors, or to the water actors in the IND, IWRM appears as a successful paradigm—yes,
in need of constant improvement, but successful. And this is what ANT teaches us
about development policies: “development success is not merely a question of measures
of performance; it is also about how particular interpretations are made and sustained
socially.” (Mosse, 2005b, p.158)
54Interview with the Climate Change focal point of WaNGO, 29 June 2010.
55Stockholm World Water Week, Focus on Africa, side event, 23 August 2011.
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Introducing the theoretical articles
The following two articles reflect on the methodology. The qualitative data was collected
from various sources: three participant observations, interviews, focus group discussions
and documents. The data collection and analysis followed the Grounded Theory Method
(Charmaz, 2006). Faithful to this method, the inquiry started with no particular theory
nor a clear delineation of the field in mind. As the first participant observation (at the
headquarters of WaNGO) proceeded, three paradigms emerged as interesting lines for
further inquiry. They were ‘followed’ into two connected sites.
Although the classic Grounded Theory Method requires the data collection to be dis-
sociated from existing theories, chapter 9 describes four forms of unavoidable, theoretical
conditioning in ethnographic data collection: (1) the framing of the research problem,
(2) the implicit ontological assumptions about the world and the problem under scrutiny,
(3) the delineation of the site of data collection, and (4) the theory-ladenness of obser-
vations. With examples from the conducted multi-sited ethnography, chapter 9 shows
this data conditioning and its impact on the grounded theorizing. It is argued that this
conditioning does not invalidate the Grounded Theory Method as such, but that it should
be made explicit throughout the process of theorizing. A case is made for post-modern
advances in the Grounded Theory Method, by bringing in fresh ontological categories
from discourse theory and Actor-Network Theory.
Chapter 10 constitutes an ex post reflection on the data collection and analysis.
The chapter argues that multi-sited ethnography as data collection method and Actor-
Network-Theory as descriptive tool constitute a powerful method/tool package for the
description of the social interactions in development aid. The chapter shows how the
method and the tool are particularly geared to each other. Subsequently, it is shown
that the package allows to move beyond the unflagging global/local and policy/practice
dichotomies that characterize many development policy analyses. Further in the chapter,
George Marcus’ six operational strategies for multi-sited ethnography are translated to
the context of development aid. The chapter also reflects on the peculiarities of gaining
access to, and forging an identity in, the different sites.
Each chapter in Part III was originally conceived as a stand-alone article. Hence,




Theoretical conditioning of the
Grounded Theory Method and the
observational data
I arrived in Kumasi with no particular goal. Having one is
generally deemed a good thing, the benefit of something to
strive toward. This can also blind you however: you see only
your goal, and nothing else, while this something else —wider,
deeper— may be considerably more interesting and important.
R. Kapuscinski — The Shadow of the Sun
9.1 Introduction
The Grounded Theory Method (GTM) is very widely used in the social sciences for the
collection and analysis of (mostly qualitative) empirical data. It was first proposed by
Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) in The Discovery of Grounded Theory. The
method’s name summarizes the central premises: (i) the collection of empirical data
concerning a social phenomenon needs to start without a particular theory or hypothesis
in mind; (ii) the theorizing about the social phenomenon should be rigorously based on
the collected empirical data and this theorizing should happen according a systematic and
inductive procedure. The product of the Grounded Theory Method is a ‘grounded theory’:
a new, meso-level, social theory that is grounded in the empirical data.1 Various manuals
exist that articulate, step by step, the entire theorizing process: from the collection and
coding of the data, over the interrogation and analysis of the data, to the theorizing (see
for instance Charmaz, 2006).
1I follow Bryant and Charmaz (2007b) in that the method should be called ‘Grounded Theory Method’
(GTM), while the outcome of the method is a ‘Grounded Theory’.
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A hallmark of GTM is that the theorizing starts as soon as the data starts to be
collected (Charmaz, 2001). Data collection and analysis are not two separate phases of
the research. They happen simultaneously because the data sampling is guided by the
requirements of the theorizing, rather than by requirements of completeness. In fact, data
sampling in the Grounded Theory Method does not aim to cover an entire social body or
population. The data does not need to be representative nor to cover all heterogeneities
(Clarke, 2005). The sampling should trigger theoretical ideas, that should be developed
through further sampling.
The practical steps of the classic GTM are as follows (based on Charmaz, 2001, 2006).
First, the raw data —mostly transcriptions of interviews or focus group discussions, ob-
servations, or any other ethnographic data— is scrutinized and split into smaller elements,
whereby each element gets ‘labeled’—or in GTM jargon: ‘coded’. These codes depend on
the researcher’s judgment; they can mean or represent anything, as long as they emerge
from the data. Nevertheless, the codes usually pay particular attention to ‘action’ and
‘process’, and they serve future analytic development rather than mere description.
A pivotal second step, between the coding and theorizing, consists of ‘memo-writing’.
Memo’s are written by the theorist to define the codes and describe their properties,
to determine theoretical categories, to demonstrate the relations between codes, and to
identify gaps in the data and coding.
As stated before, the data collection continues simultaneously with the definition of
codes and theoretical categories. Throughout the process of coding and memo-writing
the researcher identifies gaps, which he fills with new data that is collected on purpose
to improve the definition of the theoretical categories and their interrelations. This third
step is called ‘theoretical sampling’ (Charmaz, 2001).
The data sampling stops when new data does not shed any new light on the existing
core theoretical categories anymore. The grounded theory is then the collection of theo-
retical categories, their properties, and the relations between them, that allow to explain
the social processes and interactions that have been observed.
Consistent with this interpretation of GTM, various theorists consider GTM to be an
abductive rather than an inductive method (Charmaz, 2006, p.186):
Abductive inference is a type of reasoning that begins by examining data and
[. . . ] entertains all possible explanations for the observed data, and then forms
hypotheses to confirm or disconfirm until the researcher arrives at the most plausible
explanation of the observed data.
In sum, GTM proposes itself as an open-minded, framework-free orientation to the
social research domain. The positivist assmptions embedded in the two foundational
ideas, however, have been questioned over the decades. Until today some GTM scholars
stubbornly maintain that the researcher should enter the domain with no preconceived
problem statement, no interview protocols nor extensive review of literature (Holton,
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2007). Other GTM scholars admit that this is impossible —and probably not preferable—
and placatorily suggest that the researcher collects and analyzes data with an ‘open mind’,
rather than an ‘empty head’ (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007b). This second group of GTM
scholars, that take a more postmodern stance towards the data collection and theorizing,
also pay attention to the situatedness of observations (Clarke, 2005; Charmaz, 2006).
Drawing on my own, first hand experience of ethnographing and analyzing the social
practices that constitute development aid, I reflect in the present chapter on the two
foundational ideas of GTM (i.e., that the data are collected without any theory in mind,
and that the grounded theory should exclusively emerge from the data). I contend that
both foundational ideas are problematic. At various levels and different moments, implicit
theoretical and ontological assumptions are ‘always already’ woven in the GTM:
• in the data collection
• in the step from raw data to grounded theory
• in the entire setup of GTM
The step from raw data to grounded theory is widely discussed in the GTM community,
since is the one that is dearest to the grounded theorist. In the next section 9.2 I
summarize these debates and argue that whichever proposal is made to guide the stepping
up from data to theory, implicit assumptions about the functioning of ‘the social’ are
included. Moreover, these assumptions are related to the theoretical and ontological
assumptions in the entire setup of GTM. Section 9.3 elaborates on the first of three
contentions: that already the data collection suffers theoretical conditioning.
Section 9.4, then, points out why these different forms of theoretical conditioning
do not invalidate GTM. In fact, postmodern versions of GTM take the situatedness of
ethnographic data into account. I suggest in section 9.4 that grounded theorists should
not recoil in horror from making explicit their theoretical and ontological assumptions.
To the contrary, I sustain that this will make their theorizing richer.
The points I make in sections 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4 are illustrated in section 9.5 with data
from my own research, to wit, a multi-sited ethnography of development aid. Section 9.6
concludes the chapter.
9.2 Theoretical conditioning of GTM
The layout of GTM as method, independently of the social phenomenon onto which GTM
is applied, is already based on implicit ideas about how ‘the social’ works. To understand
the implicit assumptions in Glaser and Strauss’ version of GTM, the historical context
springs to our assistance.
Glaser and Strauss developed their theory in the 1960s, when positivism and quan-
tification reigned supreme in the social sciences. They wanted to propose a method for
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qualitative sociological research that displayed a similar epistemological and methodolog-
ical rigor as quantitative sociological research, and that could generate theories. In this
sense the development of GTM was heavily influenced by the postivist Zeitgeist: it pre-
tends to be a method for rigorous and systematic induction. Especially Glaser, in his
later work, defended the world as ‘knowledgeable’ and the Grounded Theorizer as an
Objective Observer.
At the same time GTM was also an opposition to the Zeitgeist. The development of
GTM was driven by an opposition to (i) the overemphasis of quantitative inquiry in the
social sciences at that time, (ii) the idea that qualitative research is impressionistic and
unsystematic, (iii) the primacy, at that time, accorded to the verification of hypotheses
and existing theory, and (iv) the logical deduction of theory from a priori assumptions
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). According to Glaser and Strauss, these characteristics obscure
“the prior step of discovering what concepts and hypotheses are relevant for the area that
one wishes to research” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.1f). Therefore they proposed GTM
as a method for the systematic generation of theory from data, instead of verifying pre-
conceived theory with data.
By the late 1960s, the positivist epistemology reigning the social sciences was chal-
lenged by various landmark publications: The Social Construction of Reality by Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann in 1966, Harold Garfinkel’s Studies in Ethnomethodology
in 1967, and also The Discovery of Grounded Theory in 1967. While the first two were
concerned with epistemological issues, the attention of Glaser and Strauss was directed
to methodology. The empirical work of Glaser and Strauss, however, revealed similar
social constructionist assumptions as the other two publications (Bryant and Charmaz,
2007a).
Because of the background of its two founding fathers, GTM is deeply rooted in sym-
bolic interactionism and pragmatism, and echoes assumptions of social life as emergent,
negotiated, situated in a specific setting, and open-ended (Charmaz, 2001; Clarke, 2005;
Clarke and Friese, 2007). Both symbolic interactionism and GTM focus in their inquiries
on the agentic actors (people that act as individuals or as collectivities) and actions.
Therefore, in a sense, Glaser and Strauss’s publication was not very distant from Berger
and Luckmann’s, or Garfinkel’s: they all explicitly argued that people construct their
realities through ordinary actions (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007a).
This focus of Glaser and Strauss on agency and actions, rather than on social struc-
tures, is not a neutral choice. The history of sociological and anthropological theory is
characterized by an eternal quest to understand the relation between ‘social structure’
and ‘individual agency’ (King, 2004). History teaches us that micro level theories of hu-
man agency (or action) have invalidated macro level theories of structure, and vice versa.
Some recent theories, such as Giddens (1984), try to find the middle path. These theories
encompass structure and agency as two aspects of the same entity; one does not exist
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without the other.
GTM seems to follow this middle path; it proposes a toolbox for grounded theorizing
about the interaction between human agency (or action) and the social conditions that
influence the actions. Strauss and Corbin’s publication of 1993 precisely treated this
interaction between agency and structure: “the action is shaped by conditions but in
turn is shaped by active actors” (Strauss, 1993, p.47). There is in GTM, however, a clear
preferential treatment of ‘action’ over ‘structure’. For Glaser, and even more for Strauss,
‘action’ is the central concept around which a grounded theory is built up. The structure
is conceived as those ‘boundary conditions’ that shape or influence the (inter)action, and
they need to be looked for in the ‘context’ of the (inter)action. Put another way, GTM
assumes the duality of structure and agency, but relegates structure to the ‘context’ of
(inter)actions and hence conceives it as something detached from these (inter)actions.
This eternal question about the interplay between agency (‘action’) and structure
(‘boundary conditions’) has not been settled in GTM. In fact, the irresolution of the
issue reveals itself in GTM during the coding process and the development of theoretical
categories. As Kelle (2005, 2007) points out, Glaser and Strauss argued in The Discov-
ery of Grounded Theory (1967) that theory should be ‘grounded’ in the data, but the
methodology they proposed to step from data to theory invoked conflicting ideas. On the
one hand they defended that the theory should emerge from the data, while on the other
hand they also make out a case for theoretical sensitivity from the researcher’s side. A
large portion of the later GTM literature should be interpreted as proposals to overcome
these diverging ideas (Kelle, 2005). I argue that, after all, it is also a discussion about
the ‘amount of structure’ that can be tolerated in grounded theorizing.
In the 1967 publication the concept of ‘theoretical sensitivity’ is not translated into
methodological rules: it is left unclear how a theoretically sensitive researcher should
use previous theoretical knowledge and experience. Not surprisingly, after their joint
publication, Strauss and Glaser developed diverging views on the process of theorizing in
GTM. Glaser adamantly maintained confidence in ‘emergence’ —I recall Glaser’s maxim
“all is data”— whereas Strauss attached greater importance to the ‘systematic’ treatment
of data.
Glaser elaborated on theoretical coding and proposed an extended list of formal episte-
mological and social concepts —such as “Causes, Context, Contingencies, Consequences,
Covariances, and Conditions” (Glaser, 1978)— and he loosely grouped them in coding
families. Although Glaser invokes terms that scent of causal relations —such as ‘cause’,
‘condition’, ‘consequence’— those terms in themselves are not sufficient for the develop-
ment of a causal model grounded in the data (Kelle, 2005). Obviously, it is a deliberate
choice of Glaser to leave the field fallow; he does not want to impose a pre-conceived
causal model. Nonetheless, by doing so, he fails to explain how his proposed coding
families should be used and linked with each other (Kelle, 2007).
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Where Glaser suggested a loose list of terms, Strauss and Corbin proposed a general
and well-articulated model of action —the paradigm model— rooted in pragmatist and
interactionist social theory. Their paradigm model, they wrote, serves “to think system-
atically about data and to relate them in very complex ways” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990,
p.99). They invited the grounded theorizer to fit all the categories and concepts that he
developed during the open coding in one of the classes of their own general paradigm
model. Moreover, a ‘conditional matrix’ was proposed to think out of the micro level
box, and to link —through 8 distinct levels (!)— the micro processes to the macro level.
Strauss and Corbin’s coding paradigm came under heavy criticism by Glaser and
others, who accused them of ‘forcing’ the data. Nonetheless, all sides seem to have
undermined GTM’s basic principle of framework-free data collection and analysis.
From this brief historical overview I distill three tentative conclusions. GTM in itself
is not free from theoretical and ontological assumptions, because of its very own outline:
• The classic version of GTM assumes the duality of (inter)action and constraining
conditions. Moreover, the conditions are to be extracted from the context. This
research outset determines the researcher’s way of looking into the world, and it
determines what he is interested in and what he will focus on during observation
and coding.
• The step from raw data to theory happens through coding and categorization of the
data. Since the researcher cannot ‘erase’ his mind, he cannot create such categories
ab ovo. Moreover, GTM requires a certain ‘theoretical sensitivity’. Therefore,
various proposals —both less and more structured versions— have been made for
the coding process and for the theoretical categories. These have been hailed with
varying enthusiasm.
• The conflict between ‘theoretical sensitivity’ and ‘emergence’ reflects the unresolved
agency-versus-structure quandary, since a theory-sensitive researcher will inevitably
be influenced by existing theories of agency and structure, whereas the emergence-
inclined researcher will inevitably emphasize action over structure.
9.3 Theoretical conditioning of observational data
In the introduction (section 9.1), I identified three levels and moments at which theoretical
and ontological assumptions are implicitly woven in GTM:
• in the data collection
• in the step from raw data to grounded theory
• in the entire setup of GTM
166
9.3. Theoretical conditioning of observational data
The latter two have been explained in the previous section. In the present section I
elaborate on the first contention, namely, that the collected data, too, are inevitably
conditioned by theoretical and ontological assumptions. The idea that researchers can
approach reality as objective observers as if they can free the mind from any preconceived
ideas whatsoever has been largely abandoned by contemporary sociology, philosophy
and psychology. Laudan wrote that “both historical examples and recent philosophical
analysis have made it clear that the world is always perceived through the ‘lenses’ of some
conceptual network or other and that such networks and the languages in which they are
embedded may, for all we know, provide an ineliminable ‘tint’ to what we perceive” (1977,
p.15). Lakatos maintained that “there are and can be no sensations unimpregnated by
expectations” (Lakatos, 1978).
In this section I describe how the collection of ethnographic data are conditioned by
theoretical and ontological assumptions in four ways:
• by the problem definition and the research questions;
• by the researcher’s implicit ontological and causal assumptions about the world
that make him focus on specific entities, categories or phenomena;
• by the delineation of the field for data collection (including the choice of informants);
• by the ‘theory-ladenness’ of human observation.
It is important to carefully distinguish the first three conditionings of data collection from
the last one. The first three sustain that data collection is limited, partial, and situated.
The last conditioning, to the contrary, implies that observations (what is heard, seen, and
felt) are different for each observer, on the basis of the conceptual and cognitive system
that he has at his disposition at the moment of the observation.
I now explain these four forms of data conditioning. They will sound very abstract,
but they are illustrated with examples from my empirical research in section 9.5.
The problem definition The most direct way in which the data collection is influ-
enced by pre-existing theoretical and ontological assumptions is through the researcher’s
definition of the problem to be researched. The problem framing is a translation of the
research purpose and already pre-defines which data are of interest.
In the hypothetic universe of all possibly available data, the researcher needs to start
at one certain point. That point is determined by the scientist’s research question, or
area of interest in general. For instance Strauss’s first rule of thumb, originally proposed
in 1979, implicitly states this (Strauss, 2001):
1. Choose a phenomenon, and give it a name, for this will be your core category,
to which all your codes will relate.
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When in the field, the ethnographer observes, asks questions, collects documents,
and he may even film or make photographs. These actions constitute a process of data
filtering: from the infinite amount of data available and the infinite number of impressions
that he receives, the researcher selects those ones that —according to his judgment—
make sense to his research problem. His pre-suppositions about the problem give him
already some ideas about what could be critically important elements and what can be
safely ignored.
This becomes most obvious in interviews. Although Holton (2007) correctly maintains
that classic GTM “requires the researcher to enter the research field with no preconceived
problem statements [or] interview protocols”, the researcher has to ask questions during
an interview. These questions inevitably convey the researcher’s implicit views on the
problem and they focus on supposedly interesting data. The questions extract only a
small part of data from the informant, and leave the largest part of the available data
undisclosed. Obviously, according to GTM, the answers that are obtained during inter-
views should steer the researcher in an unconstrained way towards new data and new
questions to ask. But once again, the researcher judges which new questions are asked
and how they are formulated.
Although Bryant and Charmaz (2007b) state that “[W]here one starts a grounded
theory study is seldom where one ends,” the path from start to end is not exclusively
guided by the data itself —as GTM ideally would want it. It is the researcher’s judgment
that ultimately determines the path.
Implicit ontological and causal assumptions In the intentional or unintentional
selection and filtering of data that I have described above, the researcher automatically
groups phenomena into ontological categories, only a small number of which he is in-
terested in. This preference for certain categories over others is inspired by (mostly)
implicit —but nonetheless fundamental— assumptions about the ontological structure of
the research subject under scrutiny and the causal relations that underpin it (Mauthner
and Doucet, 2003).
Before any theorizing can start, these implicit ontological and causal assumptions
have already laid out a general, metatheoretical framework that identifies categories of
phenomena or entities, and the relations between those categories.
Delineation of the field Taking up again the metaphor of the ‘hypothetical universe
of all possible data’, the research site could be considered as the ‘window’ through which
the researcher observes this data universe. Where he installs his window, and the size of
it, is determined by pre-conceived ideas about his research subject and depends solely on
the judgment of the researcher (Burrell, 2007). The observations he makes through this
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window may convince him to move the window more to the left or the right, or to try a
larger one, but the frame (the delineation) of the window unavoidably limits his view.
Although the selection and delineation of ‘the field’ deeply affects the quality of the
ethnographic data, the repercussions of these choices are not readily reflected on in qual-
itative social science (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Amit, 2000; Nadai and Maeder, 2005).
Theory-ladenness of observation The fourth way in which the ethnographic data
are conditioned is through the theory-ladenness of human observation. The term ‘theory-
ladenness’ has a very specific meaning and was introduced by Norwood Hanson (1969):
In short we usually ‘see’ through spectacles made of our past experience, our knowl-
edge, and tinted and mottled by the logical forms of our special languages and
notations. Seeing is what I shall call a ‘theory-laden’ operation [. . . ]
It is crucial to emphasize that Hanson sustained not just the theory-ladenness of the
textual descriptions of observations (the so-called ‘observational sentences’ and ‘observa-
tional reports’), but the theory-ladenness of the observations themselves. In other words,
Hanson assumes that cognition impinges upon perception—or better, that cognition and
perception compose one continuum.
Hanson’s thesis has been used by others to sustain relativist claims, but Hanson
himself never went that far. Obviously Hanson’s contention was refuted by many (e.g.
Hempel, 1970) who maintain that the observable reality constitutes a realm that is sep-
arate from the realm of theories.
Although Hanson has the merit of having coined the adjective ‘theory-laden’, his thesis
was not original at all. It was already present, for instance, in the work of Nietzsche, who
rejected the possibility of a non-perspectival knowing subject: “there is only a perspective
seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and the more affects we allow to speak about one
thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete
will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’, be.” (Nietzche, 1967 [1887], p.119).
The Hanson-Hempel discussion had a counterpart in the philosophy of mind, with
Fodor (1983; 1984) and Churchland (1989) disagreeing about the relation between ob-
servational processes and cognitive processes. Cognitive psychology, too, grapples with
the same problem and distinguishes ‘bottom-up’ cognitive processes from ‘top-down’ pro-
cesses (Estany, 2001). The bottom-up process supposes that human perception detects
the many basic features of a particular instance (e.g. the instance is ‘material’, ‘round’,
‘green with some red’, ‘shiny’) and the higher level cognition assembles these myriad small
perceptual units into one bigger pattern (the instance is ‘an apple’). To the contrary, in
the top-down process the higher level cognition is believed to impose an pre-existing
pattern on the lower perceptive level in order to interpret observations.
Nowadays, cognitive scientists agree that there is evidence for each of the two pro-
cesses; a complete theory of perception needs to include both bottom-up and top-down
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mechanisms. Based on a broad body of evidence from cognitive psychology, Estany con-
cludes that it is not possible to adopt a strong Hempelian nor a strong Hansonian position
(Estany, 2001):
Perception is influenced by previous knowledge but is not a prisoner of it —sensa-
tions can modify expectations. Therefore, even though philosophers who defend the
theory-laden thesis of observation are partly correct, they are mistaken in thinking
that this inevitably leads to doubt being cast over the objectivity of science and to
an epistemological relativism.
To conclude, ethnographic data are indeed shaped by the ‘perspective’, ‘lenses’, or
‘spectacles’ of the researcher, but, as Estany emphasizes, the observations are not deter-
mined by them.
Apart from the four forms of data conditioning described above, many other contingencies
determine the selection, quality, and level of detail of the collected data. They are
not described in this chapter because they do not originate in implicit ontological or
theoretical assumptions made by the researcher. The many other contingencies include,
amongst others:
• the identity that the researcher assumed (or negotiated) to enter the field, the type
of the relationship between the researcher and the informants, and the level of trust
between them (Coffey, 1999; Kawulich, 2011);
• the extent to which the choice and delineation of the field were dictated by contin-
gent conditions (Amit, 2000; Burrell, 2007);
• the personal and professional background of the researcher (Coffey, 1999; Mauthner
and Doucet, 2003).
9.4 Make the implicit explicit
It has become a truism to state that data are always ‘situated’, ‘partial’, ‘theory-laden’ or
‘perspectival’. This more nuanced view on knowledge has emerged under the impulse of
a general postmodern turn in the social sciences and humanities. While modernism was
always seeking universality, generalization, rationality, and categorizing, postmodernism
recognizes partialities, positionalities, heterogeneities, and messiness.
It does not come as a surprise, then, that also GTM scholars such as Bryant (2002),
Clarke (2005), or Charmaz (2006), have adopted a more postmodern and reflective view on
data collection and theorizing, without renouncing to the foundational principles of GTM.
Broadly speaking, GTM has evolved, since the 1960s, into three schools: (i) the Glaserian
or most positivist school, which I have been calling the ‘classic’ school, (ii) the Strauss
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and Corbin school, which propsed a full-blown ‘paradigm model’ for the theorizing, and
(iii) the Constructivist school. The latter was the last to emerge and has incorporated
the epistemological and methodological developments of postmodernism. This school
emphasizes, how the setup of the research, the methodological strategy to collect the data,
the data themselves, and the analysis of the data are all constructed by the researcher
(Bryant and Charmaz, 2007b).
The Constructivist GTM school is conscious that objective observations and ab ovo
theorizing are chimera, but this school argues that this does not invalidate the induc-
tive/abductive approach of GTM per se. In fact, they believe that GTM has ‘always
already’ contained some seeds of a postmodern epistemology, due to its affinity with
pragmatism and symbolic interactionism (Clarke, 2005). However, the Constructivist
school has pushed GTM a bit further around the postmodern turn in a number of ways
that correspond fairly well with the points I made in the previous two sections.
First, Bryant and Charmaz (Charmaz, 2006; Bryant and Charmaz, 2007b) have called
to fully “re-position” the epistemology of GTM according postmodern insights. The data
collection, as well as the inductive/abductive process of theorizing, are conditioned by
the positionality and perspective of the researcher. Theoretical categories do not emerge
from the data; they are the researcher’s interpretation of the data. Hence, the result
of GTM should be a carefully situated Grounded Theory, that sees complexities, and
that avoids generalizations of time, difference, or location. Indeed, any Grounded Theory
rendering is just this: “a representation of experience, not a replication of it” (Bryant
and Charmaz, 2007a, p.51). This epistemological repositioning roughly corresponds with
what I described in the section 9.3.
Second, Clarke (2005) encourages GTM scholars to abandon the duality of ‘social
process’ and ‘structural context’. This reflects my argument of section 9.2. Clarke par-
ticularly pulls down the concept of ‘context’ that in classic GTM is treated as a separate
entity in which the structural conditions are embedded. Instead, she proposes to analyze
the ‘situation’ as a whole. In such a ‘situational analysis’ the researcher is invited to map
the situation with all possible salient elements (human and non-human, discursive and
material, . . . ), the relations between the elements, and the relations with other situations
(Clarke, 2005, p.66-71):
I attempt to specify all the key elements in a given situation and understand them
as co-constitutive —as in part constituting each other— assuming that origins,
meanings, and change lie in relationality [. . . ] The conditions of the situation are
in the situation. There is no such thing as ‘context.’ The conditional elements of
the situation need to be specified in the analysis of the situation itself as they are
constitutive of it, not merely surrounding it or framing it or contributing to it.
Third, and closely linked to the situational analysis, GTM has been pushed further in
the postmodern epistemology by paying attention to the material objects in situations.
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This evolution is inspired by two intellectual currents. On the one hand, Actor-Network
Theory attributes agency to ‘non-human actants’ (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1993), since ma-
terial and natural objects are often forged by social dynamics and hence reproduce those
social dynamics. Haraway’s metaphor of ‘cyborg’ for “artefactual nature” is closely re-
lated (1991). On the other hand, Foucault has also described the way in which discursive
regimes materialize as ‘dispositifs ’ (Foucault, 1972; Keller, 2005, 2011). The disposi-
tifs, according to Foucault, are the material infra-structures that sustains the discourse
production. They are the devices that realize the power effects of discourses.
Both intellectual currents have raised the awareness that the material world is co-
constructed together with the social world and with its power relations. Both in the
data collection and the theorizing the researcher cannot ignore any longer the agentic
character of the non-human or material elements.
Fourth, GTM has broadened its view to include discourses. In fact, Foucault’s theory
of discursive regimes and GTM’s interactionist view on action have a common denomina-
tor: ‘practices’. While ‘action’ is central to the classic GTM project, and ‘power’ central
to Foucault’s, the two projects meet in the affine conceptualizations of ‘practices’ as fun-
damental building blocks of action and change (Clarke, 2005). Therefore, a sensitivity
to the ontological categories of reality deriving from Foucauldian theory, such as descrip-
tions of power, discourse, and subjectivation, can enrich the observations and grounded
theorizing.
The last three of these four postmodern invigorations of GTM have opened the eyes of
Grounded Theorizers to ontological categories —such as ‘situation’, ‘non-human actants’,
or ‘discourses’— that were left relatively under-explored in GTM. Since postmodern GTM
scholars believe that the data do not speak for themselves —Glaser and Strauss upheld
that data do speak for themselves— it is of uttermost importance that the observer is
‘theoretically sensitive’ to a large panoply of possible ontological categories in the situa-
tion he is observing (Clarke, 2005). “Awaiting ‘emergence’ from the data is not enough”
(Clarke, 2005, p.75).
Making all these theoretical assumptions more explicit does not at all mean that the
researcher should enter the field with a pre-conceived and full-blown theory in mind about
the functioning of the phenomena under scrutiny. However, I sustain that by making the
implicit more explicit, the grounded theorizing will be more solid and credible, for two
reasons.
• Theoretical and ontological assumptions are anyhow present in GTM—also in the
positivist or classic versions of GTM. They are not a problem per se, but failing
to recognize them will put the integrity of the grounded theory at risk. Trying to
turn them explicit forces the observer to think about the implicit assumptions and
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limitations of his data.
• Moreover, when the implicit theoretical assumptions have been made explicit, the
researcher can fearlessly explore novel theoretical categories from existing theories.
He can sharpen his theoretical sensitivity, not only during the theorizing, but al-
ready from the first moment that he starts collecting data. For instance, if he is
not aware of the novel ontological category of ‘non-human actors’ at the onset of
his research, the researcher is unlikely to collect data concerning this category. It
does not matter whether he will use the data concerning these non-human actors
in his future theorizing. It matters, however, that at least he collected the data.
I admit that the researcher cannot be aware of all implicit theoretical and ontological
assumptions in his research, nor whether the ones he makes explicit are really prepon-
derating in his observations, but he can at least try to make them as explicit as possible.
9.5 Case study: multi-sited ethnography of develop-
ment aid
That it is impossible to enter the field with an ‘empty head’ —as demanded by classic
GTM— is not only sustained by philosophers and demonstrated by cognitive scientists,
it also becomes obvious in practice. Drawing on my own doctoral research experience, I
will now illustrate each of the points that I raised in the sections 9.2 and 9.3.
The research that I draw on consisted of an observation of the network of development
aid actors in the water sector (the data was reported in chapters 6, 7, and 8). The main
scope of the research was to understand how novel development discourses (or paradigms)
attain a hegemonic status in the entire network, and whether this hegemonic status in
reality conceals dissent and conflicting interests. Therefore, a multi-sited ethnography
was conducted in 2010 and 2011 at three sites: (i) the headquarters of an multi-lateral
organization that advocates the integrated management of water, (ii) the headquarters of
a medium-sized, non-governmental development organization (NGO) specialized in water
projects, and (iii) six rural municipalities and villages in the Inner Niger Delta in Mali.
9.5.1 The theoretical conditioning of the research
The foundational ideas of GTM seem simple: collect data with an open mind, do not try
to demonstrate anything, and create your own theory that is entirely grounded on the
collected data. As argued in sections 9.2 and 9.4, these ideas convey major theoretical
assumptions, and the act of ‘creating an own theory grounded on the data’ also requires
a number of assumptions.
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In the case of my own research, I pretended to be able to study the underpinnings
and effects of hegemonic development discourses (or paradigms) by means of partici-
pant observations. This presupposes that the hegemonicity and effects of a discourse
(or paradigm) can actually be observed in the interactions of individuals, in their utter-
ances, or in their behavior. This hypothesis does include a whole number of undeclared
and vague, but nevertheless fundamental, assumptions about the relation between social
structure, agency, and discourse.
In the process of theorizing, then, I deliberately chose not to think of agency and
structure as a duality. Instead, I opted to follow the suggestion of Clarke (2005) and
Clarke and Friese (2007) to examine the observed interactions as happening within ‘a
situation’, rather than within a ‘context’ or a ‘structure’. Therefore, in the theorizing
process I mapped all major human, nonhuman, discursive, historical, symbolic, cultural,
political and other significant elements without dividing them in a group of ‘agentic’ and
a group of ‘structural’ nature. This decision, too, conveys significant assumptions about
the functioning of ‘the social’.
9.5.2 The theoretical conditioning of the data
The problem definition Although my research did not depart from a hypothesis to
be verified, nor a theory to be confirmed or disconfirmed, there was nevertheless a (broad)
problem definition that steered and limited the data collection. I was originally interested
in the transfer of discourses and/or knowledge from one development actor to another. I
assumed that my (broadly) defined research problem would be possible to be investigated
by means of participant observation, and that in the end it would provide an interesting
story about the interactions of development actors.
Moreover, the problem definition already (implicitly) included a number of supposi-
tions: that the actors in development aid epistemically and discursively influence each
other ; that this mutual influencing can be represented as a chain or a network; that there
do exist hegemonic discourses; and finally, that these discourses might be interpreted
differently by different actors in the network.
Therefore, of the infinite amount of observable data available in the field, I retained
only a very small part: those data that I considered to be relevant to the research questions
and that fell within the boundaries of the suppositions. From the onset, I was trying to
identify interesting discourses, and looked for data that could support the idea that the
discourse is supported by a network or chain. In other words, one could sustain that the
problem definition created the problem.
Implicit ontological and causal assumptions The problem definition entails rudi-
mentary assumptions about the existence of certain ontological categories and their rele-
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Figure 9.1: Some ontological categories that were implicitly assumed at the onset of the
observations, and how they changed during the course of grounded theorizing.
vance for the research. For instance, the problem definition anticipated that the different
sites —the multi-lateral organization, the non-governmental organization, and the rural
villages in Mali— would lodge actors that pertain to fundamentally different categories.
The cataloging or labeling of these actors and sites already happened at the onset of
the research, in an implicit and unconscious manner. Other entities, such as ‘discourse’,
‘policy’, and ‘practice’, were also implicitly supposed as distinct and observable entities.
In addition, I assumed relations of taxonomic and causal nature between these onto-
logical categories. In my observations at the headquarters of the different organizations,
for instance, I focused on the utterances and daily activities of the employees, or on the
financial transactions between organization. No data was collected on the eating habits
of the employees, nor on the color of their clothes. My preference for certain data over
other data demonstrates that I already implicitly assumed some causal relations. The
rise and fall of a development paradigm, I presumed, is more likely to relate to financial
transactions than to the eating habits of the employees.
It should be clear that the (implicit and unconscious) delineation and definition of
the ontological categories and their interrelation are entirely the work of my own cogni-
tion. These tentative delineations and definitions were already in place before the formal
process of theorizing started—they were even in place before the data collection started!
I summarized some of those implicitly assumed categories in figure 9.1.
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The same figure also reveals that these categories significantly changed over the course
of the grounded theorizing. Major changes included:
• the rejection of ‘knowledge’, ‘discourse’, and ‘practice’ as separate categories, in
favor of the idea that they form one continuum of ‘translations’;
• the move away from discourse as central concept to ‘paradigm’ as core category;
• the preference to conceive actors as interacting in a ‘network’, rather than in a
hierarchical ‘chain’;
• the inclusion of non-human actors;
• the adoption of ‘interests’, rather than ‘financial flows’, to explain links between
actors;
• the dismissal of ‘global’ and ‘local’ as explanatory categories.
Many of these shifts emerged from the data and the theorizing, but they were reinforced
in the final stages of theorizing by an increased sensitivity to Actor-Network Theory.
The data was not forced into the Actor-Network Theory framework, but this framework
provided me with theoretical categories that I had largely overlooked, such as non-human
actors (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005) and agencements (Deleuze and Guattari, 1998; Callon,
2006).
Delineation of the field Initially, the data collection was designed to be sourced from
participant observations in 3-4 sites in the network of different types, but no specific sites
had been identified. As GTM commands, the sites were selected on the basis of theorizing
during the data collection.
The first site (the headquarters of the development NGO) was mainly chosen because
of its accessibility. The selection of the second site (rural villages in Mali) followed
from the data collection in the first. And the third site (headquarters of a multi-lateral
organization) followed from the second. The research could have been conducted in Mali
only, or in any of the two other selected sites. Instead, I explicitly opted for a multi-sited
research. The delineation of the field was clearly inspired by the assumption that the
three sites play different roles in the development network, and by the assumption of
a certain link between the three sites. Therefore, the particular delineation of the field
(the multi-sited delineation) forced the data collection to focus on the links between sites
rather than on the dynamics within one single site.
Moroever, the choice of the 3 sites and their delineation are inevitably arbitrary.
The three sites are embedded in a large network of organizations that are linked by
innumerable connections and the boundaries of each of the three sites are fuzzy. By
selecting 3 sites, and by imposing limits to these sites, the ethnographic data collection
covered only a small portion of the entire network. The delineation of this small portion
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was judged by myself—it were not the sites themselves that revealed their boundaries to
me.
Theory-ladenness of observation That observations are theory-laden is hard to
demonstrate. This form of data conditioning should not be confounded with the three
aspects illustrated up till now. While the latter three referred to the partiality and limita-
tions of the data collection due to pre-existing assumptions, the theory-ladenness of data
collection implies that each researcher actually sees the world in different way. In other
words, two different observers that are observing the same action observe this action in a
slightly different way and describe it in different ways. The following example can clarify
this.
One day an employee of the NGO headquaters was looking at the printed drawing of
a pipeline network. The network was designed to transport water, in an African country,
from a natural well uphill to a number of villages in the valley. Observer A, with no
understanding of hydraulic engineering but with professional experience in developing
countries, observed an employee that was checking the outline of the network and the
fair distribution of water amongst the different villages (the observer knows that water
distribution amongst villages is often a bone of contention).
Observer B instead, who was trained in hydraulic engineering, assumed that the
employee was checking the diameters of the tubes and the hydraulic heads in each point
of the network (the second observer knows that this is the essential design aspect of
a pipeline network). In other words, observer B concluded that the employee of the
NGO headquarter was controlling whether the African consultant, to whom the job was
outsourced, got the technical calculus right.
Observer A observed an employee interested in the fairness and sustainability of water
distribution, whereas observer B observed an employee diffident of the job done by the
southern partner. Which of the two observers was right? We cannot know. The observers
could have asked the NGO employee himself what he had been doing, but each of the
two observers would have asked different questions, would have got different answers,
and would have understood them in two different ways. Does this necessarily lead to
relativism? As Estany (2001) points out, the theory-ladenness of observations exists, but
it does not determine observations in an absolute manner. Observer A or observer B
would probably have adjusted his opinion about his observation, based on further data
collection.
This theory-ladenness of observations conditions all data collection, but it is impossi-
ble to know to what extent the data get conditioned. Moreover, it is virtually impossible
to make this theory-ladenness explicit, since I myself am not aware of the top-down pro-
cesses in my own cognition. The only thing that I can easily make explicit about my
cognition is my educational and professional background. I was trained as hydraulic engi-
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neer as well as social anthropologist. I was, thus, observer B in the above described case.
Moreover, all my observations have also been influenced by my anthropological readings
about power, development, colonialism, and so forth. My observations probably differed
from those of an observer who has not been influenced by such readings.
9.6 Conclusions
Classic or ‘objectivist’ GTM pretended to be able to generate fresh social theories that
were grounded in pure and theory-free data. Postmodernism has shattered this positivist
illusion of absolute objectivity. I argue, drawing on empirically data, that the theories
are never ‘fresh’, and the data never ‘pure’ nor ‘theory-free’. GTM is interspersed with
theoretical and ontological assumptions at various levels and phases.
Above all, the whole setup of GTM as well as any particular theorizing (the move
from data to grounded theory) necessarily make assumptions about the functioning of ‘the
social’. Glaser and Strauss’s original version of GTM contained theoretical and ontological
assumptions about the social and about the relation between individual agency and social
structure. Postmodern GTM scholars have tried to circumvent the duality of structure
and agency by proposing ‘situational analyses’.
Further, I demonstrate that ethnographic data are conditioned in four different ways:
the problem framing, the assumption of some ontological categories and the relations
between them, the delineation of the field, and the theory-ladenness of human observation.
I sustain, however, that these different theoretical conditionings do not invalidate
GTM. What Glaser and Strauss (1967) proposed in the 1960s was a general framework
for inductive/abductive theorizing on the basis of qualitative social data. Thanks to both
the rigor and the flexibility in the set of principles and practices that they proposed, the
method gained wide acceptance. Researchers adopted and adapted the set of principles
to conduct very diverse studies. Yet, how researchers use these guidelines is not neutral
(Charmaz, 2006, p.9). The 1960s-80s shaped the work of Glaser and Strauss in one way,
whereas postmodernity has shaped the work of contemporary GTM scholars in another
way. Scholars of the earlier era were comfortable with a presumably global applicability
of their grounded theories, whereas the later have bolstered the GTM epistemology with
an awareness of situatedness (Kearney, 2007). Moreover, contemporary GTM scholars
have extended the ontological sensibility towards new categories, such as ‘situations’,
‘non-human actants’, and ‘discourses’. The core ideas of GTM, however, have always
remained the same.
I also argue that GTM researchers should not refrain from making their ontological
and theoretical assumptions explicit at the onset of the research, for two reasons. First,
such assumptions are anyhow interwoven in the research. Making them explicit will
bolster the resulting grounded theory with a more complete description of its own situ-
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atedness. Second, the researcher should not shrink from broadening up his theoretical
sensitivity to new ontological categories before starting the observations. If he got inspired
by some existing theories that helped him to not overlook crucial entities in the social
situation under scrutiny, he should make this explicit.
These arguments should not be too unnatural for GTM, since GTM, because of its
roots in pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, has ‘always already’ had a propensity
to constructionism and postmodernism.
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multi-sited ethnography of aid
A local ‘informant’, prodded by the questions of a visiting
ethnographer, realizes that most of his habits of thought
are coming from places and agencies over which he has
no control.
Bruno Latour — Reassembling the Social
10.1 Introduction
In 2010 the global development aid network handled $143 billion in official development
aid1, corresponding to 0.23 percent of the gross global economy (OECD, 2011). Be-
hind this single number —that covers multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental aid—
hides a highly complex network of heterogeneous actors and flows that operates against
the patchy background of very diverse locales. And each of these actors engages with
development aid in a different way. Depending on the actors’ interests, they engage with
development as a profession, a market, a resource, a stake, an opportunity or even an
undesired interference (Olivier de Sardan, 2005).
The size of the global development business and the complexity of the social inter-
actions that underpin it make development and development aid interesting objects of
study. More than that, any anthropological study of contemporary African, Latin Amer-
ican, or Asian society is inevitably also an anthropology of development and development
aid (Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). Particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa
it is impossible to decouple local politico-economic or socio-cultural dynamics from the
1Putting this number in perspective: The global aid sector is 6.5 times bigger than the global tobacco
industry (Shafey et al., 2009), and corresponds with one third of the global arms industry (SIPRI, 2011).
Global migrant remittances are estimated to mount to 2.3 times the global official aid (World Bank,
2012).
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international development aid machinery (Olivier de Sardan, 2005). Before we can judge
the desirability or effectiveness of development aid, we need to understand the politico-
economic, socio-cultural, and symbolic-epistemic relations that uphold the aid machinery.
The ethnography of aid can help in this project.
In the following section of the article (section 10.2) I summarize the achievements
of two decades of development aid ethnography. Contributions vary from Foucauldian
analyses of the hegemonic discourse formations in development, to interactionist accounts
of the actors’ maneuvering. By solidly grounding their studies on empirical observations
of daily interactions between actors, the latter tradition has brought us closer to an
understanding of the functioning of development aid in practice.
Nonetheless, since development aid is fundamentally a matter of long-distance flows
and concatenated interactions, I contend that important dimensions of development aid
remain out of sight when the ethnography focuses on the interactions in one site only.
In order to understand the trans-scalar character of the aid network, the mobility and
transformations of the ideas that flow through it, and the paradoxical coherence amongst
actors, we need to embrace multi-sited ethnography.
Since scholars of globalization started pointing out the limitations of single-sited
ethnography (e.g. Marcus, 1995; Appadurai, 1996; Gupta and Ferguson, 1997), multi-
sited ethnography has become more prominent as method to study topics related to
globalization and development. There are, however, very few multi-sited ethnographies
of development aid that take full advantage of the method, i.e. the possibility to reflect
on the prominent links between the very diverse and very distant realities involved in aid.
Relying on my own experience of a multi-sited ethnography of development aid, I pro-
pose in section 10.3 a comprehensive method/tool package for the study of development
aid that uses multi-sited ethnography as method for data collection, and Actor-Network-
Theory (ANT) as descriptive tool. Some ethnographers of development aid have already
judiciously experimented with ANT notions (e.g. Mosse, 2004, 2005a,b; Lewis and Mosse,
2006b), but I will show that ANT can also be rigorously applied to development aid, es-
pecially when combined with multi-sited ethnography. This method/tool package can
effectively account for (a) the network dimension of development aid, (b) the global-local
interactions, (c) the complex policy-practice relation, and (d) the extreme inequalities
in the network. I do not pretend that my package reveals universal wisdom, nor that it
would be ‘better’ than localized ethnography; it only aims at increasing the researcher’s
sensibility to those aspects that are largely overlooked by localized ethnographies.
In section 10.4, I recapitulate George Marcus’ proposed strategies for multi-sited
ethnography (1995), and translate them into operational strategies for the multi-sited
ethnography of development aid. In the last section I use again my own ethnographic ex-
perience to reflect on some practical and epistemological issues: the negotiation of access
to the different sites, and the crafting of an identity in these sites.
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10.2 Ethnographies of development aid
As a start, it is useful to distinguish ‘development’ from ‘development aid’ as two different
—yet intimately related— objects of study of anthropology. The former is an ideology
about socio-economic change that (loosely) draws inspiration from changes occurring in
the Western world. The latter, instead, can be defined as the actual ensemble of the actors
and their interactions, the financial and material flows, and the policies and practices,
that together aim at achieving this socio-economic change. Only the latter is subject of
this article (and by extension this dissertation).
Ever since its emergence as discipline, anthropology has been in an ambiguous relation-
ship first with the colonial rule (Asad, 1973) then the development assistance machinery
(Grillo and Rew, 1985). Often docking itself on these power structures, sometimes serving
them, and sometimes heavily criticizing them, anthropology has approached development
as object of study in many different ways. Applied anthropologists are concerned with
development aid and put anthropological methods and theory into action —either from
within development organizations or from an academic stage— in order to ‘improve’ the
aid (see for instance Cernea, 1991; Horowitz, 1996). A school of critical anthropologists,
to the contrary, have besieged —usually from an academic stronghold— the development
ideology and deconstructed it as a hegemonic Western narrative that politically, eco-
nomically, culturally and epistemologically subdues the former colonies (Apthorpe, 1986;
Sachs, 1992; Escobar, 1995; Crush, 1995).
Between these two extremes lies important anthropological knowledge that is not read-
ily explored, to wit, knowledge about the functioning of the development aid architecture
in itself : its actors and interactions, the relation between policy making and practice,
the professional strategies of development experts, the strategies of the beneficiaries, and
alike. Suchlike ethnographies of development aid in itself, called ‘aidnographies’ by Gould
(2004), that are strong in empirical rigor and weak in ideological bias, are much rarer
than works that incline to one of the two extremes.
A train of discourse-focused ethnographies of aid is pioneered by James Ferguson’s
Anti-Politics Machine (2007 [1990]). Inspired by Foucault’s power/knowledge theories,
Ferguson’s work is sympathetic to the deconstructionist school, but it draws on a major
World Bank project in Lesotho for empirical data. His and other Foucauldian analy-
ses of development aid have provided insights on how, at any given historical moment,
specific discursive regimes make certain development practices appropriate and others
unthinkable, throughout the entire network.
The Foucauldian approach used by Ferguson and followers, however, has been crit-
icized in two obvious ways. First, actors are demoted to cogwheels in a machine that
strips all actors of their agency. No one seems in control, not even the policy makers
and development planners themselves (Rossi, 2004). Second, Foucauldian analyses ig-
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nore the inherent openness of the development discourses, as well as their volatility over
time (Hobart, 1993; Gardner and Lewis, 2000; Goldman, 2001). In fact, Foucault’s own
work was situated within one single spatial and cultural domain, whereas in development
aid the discourse analyst faces different cultural contexts into which various exogenous
discourses penetrate (Stoler, 1995).
A second approach to the ethnography of aid is called by Olivier de Sardan (2005)
the ‘entangled social logic approach’. Assuming an actor-oriented stance, their accounts
focus on the negotiations on the interfaces between the different social worlds. Long and
Long (1992) describe development interventions as an “ongoing, socially constructed and
negotiated process”. Scholars in this tradition have demonstrated that there is room
for human agency, both in maneuvering the discourses at ‘the top’ of the development
network (de Vries, 1992; Lewis, 1998; Lewis et al., 2003), and in negotiating and resisting
them at ‘the bottom’ (Arce et al., 1994; Grillo and Stirrat, 1997; Torres, 1997; Arce and
Long, 1999; Bierschenk et al., 2000; Rossi, 2006).
Noteworthy is the body of literature in this current that focuses on two specific cat-
egories of development actors: the mediators and the brokers. Development brokers are
individuals or organizations that pertain to the developee community —but usually not
the traditional elite— and that implant themselves on the interface between the devel-
oper and developee to attract or steer the flow of development aid. They act as social
entrepreneurs that swiftly speak the development language and nimbly interact with the
international organizations (Bierschenk et al., 2002; Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Lewis and
Mosse, 2006a). The development mediators, instead, are the field workers that function
as agents of mediation between the different realms of meaning-making. They graft the
technical message of the developer organizations onto the symbolic-epistemic system the
developee community (Bierschenk et al., 2000; Olivier de Sardan, 2005).
Olivier de Sardan argues that the development mediator plays a triple role. “He or she
is the spokesperson on behalf of technical-scientific knowledge and the mediator between
technical-scientific knowledge and popular knowledge” (2005, 169). The former is the
formal role —the one he or she is trained for— while the latter is the actual but hidden
role. His third role is to negotiate, defend and secure the own personal interests.
Although ethnographies that follow the ‘entangled social logic approach’ have pro-
vided us with detailed empirical data on the how of development aid, their localized
ethnographies still miss out on some important aspects of the interactions in develop-
ment aid. To start, there is no convincing argument in privileging specific interfaces nor
specific actors in the network (Mosse and Lewis, 2006). I propose to extend the concepts
of mediators and brokers to all actors in the network: all actors play the role of broker
or mediator to a greater or lesser extent. In order to grasp the diffused and differential
agency of the actors, one needs to look at development aid from various perspectives.
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The network perspective
By claiming that development interventions happen through a ‘network’ I mean that
numerous but diverse nodes —actors or sites— are interconnected in multiple ways
—through epistemic, financial, legal, and other connections— so that things happen-
ing at one node influence what happens at other nodes of the network.
The development aid network does indeed connect very heterogeneous actors, whose
number and types have been increasing over time (Dufeld, 2002). Contemporary de-
velopment projects and programs are implemented by a battalion of international and
local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international and local consultants, de-
centralized authorities, and the local private sector (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-
Pedersen, 2003). The increasing complexity and breakdown of the network, however, is
kept in check by both spontaneous and orchestrated policy homogenization (Rossi, 2004;
Lewis and Mosse, 2006b). The Millennium Development Goals and the Paris Declara-
tion are examples of such formal instruments of orchestration. Normative discourses,
however, have demonstrated to have at least as much power in aligning the mindsets of
actors (Ferguson, 2007 [1990]). The network, although supported by extremely diverse
actors with different goals and strategies, is able to behave as a well-tuned machinery.
This interplay of “order and disjuncture” (Lewis and Mosse, 2006b) can only be
explained from a network perspective. Viewing development aid as happening through
a network shifts the focus from ‘single actors acting in a network’ to the network itself.
It also avoids two common traps: privileging particular actors, and drawing spurious
dichotomies.
First of all, the network metaphor does not privilege particular ‘brokers’, or ‘medi-
ators’. Since the success of a development intervention depends on the diffused agency
in the network, the idea of broker/mediator should be extended to all actors in the net-
work. Actors at one node are made to do things by myriad actors somewhere else in the
network. This happens in a complex way that no single actor can control. Each actor is
vital in the constitution of the network; each actor is influenced and constrained by the
connections in the network; but no one actor controls the network.
Second, by assuming a network configuration, the researcher avoids spurious and
obfuscating dichotomies such as global versus local, developer versus developee, Western
versus Indigenous, modern versus traditional, developed versus underdeveloped, or policy
versus practice. Since the path from the western donor to the farmer in Sub-Saharan
Africa is long and tortuous, and passes through organizations and actors with faceted
identities, those crusted categories would not provide new insights on the trajectory of
the path but rather obscure it. In the following two paragraphs I explore the alleged
global/local and policy/practice dichotomies.
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Beyond the global/local dichotomy
In our contemporary world, formations of social order and cultural identity cannot be
untied from the complex but continuous flows of ideas, people, imaginaries, technologies
and resources, that move through channels scoured out by migration, electronic media
and the global financial system (Hannerz, 1992, 1996; Appadurai, 1996; Holton, 2005).
Development aid is part and parcel of this phenomenon called ‘globalization’.2
An irrigation development project in the Malian Sahel, for instance, might be spon-
sored by the World Bank in Washington, and follow guidelines that were drafted by a
Dutch consultancy firm. The desk from which this rural development project is managed
probably stands in Bamako. The project manager could be an Algerian national trained
in France, who gained 15 years of professional experience in similar rice irrigation projects
in Rwanda and Benin. The Malian farmers have probably collaborated, during their life-
time, with UNDP experts, the French development agency, and a number of American
and European NGOs. At their discretion the farmers have ingeniously blended some of
the Western agricultural techniques into their own traditional farming methods. The
unquestionable preference of the village for one specific rice variety probably depends on
the fortuitous choice of one multinational seed company to implant a retail seller in the
region. And not at the least, the price of rice on the national and international markets
is probably the main determinant in the farmer’s decision whether to send his youngest
daughter to school or not.
As this short fictitious account shows, the ‘global’ and ‘the local’ are present at each
node in the network. Rather than being empirical realities of different scalar or hierarchi-
cal order, it are complementary elements in the meaning making panoply of each actor
in the network (Geschiere and Meyer, 1998; Gupta and Ferguson, 2001; Moore, 2004).
For each actor and for each interaction, the adjectives ‘local’ and ‘global’ acquire a differ-
ent meaning, which depends on the flows of people, ideas, technologies, imaginaries and
resources that come together at that specific node at that specific moment (Appadurai,
1996).
These flows, however, should be understood as multiple, parallel, and complementary
processes that inter-relate and also conflict with each other (Appadurai, 1996; Holton,
2005). This is why ‘flow’ has been a handy metaphor in the anthropological work on
globalization (Appadurai, 2001): flows are cohesive yet dynamic, and while a confluence
of flows can be laminar or turbulent, in one way or another it forcibly generates a new flow.
In order to grasp the origins of these laminar and turbulent mixtures, the ethnography of
aid needs to expand the work radius from a focus on ‘the local’ to global-local interactions.
2This is only one of the many definitions ascribed to the term ‘globalization’. Other interpretations,
not invoked in this article, are: the increased power of multi-lateral organizations; the integration of
national economies into one global market; the homogenization of culture through electronic media;
globalization as discursive repackaging of Western cultural hegemony.
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Beyond the policy/practice dichotomy
The two diverging stances towards development and development aid that were mentioned
earlier —applied versus deconstructionist— replicate in the understanding of the relation
between policy making and field practice: Mosse (2004) detects an ‘instrumental’ view
and a ‘critical’ view.
According to the ‘instrumental’ view, policy making is a matter of well-informed
agenda setting and problem solving, which takes place in one realm, whereas the im-
plementation of the policies is a matter of managerial gymnastics, which is performed
in another realm (Jordan, 2001). In the face of empirical data, however, this view ap-
pears highly naive: boundary organizations place themselves on the interfaces between
the realms (Guston, 2001); global knowledge and advocacy networks blur the identities
(Stone, 2002); the actors’ strategies thwart the logic of unidirectionality (Mosse, 2004).
The ‘critical’ view, to the contrary, is not interested in the ‘good’ implementation of
development policies, but in their (un)intended side effects and the hidden transcripts
(Scott, 1990). Departing from the assumption that development policies do much more
than working towards the explicitly stated goals, the literature in this field tries to demon-
strate that the development machinery produces the cognitive control of all actors in-
volved (Escobar, 1995); that it increases the state’s power and expands bureaucratic
control (Ferguson, 2007 [1990]); and that it subjugates, silences or erases the local and
the particular (Tsing, 1993; Skaria, 1998). All this, the critical view sustains, is covered
up by discourses that objectify the beneficiary, depoliticize the policies, and technocratize
the interventions (Apthorpe, 1996; Hobart, 1993).
‘Evidence-based policy making’ constitutes an increasingly prominent middle way,
especially in development policy making. It takes a positivist stance similar to that
of the instrumental view, by believing that the impacts of a policy can be objectively
measured and fed into future policy making, but explicitly acknowledges the non-linearity
of the policy making process (Young and Mendizabal, 2009).
None of these approaches, however, takes the pains to understand how the policies are
actually created and implemented in practice, through the interactions of social actors.
Scholars seem reluctant to open up the black box that encloses the social intricacies of
policy making and practice. Ethnographies are needed that describe, without assuming
separate realms or causal flows, how both policies and practices are produced by many
actors acting together (Mosse, 2004). Where and how do new policies really emerge?
Do they really emerge from the beneficiaries’ needs? Which actors mediate between the
supposedly policy makers and implementers? What does it mean that the implementation
of a policy ‘fails’ or ‘works’?
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Diversity and inequality
Above I have advocated to approach development aid from a network perspective, in
order to avoid pointless dichotomies such as global/local, policy/practice or developer/
developee. However, the plea to start the description of aid with only a flat network
drawn on an otherwise clean slate, does not entail that the ethnographer should remain
insensible to the ineffable diversities and power inequalities in the network.
In the first place, development intervention forces very discontinuous cultural spaces
and very dissimilar categories of actors to interact (Rossi, 2004). Each of the actors —be
it the planner, development worker, consultant, or ‘beneficiary’— works in accordance
with his or her own idiosyncratic values, preoccupations, goals, and strategies (Long and
Long, 1992).
Second, this heterogeneous collection of spaces and actors gives rise to an equally het-
erogeneous collection of knowledge systems. Each actor in this network possesses partial
and ‘situated knowledge’ (Haraway, 1988) about development problems and appropriate
solutions, and frames them in his situated way. Although there has emerged a kind of
‘global epistemic community’ of development experts around Washington, Rome or Brus-
sels (Stone, 2002), we should not ignore that this community too is very heterogeneous
(Mosse, 2011a) and maintains constant conversations with other, subaltern knowledge
systems (Rossi, 2006).
On top of those huge cultural and epistemic differences, a very unequal access to the
available financial resources discriminates the actors in the network. A handful of donors
and agencies control the vast majority of the financial flows, while thousands of smaller
actors are in fierce competition for them — let alone the theoretical ‘beneficiaries” who
seem to have a walk-on part in this competition.
We intuit that this differential access is closely related to power inequalities —although
it is unclear which one is the cause, which one the effect, or whether they are one and
the same thing. These extreme power inequalities propagate in complex ways through
the network. Power is, however, a vague concept that has been defined in many ways
(Clegg, 2001), and its explicative value is very limited (Latour, 2005). The question that
the ethnographer should pose himself is how the power is constituted and reproduced. A
particular challenge for the ethnography of development aid is thus to study the network of
actors without a prejudiced hierarchy, “without logically or chronologically presupposing
either the authority of Western experience or the models derived from that experience”
(Appadurai, 1996, p.49).
It would be an intellectually very poor move to start the ethnography of aid by
drawing on our slate a network that includes already those differences. In fact, it is
precisely the task of the ethnography to describe how the actors deploy the differences:
how the cultural spaces interact and how the differences are reproduced; how the situated
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knowledges of each actor bend the discourses, policies and practices; how the policies and
practices relate; how the resource flows contribute to instituting and reproducing unequal
power relations.
Summing everything up
Foucauldian ethnographies of aid, on the one hand, point to the hegemonic power of
discourses, whereas actor-oriented ethnographies, on the other hand, highlight the room
for human agency both at the top as amongst the beneficiaries. The method/tool package
that I propose will need to be able to account for both, and move beyond this worn-out
structure-versus-agency quandary. Moreover, the package should not include assumptions
about what is ‘local’ and ‘global’, neither pigeon-hole the actors in rigid categories such as
‘the policy makers’, ‘the practitioners’, and ‘the beneficiaries’. However, the effacement
of pre-defined categories should not be an excuse to overlook the huge power inequalities
that exist and perpetuate in the network. In fact, the ultimate goal is to show how
these heterogeneous and unequal actors, in this highly dispersed development network,
and despite their highly localized meaning-making, can create, through their interactions,
something that resembles ‘order’ (Mosse, 2004; Lewis and Mosse, 2006b).
10.3 A method/tool package
Recently a number of aidnographers (notably Mosse, 2004, 2005a; Lewis and Mosse,
2006b) have signaled the usability of Actor-Network-Theory (ANT) for the description
of the aid architecture and its dynamics. Rather than a theory of the social, ANT is a
tool that allows to describe how actors build the social. ANT sprouts from science and
technology studies, where it was developed to describe how scientists, their instruments,
and the ‘technology consumers’ connect in order to make a scientific experiment work
(e.g. Callon, 1986; Law, 1986; Latour, 1987, 1988), but it can be extended to any domain
of the social sciences (Latour, 2000, 2005).
I concur with Mosse (2004, 2005a) and Lewis and Mosse (2006b) that ANT provides
a powerful way of looking at development aid. Instead of using some insightful ANT
ideas, however, I plea to rigorously stick to the complete ANT philosophy —as in Callon
(1986) and Latour (2005)— to describe the development aid architecture and practices. I
will show, below, that ANT provides the instruments to account for its network outline,
the interplay of global and local, the entangled relation between policy and practice, the
variety of actors, as well as the unequal power relations.
At its most fundamental level, ANT claims that ‘the social’ needs to be explained as a
living assemblage of myriad connections between a collection of heterogeneous actors who
possess the agency to forge, maintain, or transform these connections. The connections
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can be of material, semiotic, economic, legal, linguistic, or other nature; the actors can be
human and non-human. ANT scholars do not accept ‘society’, ‘social context’, or ‘social
structure’ as a given dimension of reality. The social exists only through the action of
actors that form assemblages (Callon and Law, 1982; Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005).
Actors try to establish connections and assemblages to make other actors do things. In
this process, anything that modifies a state of affairs by making a difference is considered
an actor (Latour, 2005, p.71). Therefore, also objects need to be pondered as possible
actors in the formation of ‘the social’ (see further). The relations between actors in such
assemblages, however, are not direct nor causal. When an actor takes pains to make
others do things, his or his action propagate through the network in unpredictable ways,
generating transformations and triggering unexpected events elsewhere in the network
(Latour, 2005, p.107). This means that, when looking at one point in the network, the
forces of many actors aggregate, and any interaction taking place at that point “seems to
overflow with elements which are already in the situation coming from some other time,
some other place, and generated by some other agency” (Latour, 2005, p.166). One actor
never fully controls an action—an action is always ‘over-taken’ by the many actors in the
assemblage.
By shifting the focus from pre-conceived social structures to the active construction
of connections and assemblages, the analyst should also refrain from pre-conceived ideas
about the identities of actors, their matters of concern, the scale of their actions, or the
distinction between the social and the material. Each of these properties is exclusively
defined by the actors themselves, through their interactions with other actors (Latour,
2005). It cannot be the task of the observer to judge their delineations (Callon, 1986).
One expressive, powerful repertoire that is often used to operationalize ANT, is the
one of ‘translation’ and ‘enrollment’, proposed by Callon and Law (1982) and Callon
(1986). It can be applied to the functioning of a technology, a scientific experiment, a
discourse, a policy, a project, and alike. I will use the example of a development project.
In their effort to render the project successful, the actors first need to problematize the
situation and define each other’s identities in such a way that the interest of other actors is
awakened to take part in the project—this is the phase of interessement. Second, a process
of translation starts: if one actor A can convince another actor B that A’s knowledge is
useful for B to achieve B’s objectives, it is said that A translates his knowledge in order
to enroll B. The basic idea is that the interests of the actors are not static; they are
negotiable. The most nimble actors manage to profile themselves as obligatory passage
point. Third, by enrolling others, actors try to build long chains of associates or allies in
order to make the project work. As said earlier, no distinction is made between a supposed
realm of policy making and a realm of implementation, nor between the social and the
natural. The allies in the chain can be development planners, farmer unions, as well as
statistical data, concepts, legal instruments or a water well. In fact, non-human devices
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and artifacts are key anchor points of the social relations (Law, 1986; Latour, 2005).
Finally, actors can also betray their allies, which forces the other actors to renegotiate the
interests. The betrayal can eventually lead to a breakdown of the chain. “Projects do not
fail, they are failed. [. . . ] Failure is manufactured not inherent” (Latour, 1996, p.35-36,
emphases are mine). The scientific experiment, the policy, or the discourse works or fails
depending on the strength of the chain — not the other way around.
Familiar now with Callon’s ANT vocabulary, we better understand Mosse (2004,
p.647) when he sustains, regarding development policies, that:
clearly common narratives or commanding interpretations are supported for dif-
ferent reasons and serve a diversity of perhaps contradictory interests. The dif-
ferentiation of practical interests around ‘unifying’ development policies or project
designs is a consequence of successful enrolment, and a condition of stability and
success. But it also requires the constant work of translation (of policy goals into
practical interests; practical interests back into policy goals), which is the task of
skilled brokers (managers, consultants, fieldworkers, community leaders) who read
the meaning of a project into the different institutional languages of its stakeholder
supporters.
Actors are continuously involved in juxtaposing each other’s identity and in translating
common interests, in order to to enroll other actors in the alliance. The task of the social
researcher that analyzes development aid projects is to show this (Mosse, 2004, p.647):
examining the way in which heterogeneous entities —people, ideas, interests, events
and objects (seeds, engineered structures, pumps, vehicles, computers, fax ma-
chines, or data bases)— are tied together by translation of one kind or another into
the material and conceptual order of a successful project.
The method par excellence to observe this continuous work of delineating identities,
translating interests, and enrolling fellow actors in alliances, is ethnography, thanks to
its profound anchoring in the field and its well-developed sense of being “here-and-not-
elsewhere” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997). The interactions of global and local elements at
each site, however, have plunged single-sited ethnography into a maelstrom of reflections
on what ‘the field’ actually is (Marcus, 1995; Amit, 2000; Gupta and Ferguson, 2001), and
the time has come for ethnography to think out better what this “here-and-not-elsewhere”
actually means (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Moore, 2004). Ethnography should let go
its bent for a spatially circumscribed ‘place’, and further exploit its well-developed at-
tentiveness to the local as relationally constituted ‘space’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997;
Gustavson and Cytrynbaum, 2003).
Latour argues that, in order to observe the chain of actors and their continuous work
of translation, the observer needs to occupy various standpoints. “If action is dislocal,
it does not pertain to any specific site; it is distributed, variegated, multiple, dislocated
and remains a puzzle for the analysts as well as for the actors” (Latour, 2005, p.60).
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Therefore the observer is urged to move from one frame of reference to another, rather
than sticking to any absolute or arbitrary viewpoint.
Multi-sited ethnography severs ethnography from its enchantment with location and
allows shifts in standpoint. It takes a network of interacting sites3 as ‘field’, in order to
examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in the diffuse time-
space of this network (Marcus, 1995; Hannerz, 2003; Falzon, 2009b; Coleman and von
Hellermann, 2011). The ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence
in a number of strategically or opportunistically selected sites, with the posited logic that
the relationships between these sites are at least as important as the relationships within
them (Hannerz, 2003). The focus on linkages makes the multi-sited study something
fundamentally different from a mere ‘comparative’ study of localities — in fact, according
to classical anthropological theory, the comparative study of localities was precisely based
on the assumption that such linkages did not exist (Hannerz, 2003).
In multi-sited ethnography the ‘global’ is no longer treated as ‘context’ to some arbi-
trarily circumscribed location. In fact, no one macro-construct is allowed to stand for the
‘context’ of a site; it is exactly this macro-construct that has been reduced to a collection
of equally local, equally observable, sites. Indeed, the ethnographer wants to know how
one site, that used to be arbitrarily labeled as ‘global’, influences the actions in another
site, that used to be designated as ‘local’.
Deflating ‘the global’ and dismantling ‘the context’, in order to “keep the social flat”,
this is exactly what Latour urges us to do if we want to describe how actors build their
network (Latour, 2005, p.165). Only the actors themselves have the authority to flesh
out the network. The observer’s only task is to rigorously describe each time some actor
A is said to be connected to some actor B —be it when those connections serve to delin-
eate identities, to define matters of concern, to articulate scale, to translate each other’s
interests, or to maintain an alliance. This is describing the social. The social is nothing
more than entities connecting with other entities. And if a connection originates in some
other point on earth or in time, so be it! This does not mean that the connection pertains
to ‘the global’, ‘the context’ or ‘the structure’. Allowing the ethnography to evolve into
a multi-sited ethnography, the observer has to move from one standpoint in the network
to another to follow the connections.
At this point we have a solid method/tool package to trace the network and interactions
in development aid: multi-sited ethnography is the method for data collection, ANT is
the tool to describe the data. Some might raise the criticism that in my package theory
precedes data, contrary to the spirit of ethnography. In my defense, I oppose that ANT
3What Marcus (1995) called ‘world system’ in his article, is renamed to ‘network of interacting sites’
in mine.
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is not a theory that analyzes the social, but a tool that helps to describe it. ANT invites
to empirically record all physical traces that are left by any form of agency exhibited
by any actor, and to at least allow all actors to be full-blown actors. An actor-network,
however, remains nothing more than a concept, a mere tool to help describe something.
It is not something out there (Latour, 2005, 128-31).
In the light of the new method/tool package, I revisit the four aspects I have touched
upon in the previous section: the network aspect, global-local interactions, the relation
between policy and practice, and the inequalities in the network.
The network perspective revisited
ANT is a tool to describe how actors, by building and maintaining a network, create the
‘social’ dimension of reality. In the ANT philosophy, the ‘network’ concept has little to
do with a form of organization (as in Riles, 2001; Perkin and Court, 2005). The network
metaphor in ANT transcends the idea of an organizational layout, and refers to the flows
of agency between actors. It is a ‘net-of-work’, rather than a ‘network’ (Latour, 2005).
Through their actions, actors link up with each other, and build the social. Nothing is
given beforehand; everything is left to the action of the actors. Where there is no action,
there is no network—there is only empty space.
In this net-of-work, the actors are continuously at work to construct the following
delineations. First, they delineate their own identities. There does not exist an incon-
trovertible entity that epitomizes the basic building block of the network. The actors in
the network can be individuals, organizations, factions within an organization, events,
discourses, or even objects. Whichever entity that alters the configuration of the network
is an actor. Actors are incessantly engaged in linking, opposing, juxtaposing, and sub-
suming, in order to create and define their identify. It is important that, in the observer’s
account, the actors are allowed to deploy their own arguments for the delineation of their
identity; their arguments should sound louder than those of the ethnographer (Latour,
2005, p.30). We should not take, for instance, the World Bank as a monolithic actor,
when we observe that the different categories of experts within the Bank take pains to
differentiate themselves from each other (Mosse, 2011b).
Second, the world does not include pre-existing scales, levels, hierarchies, etc. Where
they exist, they are created and reproduced by the actors, through their interactions.
Since an actor’s perception of scale is often contradictory to the ethnographer’s perception
(Leach, 2006; Gatt, 2009), it is a fortiori important to leave the delineation of scale to
the actors themselves. For instance, whereas outsiders perceive the policies of the World
Bank as produced at ‘global’ scale, for development experts working inside the World
Bank these policies are the product of everyday, local-scale ‘village politics’, in this case
of a village located at 1818 H Street in Washington (Mosse, 2011b).
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Third, faithful to the philosophy of free association in the network, the observer must
abandon all a priori distinctions between the social and the natural, between human actors
and non-human actors. He must reject the hypothesis of a definite boundary between
the two, since such a division is the result of the interactions between actors rather than
a point of departure (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2004, 2005). Our world is full with hybrid
objects that were assembled somewhere else, enter a new site as simple material objects,
but start to mediate actions of the actors in the new site (Akrich, 1992). Examples are
the logical framework form imposed by the European Commission for the formulation
of a development project; the software used for the accountability of the development
project; the Skype technology that mediates the daily contact between Bamako and ‘the
field’; the FAO manual for rice cultivation; the high-yielding rice seeds that require a
specific cure.
A fourth observation, regarding ‘fact’ and ‘truth’, takes us back to the origins of ANT.
ANT ensues from observations of how scientists, their instruments, and the ‘consumers’
connect in order to make a scientific experiment work (e.g. Callon, 1986; Law, 1986;
Latour, 1987, 1988). Unjustly labeled as relativistic, ANT emphasizes that what appears
as fact to us is not given, but is delivered to us by a fragile, socially sustained construction
of ties between human and non-human elements. What appears afterwards as an alliance
that was successful because ‘truth was on its side’, was in actuality an alliance that was
successful in building the truth. Observing how a ‘truth’ is constructed, is like observing
a building construction site: “you are experiencing the troubling and exhilarating feeling
that things could be different, or at least that they could still fail—a feeling never so
deep when faced with the final product, no matter how beautiful or impressive it may
be” (Latour, 2005, p.89). Mosse translated this viewpoint on ‘failure’ and ‘success’ to
development aid projects (2004):
the success of policy ideas or project designs is not inherent (not given at the
outset) but arises from their ‘ability to continue recruiting support and so impose
[their] growing coherence on those who argue about them or oppose them’ (1996,
p.78). The point is that authoritative interpretations have to be made and sustained
socially.
The global/local dichotomy revisited
I have argued above —syntonic with various scholars of globalization— that no place is
dominant enough to be labeled ‘global’ and no place self-contained enough to be consid-
ered ‘local’. The task of an ANT registrar is to stubbornly maintain the network flat and
to unravel this conundrum: what do ‘locality’ and ‘globality’ mean as a lived experience
to each actor in this vast network that spans the World Bank offices in Washington, FAO
in Rome, an NGO office in Bamako and rural villages in Mali?
This can be done, first, by following the traces of those supposedly ‘global’ elements to
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their source of origin, without trying to ‘jump’ to a higher explicative level. The observer
needs to patiently plod, step by step, from one mediator to another, the successive trans-
lations of the elements, to their site/actor of origin. When the mayor of a rural Malian
municipality claims that his or his team ‘lacks capacity’ and needs ‘capacity building
projects’, the ethnographer should wonder how this Western development jargon filtered
through the mayor’s vocabulary, and how this concept was translated from what it meant
to UNDP two decades ago to what it means to the mayor now.
A second, contrary move is necessary to understand how the ‘local’ is generated. Many
visible and hidden actors are at work —simultaneously or diachronically— in the creation
of the locality. Non-human actors play a particularly important role in this process. A
rice paddy in Mali’s Inner Niger Delta has been made to be a ‘local’ place through the
now silent mediation of objects such as: the upstream dam erected by the French colonial
regime; the small barrages and channels constructed by a local NGO; the title deeds of
the families; the project manager’s spreadsheet that keeps tally of the paddy production.
Each of these objects incorporates a script that was written somewhere else, but that
define ‘locality’ in the new site of adoption.
By practicing the two gestures simultaneously —localizing the global and redistribut-
ing the local— only connections between actors remain, and the ‘sites’ as spatially defined
entities disappear from the map.
The policy/practice dichotomy revisited
What is valid for the global/local dichotomy, counts for the policy/practice distinction as
well. The realms of policy-oriented data collection, policy making, and policy implemen-
tation, appear as separate to us because actors construe them that way. But they are
artificial. To overcome the trap of sticking to these obfuscating categories, the ethnogra-
pher should maintain an agnostic and symmetric position to what is defined as ‘evidence’,
‘policy’ or ‘practice’.
The task is the same as always: follow the links from one actor to another, without
creating fault lines in the network. Trace who sponsored that particular workshop in
Bamako that made the ministries of water and agriculture talk to each other, trace which
consultants produced the report and what their background is, show how this report was
merged with other reports and reappeared as FAO guidelines, describe who distributed
the guidelines, show that the guidelines influenced a Western NGO in Mali in choosing
one type of rice rather than another, report how this NGO defended this choice in front
of the provincial farmer union, etc. It is not the task of the ethnographer to sweep these
different links into a ‘policy heap’ and a ‘practice heap’ — the actors themselves will
probably do so.
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Diversity and inequality revisited
The insistence of ANT on symmetry and flatness has induced critics to argue that ANT is
unable to account for inequality and power (Whittle and Spicer, 2008). As clearly stated
above, ANT has indeed an abhorrence of pre-conceived social structures such as power,
especially when they are employed to explain social phenomena. There is, however,
space for power in ANT, but only as constructed phenomenon. Instead of being an
already present stratum, ANT conceives power as constructed by the assemblage itself.
Power resides in the network in two ways: in the differential between mediators and
intermediaries, and in non-human objects.
As stated earlier, one actor never controls the network, not even one action. Each
action is over-taken by the network of actors and can result in unpredictable events.
ANT does, however, recognize the differential pressures that are brought to bear on the
assemblage by mediators and intermediaries, the latter simply adding predictability to
the setting, the former shaping and transforming the assemblage in unexpected ways. If
all actors were fully-fledged mediators, able to completely alter the network, the network
would remain flat and egalitarian. Instead, power inequalities in the network result from
the differences between mediators and intermediaries. The actors that are most nimble
in bending the network, or the ones that have knitted most ties, are the most powerful
mediators. Intermediaries, to the contrary, simply pass on the flows in the network
without altering them. A good ethnography should lay bear which actors are powerful
mediators, and which are simple intermediaries.
I repeat that mediators do not need to be humans. In fact, non-human mediators
can be very effective treasurers of power relations (Law, 1986). Consider, for instance,
the following non-human devices: the donors’ periodical calls for proposals, the logical
framework for project formulation, a national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, a simple
earthen dam that controls the water level in the rice fields, or a new high-yielding rice
variety. These non-human objects exert structuring power over other actors and do mold
the agency of other actors. Once put in place, these non-human devices have long-lasting
mediating effects—much longer than the human-human ties, which in general require
continuous efforts.
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of agencement (1998) can be a useful descriptive tool
in this respect4. A socio-technical agencement is an assemblage of heterogeneous elements
that have been made to come together and carefully fit one another (Callon, 2006). As
such, an agencement is endowed with a powerful combination of intentional and non-
intentional, human and technical agency and is amazingly effective in forcing other actors
to do particular things. An example of such a fine-tuned socio-technical agencement is the
ensemble of: the periodical ‘call for proposals’ launched by a donor, the logical framework
4I a am grateful to Yuti Ariani for this suggestion.
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the donor impose to formulate the proposals, the standard contract that is signed with all
parties, and the sum of money transferred from donor to the implementing organization.
These four elements together form a very effective agencement.
10.4 Tracing the links
Despite the comprehensive review paper by George Marcus (1995) being widely cited,
multi-sited ethnography is not yet a mainstream practice in anthropology, let alone in
the anthropology of development aid. Authoritative research methodology manuals in
the field of anthropology, such as Bernard (2006), Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) or
Silverman (2009), do not mention multi-sited ethnography at all. Lindlof and Taylor
(2010) cite Marcus but do not elaborate on what multi-sited ethnography might look
like.
Marcus himself describes in his review paper a number of operational strategies —op-
portunistic or planned— to unearth the links between sites (Marcus, 1995): follow the
people; follow the thing; follow the metaphor; follow the plot, story or allegory; follow
the life or biography; follow the conflict.
From two sides some criticism has been leveled against these strategies. First, why
does the multi-sited approach, that preaches to break the chains of single-sited ethnogra-
phy, accept new self-imposed limitations? Second, in adopting one of the six ‘following’
strategies, the ethnographer appears to assume a pre-existing space of trajectories that
can be followed. That would clearly go against basic ANT principles. In other words, the
researcher cannot know whether those spaces are created by the entity he is following, or
by himself.
There are two simple answers to those criticisms. First, single-sited ethnography
as well as multi-sited ethnography are partial in their data collection. No matter how
thick a single-sited ethnographic description may be, it scrutinizes only some data in the
infinite universe of available data, and leaves untouched the remainders—the infinitely
large remainders (see also chapter 9). Multi-sited ethnography is no different, but rather
than an interest in the interlocks at one site, it pays particular attention to the links
between different sites. In other words, multi-sited ethnography is no more holistically
inclined than single-sited ethnography (Falzon, 2009a). The six strategies proposed by
Marcus are ways to strike a compromise between a grand holistic ambition (to cover the
‘world system’, in the words of Marcus) and an arbitrary way of ‘making the cut’ in this
infinite universe of available data (Falzon, 2009a).
Second, despite the inevitable partiality of any form of data collection, the researcher
needs to tell a coherent story (Linsteadl, 1994). Each of Marcus’ strategies offers a way of
slicing a meaningful segment out of the vast network, in order to tell a story that makes
sense to both the ethnographer and the reader. In this article I have proposed a method
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to observe such a segment (multi-sited ethnography) and a tool to describe it (ANT),
but the product that tells the story is ultimately crafted by the ethnographer. It is his
ethnography, his account, his written story. As a result, his mind and hand are in fact
accomplices in constructing space(s)—in his story. But that is fine because there is no
other way, and this absolutely does not mean that his story would be fiction or less true.
The researcher himself and his texts are, in a sense, also mediators (Latour, 2005, p.125).
In what follows I will hold Marcus’ six strategies to an ANT light, and translate them
into the context of development aid.
Following the people
Following an individual or a group of individuals is probably the most natural form of
multi-sited ethnography (Marcus, 1995), as it was already practiced by Malinowski who
followed the Trobriand islanders on their kula journeys (1922), and is a well-established
practice in contemporary migration studies (e.g. Galli, 2009; Riccio, 2011). Also in science
studies, the cradle of ANT, it is a common strategy to “follow around the scientist”
(Latour, 1993).
In aidnography this strategy can be translated into following around the development
agent, the development consultant, or the mayor of a ‘beneficiary’ municipality. Taking
an ANT stance, the ethnographer should not only describe the mediating powers of the
observed individual or group, but also report how other close or distant actors influ-
ence the observed subject’s actions, and how the actions of the subject acquire different
meanings in different ‘localities’.
Hovland (2009) followed around a group of Norwegian missionaries in Madagascar
and came to the conclusion that the idea of ‘missionary’ acquires a different content
in Norway and in Madagascar. She argues that disjunctures and communicative gaps
are as important an aspect of globalization as flows and connections. Spencer (2008)
followed tourists around in Cuba that participated in study tours, organized by local
NGOs. These tours were designed to raise the awareness of the tourists of development
issues. An important side effect, Spencer concludes, was that the tours also increased the
social capital in Cuba.
The emerging sub-field of ‘ethnography of development expertise’ (notably Mosse,
2011a) has been producing interesting ANT accounts. Ethnographies of development
expertise portray, for instance, the formation of alliances amongst actors to make policies
work (Mosse, 2004, 2005b), or the struggle of experts to defend their professional space
within the Big Organization (Mosse, 2011b).
Various of these ethnographies of expertise exploit the split identity of the ethno-
grapher himself. In other words, these ethnographies report the ethnographer’s own
adventures as development expert. In a certain sense, by describing the own experience
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as development expert, these ethnographers de facto apply a ‘follow yourself’ strategy.
Unfortunately, these ethnographers tend to pay attention to only one side of their split
identity. They rarely continue to ‘follow themselves’ when they move from their expert
chair to their chair in academia, as is the case for Rossi (2004) and Mosse (2011b).
Following the life or biography
Whereas the previous strategy consisted in following a person without giving a major
role to the passing of time —as if the actor-network were deployed in a “single global
present” (Massey, 2005, p.76)— the second strategy consists in following a person through
the several spaces that he has passed through during his entire (professional) life.
Rarely considered a strategy for multi-sited ethnography, the biographical method is
nonetheless a common ethnographic method since almost a century.
Following the object or technology
Following the thing or technology is at least as natural a strategy to ANT scholars as
following an individual. It involves tracing the circulation of a non-human object through
different ‘localities’ and the role it plays in each of them. In an ideal scenario the ethno-
graphic journey departs from the site where the object was put together. When objects
are designed and created, they necessarily absorb the hypotheses made by the designer
and manufacturer about the future context into which the object will be inserted. As
such, designers inscribe a ‘script’ in the object that, when introduced in the new context,
starts reconfiguring the context according the original assumptions of the designer and
manufacturer (Akrich, 1992). The ethnographic journey continues to the sites where the
object is inserted and where the script bends the users to its will. Of course, users have
the choice not to comply with the script, with the high probability that the object will
remain a chimera. It is through the users and their adaptation to the script that an
object is rendered real or unreal, and considered to work or not to work (Akrich, 1992).
In the context of development aid, the ethnographer could, for instance, follow the
design, diffusion, and use of a mobile phone based banking system, or a water potabi-
lization plant. Luetchford (2006) followed Costa Rican Fair Trade coffee, from the coffee
cooperatives in Costa Rica, over alternative trade NGOs, up to the Costa Rican agencies
that negotiate the deals with the Northern buyers. Not an ethnography but a historical
case study, Cherlet (2010) described how a script was inscribed into the seeds of the
high-yielding crop varieties that were developed during the Green Revolution, and the
impacts that this script had on the socio-technical organization of the farmers’ life.
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Following the metaphor, concept or discourse
Following a metaphor, concept or discourse means trailing its emergence and the alliance
that sustained it, observing its ability to enroll allies, and describing its performative
capacity in creating new socio-technical assemblages and ‘localities’. By adhering to
this strategy, the ethnographer ventures to set foot on the battlefield that surrounds
Foucauldian ethnographies of development aid.
Salemink (2006) explores the effects of the international donors’ emphasis on rein-
forcing civil society in Vietnam. He shows that the donor-set ‘civil society objectives’
were hard to translate linguistically, conceptually, and operationally in Vietnam’s real-
ity —which is characterized by an absence of a liberal civil society— while the Western
NGOs were nevertheless evaluated against these Western ‘civil society objectives’. As a
result, Salemink’s tale is one of “calculated misunderstandings”.
In my own multi-sited ethnography, I traced the emergence of the Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM) discourse in the sphere of multi-lateral organizations,
and the deployment of the discourse in Mali’s water sector (chapter 8). Besides ethno-
graphic work in Mali, I carried out participant observations at the headquarters of an
intergovernmental water organization as well as a non-governmental water organization
that are both active in Mali. I showed that, from an ANT vantage point, the IWRM
discourse works because a strong alliance of international and national actors makes it
work.
Following the plot or project
The fourth strategy proposed by Marcus takes the narrative of a myth (in a broad sense)
as starting point to allow the ethnographer to connect different real world sites and
develop a multi-sited ethnography. In the case of development aid, the equivalent of
a myth could be a ‘project outline’. A development project is usually formulated by
professional myth makers in a Western office far from the site of implementation, who
inscribe in the project outline a strict script for all actors. When following a project, the
ethnographer should thus trace the connections in two directions. First, he needs to trace
the connections that link backwards and ask which elements were merged in the project
formulation, by whom, and how: the juxtaposition to past or competing projects, the
insertion of ‘local’ and ‘global’ elements, shifted delineations of matters of concern, etc.
The second, opposite move needs to trace the connections that link forward, produced
by the project’s script: the creation of ‘the local’ through the project, the enrollment of
new actors in the alliance, the reconfiguration of the network, etc.
Markowitz, who had collaborated with associations of Peruvian alpaca breeders in the
past, uneasily noted, when she returned 5 years later, that the associations had radically
moved from an agenda of political revendication to a purely commercial project. To
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understand this shift she ‘followed’ the project trajectories from the grassroots NGOs in
Arequipa to the donors in Lima and to the stakeholders in the rural Andes (Markowitz,
2001).
Whereas Markowitz followed all skeins being knitted at one single moment in time,
Rossi (2004) followed a project for fighting against desertification from its early formu-
lation in 1982 to its reformulation around the turn of the millennium. Although not
explicitly based on a multi-sited ethnography, her description of the project formulation
and reformulation adroitly commutes between the villages targeted by the project, the
office of the project manager, and the sphere of international organizations.
Following the conflict
The last but definitely not the least interesting strategy consists of following a conflict.
Consider for example the conflicts surrounding the construction of a controversial dam,
or the creation of a large natural reserve in indigenous territory. By following the many
strings that tangle in the Gordian conflict, the ethnographer can compose a meaningful
multi-sited ethnography. Moreover, from the vantage point of ANT, a conflict sets the
stage for a play in which numerous actors appeal to each other’s knowledge and interests
in order to create alliances. The conflict juxtaposes or ties together actors as diverse as:
grassroots movements, national ministries, legal institutions, mass media, international
environmental NGOs, etc. Each of the actors defines the own identity, matters of concern,
and scale of the conflict in their own ‘local’ terms.
Where power conflicts are concerned, ethnography has a notable record of choosing
the perspective of the silenced and the subaltern. Assuming an actor-network perspective,
however, and moving the standpoint from one site to another, can open new windows on
the conflict. It can reveal surprising links such as: the occasional coalescence of environ-
mental discourses of grassroots movements with those of urban elite (Rangan, 2000), the
interweaving of ideological values in supposedly objective environmental science (Forsyth,
2003), the seizure of an environmental issue to ventilate deeper political discontent (Rob-
bins, 2012, p.199-214), or the occasional detrimental effect of mass media coverage to the
environmental cause (Princen and Finger, 1994).
Multi-sited ethnographies of development aid are needed in order to reveal on the links
between different sites. A number of suchlike ethnographies have been mentioned in this
section. Only a very small number of them tried to include some ANT insights in their
analysis.
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10.5 Negotiating access and crafting an identity
As is common in ethnography, I conclude this article with a reflective note. Sticking to
my objective of delivering a concrete method/tool package for empirical data collection,
I limit myself to discussing practical issues directly related to the multi-sited character of
the package. Whereas Latour asserts that he can easily come up with “two dozen ways”
to shift out of any standpoint (Latour, 2005, p.145), the ethnographer’s major concern is
probably how to shift into another standpoint. In conducting multi-sited research, one
encounters two major practical problems: first, many sites are shielded from outsiders,
and second, the identity one assumes in the site determines how large the window on the
site will be and which panorama one will view. Both issues are closely linked with the
personal background and commitments of the researcher.
The first issue, gaining access, is perhaps the most difficult aspect of ethnography,
especially when a participant observation is the goal (Bernard, 2006). Not only in in-
digenous communities it can be hard to pass the ‘gatekeeper’ (Kawulich, 2011), this is
likewise the case in urban or western communities (Feldman et al., 2003; Maginn, 2007),
or in institutions (Schwartzman, 1992; Feldman et al., 2003). According to my experience
(see chapter 9) and that of others (Markowitz, 2001; Mosse, 2006), development experts
or practitioners are fairly available for interviews but reluctant to tolerate a participant
observation. Ethnographic description can indeed be experienced as undercutting or
threatening to their professional authority, given that ethnography “examines the insta-
bility of meaning [and] detracts from the substance of official narratives” (Mosse, 2006).
Especially in the case of large international organizations, the path to ‘get inside’ is labori-
ous, and success is far from guaranteed. The permission to establish a long-term physical
presence at the site arbitrarily depends on factors such as: the identity adopted by the
researcher when knocking at the gate (social scientist, development expert, trainee, . . . ),
the university that backs the research, the researcher’s curriculum, references, language
proficiency,. . . (Maginn, 2007).
My own case is paradigmatic. As a PhD student with a formal training in both
hydraulic engineering and social anthropology, I could convince a water NGO as well as
an intergovernmental water advocacy organization to accept a participant observation.
Without a master degree in engineering, however, I would probably not have been granted
the permission for a participant observation at their premises.
One strategy to increase the chances is to emphasize that both parties can gain from
the research. The organizations that accepted my participant observation were those
organizations that realized that thanks to my training and experience in hydraulic engi-
neering I could productively contribute to their everyday activities. No one likes to feel
that he or she is being used or that something has is taken without proper recompense
(Kawulich, 2011). Therefore, some ‘haggling’ might be necessary to reach a balanced
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reciprocity. This includes a willingness from the researcher’s side to refocus the research
when the host would benefit from research in an area other than the original area of
interest (Lassiter, 2008).
If gaining access to a single site is hard, gaining access to the n sites in an n-sited
ethnography is roughly n times as hard. Fortunately, the multi-sited setup of the research
can be used as leverage in the negotiation of access. A development professional, for
instance, might be interested in the information that the ethnographer will collect in his
multi-sited research. Development professionals do realize that a multi-sited ethnography
can throw a unique, multi-faceted light on their work.
The bottom line is that the issue of access is absolutely crucial for the research. One
might develop the most brilliant research outline, but if no access is granted to the data,
there is no research. Therefore I plea for a pragmatic approach in the construction of a
multi-sited ethnography. I started in one site where access was relatively easily granted.
From that site, uncountable links led to myriad other sites. My choice to trace some links
rather than others was largely determined by the access permits I could obtain along the
path—not the intrinsic interest of one link over another. Obviously, this strategy cuts
out only a limited section of the entire actor-network, but partiality and situatedness
are anyhow to be accepted as inevitable (see chapter 9). As stated earlier, multi-sited
ethnography does not have the ambition to be more holistic than single-sited ethnography.
The second issue, crafting an acceptable identity, is one of epistemological concern.
Once access is granted to the site, the identity and attitude of the researcher will determine
the depth to which the informants will allow his to dig, and where. Depending on
which identity is crafted, new spaces will open up and others will remain shielded off
(Coffey, 1999). It is self-evident, for instance, that only a female ethnographer could
have access to the intimate life world of Bedouin women (Abu-Lughod, 1986). In most
cases, however, the role of identity is more subtle. For the collection of ethnographic
data among Muscogee (Creek) people, playing the identity of ‘farmer’s daughter’ proved
to be a better gambit than playing the identity of ‘academic researcher interested in
contemporary Muscogee culture’ (Kawulich, 2011). However, the ethnographer is not
always in control. The status and position of the gatekeeper that granted the access to
the site will vest the ethnographer with a specific identity that can open new doors in a
snowballing manner, but will as well close others (Feldman et al., 2003).
In my own multi-sited research on development aid in water management, I overtly
entered the headquarters of a water NGO as an observer, but was forced to assume the
role of trainee when I tried to enter a multilateral organization. As a result, attending
closed meetings was obvious in the former site but somewhat harder in the latter. In
the rural Malian villages, the third site of inquiry, I was careful not to present myself
as collaborator of the water NGO but as independent researcher. By contrast, in order
to get access to the representatives of the European Commission in Mali, I was more
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successful when wearing the hat of the NGO than the hat of academic researcher.
The aforementioned remarks apply to any participant observation. A multi-sited
ethnography, however, complicates the identity issue even further, as the work in one
site influences the position of the researcher in another site. Although I entered the
multilateral water organization in the capacity of trainee, thanks to my preceding field
work in Mali and collaboration with a water NGO, I managed to acquire a certain status
of authority on ‘local’ issues within the multilateral organization. It notably increased
the trust in my work and loosened the tongues.
My experience, accumulated in the different sites, had also another effect. Having
taken cognizance of the reality in Mali, and having observed the everyday preoccupations
of the individual employees at the headquarters of different development organizations, it
was hard to suppress emotions that oscillated between pity and perplexity, when realizing
that each of the sites, although interlinked in multiple ways, is incredibly detached from
the others. I experienced each site as a new world, parallel to the other sites I had
observed, not a world above or beneath the other sites. Marcus believes that multi-sited
ethnography definitely eliminates the possibility of doing non-engaged observations, not
because of some preference for the subaltern, but because the multi-sited methodology
in itself constitutes a form of disciplinary activism:
“In certain sites, one seems to be working with, and in others one seems to be work-
ing against, changing sets of subjects. This condition of shifting personal positions
in relation to one’s subjects and other active discourses in a field that overlap with
one’s own generates a definite sense of doing more than just ethnography, and it is
this quality that provides a sense of being an activist for and against positioning in
even the most self-perceived apolitical field-worker” (Marcus, 1995).
In ANT as well there is some form of activism: the political project of welcoming and
giving voice to any possible actors, in an attempt to reassemble our common social world,
free from the limits that had been prematurely imposed by modernist thinking (Latour,
1993, 2004, 2005). In ANT’s quest of detecting links that had sunk into oblivion, multi-







Conclusions of the research
The emergent when it appears is always found to fol-
low from the past, but before it appears it does not, by
definition, follow from the past.
George H. Mead — The Philosophy of the Present
Various scholars share with me a feeling of amazement when observing that the actors
involved in development aid manage to work together (e.g Mosse, 2004, 2005b; Gould,
2008). In fact, despite the continuously shifting ideas about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ways of
delivering aid, despite the immense heterogeneity of actors involved in the development
aid machinery, and despite the very situatedness of these actors’ knowledge, the actors
display a high degree of congruence in implementing development ideas and projects that
seems to extend from the donor, over the professional consultant, to the village chief.
Therefore, the main research question was: Given this immense heterogeneity and
these continuous policy shifts, how can their homogeneous support for a specific develop-
ment paradigm or paradigm shift be explained? This question led to three sub-questions:
First, where does a new development paradigm (and the related paradigm shift) come
from? Second, how does a new paradigm gain new support of the entire network? Third,
is there actually congruence amongst all actors or is this just an appearance?
An answer to the research questions was sought by collecting qualitative data re-
garding the dynamics of development paradigms that appeared to be hegemonic in the
development aid network.
Different theoretical viewpoints reveal different stories in the data
Data collection and analysis happened by means of the Grounded Theory Method. At
the start of the data collection phase, the research field had been limited to the water
sector, yet no particular sites (other than the first) had been selected. In fact, faithful
to GTM, the data collection started with no hypothesis nor a clear delineation of the
field in mind. As the first participant observation proceeded, two subsequent sites were
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selected for participant observation, based on their links with the first site and based on
the ongoing theorizing. The first site was the head office of an international development
NGO specialized in water projects, the second site was the Inner Niger Delta in Mali,
and the third site was the global secretariat of an multilateral network organization that
promotes the integrated management of water.
From the participant observations soon emerged that the field of inquiry would be
further reduced to three (apparently) hegemonic paradigms in the water sector. The
first was ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’ (IWRM) as best practice, the sec-
ond was ‘Capacity Building’ as mode to deliver the aid, the third was ‘Adaptation to
Climate Change’. During the data collection and analysis, however, ‘Adaptation to Cli-
mate Change’ was gradually abandoned as separate paradigm, and was only considered
in relation with IWRM.
The theorizing concerning the three research questions happened together with the
data collection and resulted in a theoretical journey from a more Foucauldian interpreta-
tion to a more actor-oriented interpretation (see Table 11.1). Therefore, the four articles
that compose the empirical part of this dissertation give answers to the research questions
from different theoretical perspectives. First, a historical analysis of the emergence of the
‘Capacity Building’ paradigm solicited the use of the Foucauldian concept genealogy. The
empirical observations concerning the actual use of the ‘Capacity Building’ paradigm were
best explained using the concept of translation. The third empirical chapter moved the
focus to the IWRM paradigm, and showed the importance of individual agency rather
than the discursive power of the paradigm for the implementation of IWRM in Mali and
Burkina Faso. The last empirical article relied on full-blown Actor-Network Theory to































Table 11.1: Theoretical approaches and main data sources of the four empirical chapters.
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describe the network that supports the IWRM paradigm. The latter resulted to be the
most articulated tool to describe the eclectic collection of data that was obtained from
the multi-sited ethnography, interviews, focus group discussions and documents.
As the four empirical articles of Part II demonstrate, one theory cannot explain ev-
erything. Just like some physical properties of light can only be explained by means
of the ‘wave theory’, and others by the means of the ‘particle theory’, the emergence
of a paradigm and its implementation can be viewed through genealogical spectacles as
well as actor-oriented spectacles. The conclusions that are drawn from the two different
analyses are not contradictory—they are complementary.
Paradigms have age-long lines of descent
Chapter 5 explored the origins of paradigm shifts, by having a closer look at the emer-
gence of ‘Capacity Building’ (CB) as hegemonic paradigm in development cooperation. If
this paradigm is interpreted as an opposition to the ‘technological determinism’ ingrained
in traditional ‘technical cooperation’—as argued by the proponents of CB themselves—
CB needs to be placed in an age-long genealogy of discussions about the role of knowledge
and technology (K&T) in development. Chapter 5 showed that the genealogy of these
discussions goes back to Enlightenment—the moment in history that the very ‘develop-
ment’ idea took shape. At any moment in history, since the Enlightenment until today,
more deterministic and less deterministic interpretations concerning the role of K&T in
development have existed along each other and yet the one or the other extreme prevailed.
CB, the currently hegemonic paradigm in development cooperation, is no more than the
latest non-deterministic discourse concerning K&T in development.
The development industry has a very strong propensity to reflection, auto-evaluation,
and auto-correction (Gould, 2008). This reflex, however, does not seem to go back in
time more than a couple of years, a decade at best. Promoters of CB, however noble
and justified their case might be, would do well to realize that their arguments bear
many similarities with some of the criticism issued in the early 1950s against Technical
Assistance (TA), when the latter was still in its phase of inception. But this advice, to
look further than one decade back in time, applies even the more to those who promote
deterministic paradigms of ‘K&T in/for development’.
Actors, their agency, and their context-specific translations are crucial
While in Chapter 5 the descent of CB was still viewed through a Nietzschean/Foucaul-
dian genealogical lens, the ethnographic data collected at the different sites directed the
theorizing towards more actor-oriented theories. The spread of the CB paradigm and the
IWRM paradigm, their influence on policy makers and development professionals around
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the globe, their rise to hegemony, their resilience and mutations, and their downfall all
depend on the agency of actors.
The ethnographic data showed that the CB paradigm, for instance, is interpreted
differently at various points in the development network —from the donor to the rural
municipalities in Mali’s Inner Niger Delta. The data presented in chapter 6 elicited
that the link between the abstract CB paradigm and its implementation on the ground
exists only by virtue of numerous mediators and intermediaries that, perforce, interpret
the paradigm (and related policies) differently. The often blamed ‘gap’ between policy
making and practice is bridged by the multiple small shifts in interpretation. Moreover,
all actors actively translate the new policy according to their own interests, in order to
reaffirm the own position in the complex network that bridges the ‘gap’. Therefore, the
paradigm (and related policies) only fails when a number of actors decides to desert the
network, provoking the disintegration of the network.
Also the ethnographic data concerning the IWRM paradigm (Chapters 7 and 8)
showed the essential role of individual actors. Although some critics have described
IWRM as just another “nirvana concept” for water scholars and practitioners (Molle,
2008), our account showed that, in reality, IWRM required the relentless work of individ-
uals in order to become hegemonic in the sphere of multilateral organizations (Chapter 8)
and to be implemented at country level (Chapter 7).
Chapter 7 described the complex interplays of policy entrepreneurs at the multilateral
level and policy entrepreneurs at the national Burkinabe´ and Malian level in shaping
the water policy reforms in both countries over the past 15 years. Despite the global
hegemony and apparent uniformity of the IWRM paradigm, the qualitative comparison
of IWRM-inspired water policy changes in the two neighboring countries showed that
the reforms, as well as the way in which they are ‘owned’ by national policy makers, are
significantly distinct. The differences boil down to different levels of individual agency
that conditioned the observed policy reforms.
The hegemony and success of the paradigm sits on a tight network of human
and non-human actors
Chapter 8 zoomed out from the country-centered focus and brought the temporal and
spatial extent of the IWRM network in the picture. The actors that sustained the emer-
gence of the IWRM paradigm in the multilateral sphere two decades ago, the actors that
introduced IWRM in Mali through governmental development aid, and the actors that
implemented IWRM through non-govenrmental aid, they are all connected by numerous
translations in one single network. The network of actors that supports IWRM has man-
aged to construct a solid alliance over space and time because they constantly negotiate
and translate each other’s interests in order to enroll one another. Non-human actors
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—e.g. the typical aid financing mechanism, the Dublin Principles for IWRM, organiza-
tions such as GWP or WWC, or the Niger river— have proven to be important anchorage
points for the alliance.
The network constructs ‘success’
The skeptic reader might rightly wonder whether Actor-Network Theory (Chapter 8) and
the idea of ‘translations’ (Chapter 6) really add to our understanding of the development
aid architecture. Perhaps, these actors, located at different points in the network, are
very nimble at playing to the donor’s tunes? Doesn’t the alliance of actors simply align
along the already well scoured flows of donor money?
The Chapters 6 and 8 showed that the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the paradigm depends
on the strength of the alliance, not the strength of the paradigm. So, contrary to intu-
itive conclusions, the data showed that the donor money follows those alliances that are
performing. Taking a different tack than Foucauldian analyses, I argue that paradigms
such as Capacity Building or IWRM derive their success from the loads of work that
is being done ‘behind the stage’ by various actors in order to continuously tie in more
allies in the assemblage, and to make the paradigm work. In other words, the paradigm
performs because a network of actors makes it perform. “Only voices speaking in unison
will be heard” (Callon, 1986). An alliance that performs, is also an alliance that attracts
donor money. My tracing of IWRM (Chapter 8) showed that much effort had to be but
in the IWRM assemblage before it attracted money: the money is an indicator that the
network performs—not the other way around.
Power relations do not explain much—power needs to be explained
Other critics might object that the use of ‘translations’ (Chapter 6) and Actor-Network
Theory (Chapter 8) to describe the networks of actors behind the paradigms naively ig-
nore ‘existing power relations’. At the end, critics might argue, the outline of the Capacity
Building and/or IWRM networks simply mirror existing donor-recipient structures.
The reply is simple. As stated in the theoretical Chapter 10, Actor-Network Theory
has an abhorrence of pre-conceived social structures (such as power), especially when
they are employed to explain social phenomena (such as unequal access to aid). Unlike
Foucauldian analyses that consider discourse to be the overpowering force that precedes
and encompasses all agency, power in Actor-Network Theory is constructed. Yes, power
does curb the agency of other actors—but instead of conceiving it as a metaphysical
entity, ANT tries to describe power as constructed by the actors and embedded in the
assemblage.
For one thing, one actor never controls the network, not even one action. Danida alone
did not put IWRM on the international agenda in the 1990s; it needed a tight network of
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allies in order to be heard. IWRM planning in Mali and Burkina Faso was not exclusively
donor-driven; the process required national and international water professionals to come
up with the idea and consultants to elaborate on them.
ANT does recognize, however, the differential pressures that are brought to bear on
the network by different actors, some actors simply adding predictability to the setting,
other actors shaping and transforming the assemblage in unexpected ways. In other
words, some mediators are able to alter the network more deeply than others. Indeed, if
all actors would be fully-fledged mediators, able to alter the network at will, the network
would be flat and egalitarian. Hence, power inequalities in the network result from
differences in this ability to translate and enroll other actors. The actors that are most
nimble in bending the network, or the ones that have knitted most ties, are the most
powerful mediators. These different abilities of the actor to translate and enroll are off
course path-dependent, and depend on the position of the actor in the network. That the
chair of the GWP Technical Committee was also director of the Water Division of DHI,
a senior advisor to Danida, as well as involved in the preparation of Rio 1992, made him
a very powerful mediator in the network, able to alter the network deeply.
He did, however, never act alone. He derived his network-altering power from em-
ploying other actors, most of them coming from other times and spaces (Latour, 2005,
p.166). DHI as organization existed before he became head of its Water Division. The
Rio 1992 conference was planned before he got involved in the preparation of the water
chapter. And otherwise, his network-altering power has been inscribed into non-human
actors that will continue to over-flow future times and other spaces. Although new people
occupy the chair of the GWP Technical Committee and the Water Division of DHI, the
two organizations still collaborate. The Dublin Principles that he helped to formulate
during the run up to the Rio 1992 conference are still being cited.
In fact, non-human actors such as an advocacy organization, a water management
principle, an aid financing mechanism, or a water dam are effective and persistent medi-
ators of power relations (Law, 1986) —usually much more effective and persistent than
inter-human ties, since the latter require more maintenance than the former. These
non-human artifacts incorporate a ‘script’, consciously or unconsciously written by the
designers of the artifact, that has the power to establish, reconfigure and naturalize the
social, political and economic relations that surround the artifact—now and in the future.
Limitations of the research
The research was consciously limited in two ways: by focusing on the water sector and by
focusing on three paradigms only. Therefore, the conclusions of this research only apply
to this sector and these paradigms. Obviously, the research had other limitations.
First, as described in the theoretical Chapter 10, I conducted my multi-sited ethnog-
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raphy by ‘following paradigms’. In doing so I presumed the existence of trajectories that
can be followed. In other words, I cannot know whether I really followed the trajectories
of the paradigm or whether I created them myself.
Second, I selected paradigms that had already reached a hegemonic status in the
network. No serious efforts have been made to analyze the failure or demise of a paradigm,
nor to analyze a paradigm that never reached hegemonic status. The dynamics that
explain the support for a new paradigm do not necessarily explain the opposite movement.
Third, the identity and attitude that I assumed in each of the sites determined the
type of data that I could collect, and the depth to which the informants allowed me to dig.
For instance, I overtly entered the headquarters of the water NGO as an observer, but was
forced to assume the role of trainee when I tried to enter the multilateral organization.
As a result, attending closed meetings was obvious in the former site but harder in the
latter. In the rural Malian villages, the third site of inquiry, I was careful not to present
myself as collaborator of the NGO but as independent researcher. By contrast, in order
to get access to the representatives of the European Commission in Mali, I was more
successful when wearing the NGO hat than the academic hat.
Further research
A natural extension of the research would consist of completing the Table 11.1. On the
one hand, an analysis of the sequence of different water development paradigms over
the past 70 years (their genealogy), and their mutual oppositions, would definitely add
more insights to the functioning of the development aid sector. On the other hand, a
comprehensive ANT description of Capacity Building could validate my argument that
ANT can be applied to the development aid sector to reveal certain of its dynamics.
However, it could be more innovative to analyze the demise of a hegemonic paradigm,
or to analyze a paradigm that never reached the status of hegemony and that remained
in oblivion. Bruno Latour did something similar when he studied Aramis, the innovative
Parisian transport system that never was (Latour, 1996).
A third path for further inquiry would exclusively focus on water management in
the Inner Niger Delta. As briefly mentioned in the description of the Inner Niger Delta
(Chapter 3) and in the ANT analysis of IWRM in Mali (Chapter 8), access to water and
land in the Inner Niger Delta used to be regulated by a century-old system of customary
laws: the Diina. Since the creation of municipalities as lowest decentralized level of gov-
ernmental decision-making in the early 1990s, the municipalities have become the main
competent body in matters of environmental resources management in their territory.
However, two decades later, they still need to compete with the Diina system (Ben-
jaminsen and Ba, 2008). The interaction between government-supported IWRM and the
traditional Diina-based water management definitely deserves further scrutiny.
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Chapter 12
Practical implications of the research
Life cannot wait until the sciences explain the
universe scientifically.
Jose´ Ortega y Gasset — Cultura y ciencia
The following practical implications need to be taken with caution, since they are based
on one qualitative study only: the case of development aid to water management. They
are largely based on my own extrapolation of limited research results, and are obviously
interspersed with personal opinion. Nevertheless, they are supported by the findings of
other anthropologists as well (such as Mosse, 2004, 2005b).
New ideas need a fertile context and a lot of work to emerge
The community of development professionals is well aware of their own funny habit to
come up at regular basis with new ideas, concepts or policies for ‘better’ development
aid.1 Therefore, development professionals themselves readily mock the overpowering
but transitory attraction of bandwagon concepts, and the necessity to “speak the right
language at the right time.”2
These new ideas or policies do not appear overnight but usually have a long line of
descent. This has two implications. First, new ideas pop up when the time is right, or
in other words, when the intellectual and political context is right. Second, usually these
new ideas or policies are not as original as they suggest. Development assistance has a
history of nearly seven decades. Nearly all contemporary discussions echo discussions of
some earlier times. The argument that capacity building should prevail over the transfer
of knowledge and technology, for instance, dates back to at least the early 1970s.
Nevertheless, a new idea or policy needs the unrelenting work of dedicated individuals
in order to become hegemonic. ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’ (IWRM) might
1In my dissertation I collected them under the denominator ‘paradigm’.
2Personal communication of an aid professional, 26 July 2011.
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be considered by some as a transitory fad or fashion in water management, but it required
a lot of work of some ‘champions’ and organizations so that IWRM would be inscribed
in the water policies of more than 80% of the countries in the world. And once on the
fore, the new idea or policy continues to require a strong network of actors in order not
to vanish.
Where a gap between policy making and practice exists, it is created
A new idea or policy that becomes hegemonic in development aid does not act in a
homogeneous way; neither is its implementation homogeneous. A new idea or policy is
secured upon a vast network of actors that, depending on their position in the network,
interpret the idea or policy differently. The idea or policy has to be interpreted differently
by each actor. All actors —regardless of whether they constitute the donor, a mediator,
or the aid recipient— implant their own interests in their interpretation of the idea or
policy (the actors ‘translate’ their interests). These translations, that slightly differ from
one actor to another, are necessary to cement and reproduce the network.
Therefore, when an idea or policy fails, this cannot be attributed to a ‘gap’ between
policy making and practice, nor to the ‘ill-conception’ of the policy (Latour, 1996, p.78):
If we say that a successful project existed from the beginning because it was well
conceived and that a failed project went aground because it was badly conceived,
we are saying nothing, we are only repeating the words ‘success’ and ‘failure’, while
placing the cause of both at the beginning of the project, at its conception.
The idea or policy fails when (some part of) the network wants it to fail.
Power and dependence are reproduced in very concrete ways
The indisputably unequal power relations in development aid are not inscribed in some
metaphysical stratum that occludes all actors and actions in an invisible and unavoidable
manner. Instead, inequality is inscribed in very concrete agreements, tangible artifact,
and human-made procedures.
For instance, the guidelines and procedures of the calls-for-proposals of the European
Commission, together with its PADOR database of eligible aid recipients, are an effective
set of tools that maintains and reproduces donor-recipient inequalities. Or, the choice of
a Western NGO to assist a municipality in the South with the construction of drinking
water infrastructure, but to nevertheless bypass the treasury of that municipality in order
to maintain control over the aid money, perpetuates the unequal relationship between the
NGO and the municipality.
In other words, unequal power relations are not a coincidence nor invisible. They are
reproduced day after day by the actors, through the connections they make with other







Introduction and research question. Anthropology rarely manages to approach
‘the social practice’ of delivering development aid as research subject per se, without
succumbing to discussions on the desirability or effectiveness of this practice. Indeed,
there is a wide abyss between, on the one hand, critical but lofty contemplations that
deconstruct ‘development’ as hegemonic Western ideal, and, on the other hand, applied
but hidebound evaluations that merely focus on increasing the effectiveness of ‘develop-
ment aid’ as instrument. In this abyss lies important anthropological knowledge that is
not readily explored, to wit, knowledge about the social interactions in themselves, about
the actors’ strategies, how they handle the diversity, or how they translate an abstract
policy into a concrete development project. A growing stream of ‘ethnographies of aid’
are now exploring the social organization of aid as such, and the present research situates
itself in this current.
The research departed from the observation of an apparent contradiction. Devel-
opment aid is delivered through a complex network of myriad actors, such as donors,
multilateral agencies, consultants from the Global North and South, the private sector
from the Global North and South, governmental administrations, village chiefs, grass-
roots NGOs, and farmers. These actors possess incredibly diverse world views, cultural
backgrounds, interests, resources, and outreach. Despite this heterogeneity, though, when
it comes to delivering aid and implementing projects, all actors speak the same ‘develop-
ment jargon’ and seem to display congruence; this congruence appears to extend from the
donor over the aid professional to the village chief. And although the ideas about what
counts as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aid have constantly changed over time —with new paradigms
and policies sprouting every few years— the apparent congruence between actors more
or less remains unchanged.
This observation triggered the following research questions: How can the congru-
ence between actors be explained against the background of heterogeneity and changing
paradigms? When a new paradigm appears, where does it come from and how does it
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gain support? Is this support actually homogeneous amongst all actors or is it just an
appearance?
Research methodology. In order to get an answer to these questions, qualitative
data concerning the emergence of, and support for, hegemonic development paradigms
was collected from three different sites in the development aid network, via a multi-sited
ethnography. From the outset the research focused on one sector: development aid in the
water sector (this covers water management and access to drinking water).
The collection and analysis of the qualitative data followed the Grounded Theory
Method. Faithful to this method, the research started without any particular theory,
hypothesis, or field delineation in mind. During the first of three participant observations,
three paradigms emerged as worthwhile to be concentrated on:
• ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’ (IWRM) as best practice;
• ‘Capacity Building’ as mode to deliver the aid;
• ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’ and its implications for the IWRM paradigm.
From the data collected at the first site followed the selection of two subsequent sites
of inquiry. The three sites of inquiry were, in chronological order, the following:
• the international headquarters of WaNGO, a non-governmental development orga-
nization specialized in implementing water projects in Africa and Latin America,
one of which in the Inner Niger Delta in Mali;
• six rural villages in the Inner Niger Delta in Mali;
• the international headquarters of the Global Water Partnership (GWP), an inter-
governmental organization founded by the World Bank and UNDP that fosters the
integrated management of water resources worldwide, including in Mali.
Eventually the complete corpus of data consisted of 13 months of participant ob-
servation at three sites, 48 interviews, 21 focus group discussions and over 50 official
documents.
Outline of the dissertation. The dissertation, which reports the above-described
research, is conceived as a collection of six original articles. Part I of the dissertation
sets the scene for the six articles; part II collects four empirical articles that answer the
research questions; part III contains two theoretical articles that reflect on the research
methodology; and the final section, part IV, reformulates the findings of the six articles
in both scholarly and practical terms. Each of the six articles in part II and III stands on
its own and can be read independently of the rest. They are summarized in the following
paragraphs.
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The four empirical articles in Part II present the data that was collected concerning
‘Capacity Building’ and ‘Integrated Water Resources Management’ (IWRM). During the
data collection and analysis, ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’ was abandoned as separate
paradigm, and was only considered in relation with IWRM. Each of the empirical articles
reports and analyzes data concerning one of the paradigms in order to give an answer
to one of the research questions. However, each article uses a slightly different theory to
present the data, mirroring different stages in the data collection and grounded theorizing.
The first empirical article (Chapter 5) probes the origins of paradigm shifts, by
unearthing the genealogy of Capacity Building, a currently hegemonic paradigm in devel-
opment cooperation. If this paradigm is interpreted as an opposition to the technological
determinism ingrained in traditional Technical Cooperation —as argued by the propo-
nents of Capacity Building themselves— Capacity Building can be considered as the
latest offspring of an age-long genealogy of discussions on the role of knowledge and tech-
nology in development. In fact, it is shown that the genealogy of these discussions dates
back to the Enlightenment. Moreover, at any moment in history, more deterministic
and less deterministic interpretations have existed along each other, with the sequence
of development paradigms swinging back and forth between both extremes. Capacity
Building is, hence, no more than the latest non-deterministic paradigm concerning the
role of knowledge and technology in development.
As is the case with Capacity Building, new development paradigms are usually pre-
sented as the thaumaturgic successor of a previous failing paradigm —with failure usually
being attributed either to the misconception of the previous paradigm, or to a gap be-
tween the original paradigm and its practical implementation. In the case of Capacity
Building, the failing predecessor was Technical Assistance. This dichotomized image of
the paradigm and its implementation as two monolithic and separate entities is unten-
able. In fact, the ethnographic data adduced in the second empirical article (Chapter 6)
shows how the Capacity Building paradigm is interpreted differently at various points in
the development network —from the donor to the rural municipalities in Mali’s Inner
Niger Delta. The link between the donor and the Malian municipalities exist only by
virtue of numerous mediators and intermediaries that, perforce, interpret the paradigm
differently. Therefore it is hard to claim the existence of a ‘gap’. Moreover, all actors
actively translate the new paradigm according to their own interests, in order to reaf-
firm the own position in the network and in order to reproduce the network. Hence, the
paradigm stands or falls with the integrity of the network.
The third article (Chapter 7) is the first of two articles to have a closer look at
the IWRM paradigm. Definitely moving away from the idea that paradigms have an
overpowering and disembodied discursive power, this article highlights the role of indi-
vidual agency in the deployment of a paradigm. Taking the introduction of the IWRM
paradigm in Burkina Faso (in 1996) and Mali (in 2004) as entry point, the article de-
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scribes the interplay between national policy entrepreneurs, international organizations,
and structural constraints in the shaping of the IWRM-inspired water policy reforms in
the two countries. Despite the apparent uniformity of the IWRM paradigm, the qualita-
tive comparison of the policy change process in the two countries shows that the reforms,
as well as the national ‘ownership’ of these reforms, are significantly distinct. The idiosyn-
crasies of the reform dynamics and ownership largely depend on the agency displayed by
individual policy entrepreneurs.
The last empirical article (chapter 8) traces the network of actors that sustained the
emergence of the IWRM paradigm in the multi-lateral sphere two decades ago and the
implementation of IWRM in Mali through governmental and non-governmental develop-
ment aid. The article displays the most advanced level of theorizing in the dissertation,
as it found inspiration in Actor-Network Theory to describe how actors enroll each other
in an alliance that makes the paradigm work. Non-human actors —e.g. the typical aid
financing mechanism, the Dublin Principles, the organization GWP, or the Niger river—
have proven to be important anchorage points for the alliance. Yet, the alliance that once
was so strong, seems to be disintegrating now, and actors are compelled to renegotiate
IWRM by drawing in ‘climate change’. In resonance with Chapter 6, Actor-Network
Theory proves helpful in showing that the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the paradigm depends
on the strength of the alliance, not the strength of the paradigm.
The two theoretical articles in Part III reflect on the use of, respectively, the Grounded
Theory Method and multi-sited ethnography. Although the classic Grounded Theory
Method requires the data collection to be dissociated from existing theories, it is argued
in the first reflective article (Chapter 9) that there are at least four forms of unavoidable,
theoretical conditioning in the data collection: (1) the framing of the research problem,
(2) the implicit ontological assumptions about the world and the problem under scrutiny,
(3) the delineation of the site of data collection, and (4) the theory-ladenness of observa-
tions. Drawing on the experience of the multi-sited ethnography, the article exemplifies
this data conditioning and its impact on the grounded theorizing. It is asserted, however,
that this conditioning does not invalidate the Grounded Theory Method as such, but that
it should be made explicit throughout the process of theorizing. Therefore, a case is made
for post-modern advances in the Grounded Theory Method, by allowing novel ontological
categories from Discourse Theory and Actor-Network Theory to enter the theorizing. In
the most advanced phase of theorizing in the present research, the latter theory provided
powerful categories for the description of the data.
In an ex post reflection on the data collection and the data description, the second
reflective article (Chapter 10) points out that multi-sited ethnography as data collection
method and Actor-Network Theory as descriptive tool constitute, in effect, a powerful
method/tool package to describe the social interactions in development aid. The article
shows that the method and the tool are particularly geared to each other. Subsequently, it
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is shown that the package allows the analyst to move beyond the persistent global/local
and policy/practice dichotomies that characterize many development policy analyses.
Further in the article, George Marcus’ six operational strategies for multi-sited ethnogra-
phy are translated to the context of development aid. To conclude the article, the author
draws again on the experience of the conducted multi-sited ethnography to reflect on the
peculiarities of gaining access to, and forging an identity in, the different sites.
Conclusions. The four empirical articles experiment with different theoretical concepts
to present the data. Starting with a genealogical description of the Capacity Building
paradigm in the first empirical article, the theorizing subsequently demonstrates that
this paradigm gets translated in numerous ways. The third empirical article shows the
importance of individual agency in the implementation of the IWRM paradigm, and the
last relies on full-blown Actor-Network Theory to describe the network —widespread
in time and space— that supports the IWRM paradigm. Although each theoretical
perspective emphasizes different aspects of the data, Actor-Network Theory turns out to
be the most apt tool to describe the eclectic set of data that was obtained from multi-sited
ethnography, interviews, focus group discussions and documents.
Regarding the research questions, the data shows that neither the Capacity Building
nor the IWRM paradigm shift happened overnight; they have a long line of descent. More
importantly, they needed the unrelenting work of a small number of dedicated individuals
to become hegemonic and they continue to require a strong network of actors to remain
so.
Moreover, these paradigms are no monolithic entities; neither is their implementation.
No ‘gap’ between paradigm and implementation is observed, but only a vast network of
actors that collectively adhere to the paradigm and that, depending on their position in
the network, interpret the paradigm differently. All actors implant their own interests in
their interpretation of the paradigm (the actors ‘translate’ their interests), regardless of
whether they constitute the donor, a mediator, or the aid recipient. These translations are
necessary to cement and reproduce the network: actors enroll each other in the network
by translating interests. The strength of a novel development paradigm depends on the
strength of the network and the translations.
The limitations of the reported research are obvious: it is based on a small selection
of paradigms from only one aid sector. The results might not be generalizable. Moreover,
the research focused on paradigms that were said to be working ; no data was collected on
the demise or failure of development paradigms. The latter could be the topic of future
research.
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Introduzione e domanda di ricerca. L’antropologia raramente riesce ad affrontare
‘la pratica sociale’ di fornire aiuti allo sviluppo come oggetto di ricerca in se´, senza soc-
combere alle discussioni sulla necessita` o sull’efficacia di questa pratica. Infatti, vi e` un
profondo abisso tra, da un lato, le critiche ma ampollose contemplazioni che decostrui-
scono lo ‘sviluppo’ come ideale occidentale e, dall’altro, le applicate ma grette valutazioni
che si concentrano meramente per aumentare l’efficacia degli ‘aiuti allo sviluppo’ come
strumento. In questo abisso giace un importante sapere antropologico che in gran parte
rimane inesplorato, cioe`, la conoscenza sulle interazioni sociali in se´, sulle strategie de-
gli attori, il modo in cui gestiscono la diversita` o il modo in cui traducono una politica
astratta in un progetto di sviluppo concreto. Un flusso crescente di etnografie dell’aiuto
pero` inizia ad esplorare questo abisso e la presente ricerca si colloca in questa corrente.
La ricerca e` partita dall’osservazione di un’apparente contraddizione. L’aiuto allo
sviluppo avviene attraverso una complessa rete di innumerevoli attori come i donatori, le
agenzie multilaterali, i consulenti del Nord e del Sud Globale, il settore privato del Nord
e del Sud Globale, le amministrazioni governative, i capi villaggio, la societa` civile e gli
agricoltori. Le visioni del mondo, i background culturali, gli interessi, le risorse ed i raggi
d’azione di questi attori sono incredibilmente diversi. Nonostante la loro eterogeneita`,
quando si tratta di implementare progetti di cooperazione, tutti gli attori parlano lo stesso
‘gergo di sviluppo’ e sembrano mostrare congruenza; tale congruenza pare che si estenda
dal donatore al professionista dell’aiuto, fino al capo villaggio. E anche se le idee su cosa
considerare ‘aiuto buono’ e ‘aiuto cattivo’ sono costantemente cambiate nel tempo —con
nuovi paradigmi e politiche che spuntano ogni paio d’anni— l’apparente congruenza tra
gli attori rimane quasi invariata.
Questa osservazione ha innescato le seguenti domande di ricerca: Come puo` essere
spiegata la congruenza tra gli attori alla luce dell’eterogeneita` e dei paradigmi volubili?
Quando appare un nuovo paradigma, da dove proviene e come fa ad ottenere sostegno?
Questo sostegno e` realmente omogeneo tra tutti gli attori o e` solo un’impressione?
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Metodologia di ricerca. Al fine di ottenere una risposta a queste domande, sono
stati raccolti dei dati qualitativi —relativi all’emersione e al sostegno di paradigmi di
sviluppo egemonici— da tre diversi punti nella rete di attori dello sviluppo, attraverso
un’etnografia multi-sito. Fin dall’inizio, la ricerca si e` focalizzata su un unico settore: gli
aiuti allo sviluppo nel settore idrico (che include la gestione delle risorse idriche e l’accesso
all’acqua potabile).
La raccolta e l’analisi dei dati qualitativi ha seguito il metodo della ‘grounded theory’;
fedele a questo metodo, la ricerca e` iniziata senza particolari teorie, ipotesi o delimitazioni
di campo in mente. Durante la prima delle tre ‘osservazioni partecipanti’ sono emersi tre
paradigmi su cui si e` deciso di concentrarsi:
• la ‘Gestione Integrata delle Risorse Idriche’ (GIRI) come ‘best practice’;
• ‘Capacity Building’ come modalita` per fornire gli aiuti;
• ‘l’Adattamento ai Cambiamenti Climatici’ e le sue implicazioni sul paradigma GIRI.
Dai dati raccolti nel primo sito e` derivata la selezione dei due siti d’indagine successivi.
I tre siti di indagine sono stati, in ordine cronologico, i seguenti:
• la sede internazionale di WaNGO, un’organizzazione di sviluppo non governativa
specializzata nell’implementazione di progetti idrici in Africa e in America Latina,
uno dei quali nel delta interno del fiume Niger in Mali;
• sei villaggi rurali nel delta interno del fiume Niger (DIN) in Mali;
• la sede internazionale della Global Water Partnership (GWP), un’organizzazione
intergovernativa fondata dalla Banca Mondiale e UNDP che promuove la GIRI in
tutto il mondo, incluso il Mali.
Alla fine, la banca dati completa consisteva in 13 mesi di osservazione partecipante in
tre siti, 48 interviste, 21 focus group e piu` di 50 documenti ufficiali.
Schema della tesi. La tesi, che descrive suddetta ricerca, e` concepita come una rac-
colta di sei articoli originali. La parte I della tesi prepara la scena per i sei articoli, la
parte II raccoglie quattro articoli empirici che rispondono alle domande di ricerca, la par-
te III contiene due articoli teorici che riflettono sulla metodologia di ricerca e la parte IV
riformula i risultati dei sei articoli, in termini sia accademici sia pratici. Ognuno dei sei
articoli nella seconda e terza parte e` a se´ stante e puo` essere letto indipendentemente dal
resto: tali articoli vengono riassunti nei seguenti paragrafi.
I quattro articoli empirici della parte II presentano i dati che sono stati raccolti in ma-
teria di ‘Capacity Building’ e ‘Gestione Integrata delle Risorse Idriche’ (GIRI). Durante
la raccolta dei dati e l’analisi, ‘l’adattamento ai cambiamenti climatici’ e` stato abbando-
nato come paradigma separato ed e` stato considerato solo in relazione alla GIRI. Ogni
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articolo empirico riporta e analizza i dati relativi ad uno dei paradigmi al fine di dare
una risposta ad ogni domanda di ricerca. Tuttavia, ogni articolo utilizza una teoria leg-
germente diversa per presentare i dati, rispecchiando diverse fasi della raccolta dei dati e
della teorizzazione (la ‘grounded theorizing’).
Il primo articolo empirico (Chapter 5) indaga le origini di un ‘cambiamento di pa-
radigma’, concentrandosi sul paradigma Capacity Building, che e` attualmente egemonico
nella cooperazione allo sviluppo. Se questo paradigma viene interpretato come un’op-
posizione al determinismo tecnologico radicato nella tradizionale cooperazione tecnica
—come sostengono i fautori stessi della Capacity Building— la Capacity Building puo`
essere considerata come l’ultimo discendente di una genealogia secolare di discussioni su
quale ruolo abbiano la conoscenza e la tecnologia nello sviluppo. Nell’articolo si dimostra
che la genealogia di queste discussioni risale all’Illuminismo. Infatti, nonostante abbiano
sempre coesistito delle interpretazioni piu` o meno deterministiche, in qualsiasi momento
della storia l’uno o l’altro estremo e` ha sempre prevalso—alternandosi. La Capacity Buil-
ding e` niente piu` che l’ultimo paradigma non-deterministico sul ruolo della conoscenza e
della tecnologia nello sviluppo.
Come nel caso della Capacity Building, nuovi paradigmi vengono immancabilmente
presentati come il successore miracoloso di un precedente paradigma fallito—e il falli-
mento di quest’ultimo viene invariabilmente attribuito alla sua erroneita` inerente o a un
divario tra il paradigma originale e la sua attuazione pratica. Nel caso della Capacity
Building, il predecessore fallito era l’assistenza tecnica. Questa immagine dicotomizzata
del paradigma e della sua attuazione come due entita` monolitiche e separate e` insostenibi-
le. Infatti, i dati etnografici addotti nel secondo articolo empirico (Chapter 6) mostrano
come il paradigma della Capacity Building sia interpretato in modo diverso nei vari punti
della rete di attori—dal donatore ai comuni rurali nel delta interno del Niger in Mali. Il
legame tra il donatore e questi comuni esiste solo in virtu` di numerosi mediatori e inter-
mediari che, necessariamente, interpretano il paradigma in maniera differente. Pertanto,
e` difficile sostenere l’esistenza di un divario. Inoltre, tutti gli attori traducono attivamente
il nuovo paradigma in base ai propri interessi, al fine di riaffermare la propria posizione
nella rete e riprodurre la rete stessa; quindi, la continuita` o il decadimento del paradigma
dipendono dall’integrita` della rete.
Il terzo articolo (Chapter 7) e` il primo di due articoli che esaminano piu` da vicino
il paradigma GIRI. Allontanandosi in modo decisivo dall’idea che l’egemonia di un para-
digma deriva da un potere discorsivo incorporeo e sovrumano, questo articolo mette in
evidenza il ruolo del libero arbitrio individuale (‘agency’) nella diffusione e implementa-
zione di un paradigma. Prendendo come punto di partenza l’introduzione del paradigma
GIRI in Burkina Faso (nel 1996) e in Mali (nel 2004), l’articolo descrive l’interazione
tra responsabili politici nazionali, organizzazioni internazionali e vincoli strutturali nelle
riforme politiche dell’acqua in questi due Paesi. Nonostante l’apparente uniformita` del
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paradigma della GIRI, il confronto qualitativo del processo di riforma delle politiche del-
l’acqua nei due Paesi mostra che queste riforme, cos`ı come la ‘ownership’ nazionale di
queste riforme, sono significativamente distinte. Le idiosincrasie sia delle riforme stesse
sia della ‘ownership’ risultante dipendono in larga misura dal libero arbitrio (‘agency’)
manifestato dagli individui, sia a livello nazionale che internazionale.
L’ultimo articolo empirico (Chapter 8) mostra il livello di teorizzazione piu` articolato
della parte II. L’articolo ripercorre la rete di attori che hanno sostenuto l’emergere del
paradigma GIRI nell’ambito multi-laterale negli ultimi due decenni e l’attuazione della
GIRI in Mali attraverso gli aiuti allo sviluppo governativi e non governativi. Sfruttando
la ‘Actor-Network Theory’ come strumento descrittivo, l’articolo illustra come gli attori
si ingaggino a vicenda in un’alleanza che permette al paradigma di funzionare. Attori
non umani —per esempio, il tipico meccanismo di finanziamento degli aiuti, i Principi
di Dublino per la GIRI, l’organizzazione GWP o il fiume Niger— hanno dimostrato di
essere importanti punti di ancoraggio per l’alleanza. Tuttavia, l’alleanza che una volta
era cos`ı forte, sembra che ora si stia disintegrando e gli attori sono costretti a rinegoziare
la GIRI attingendo dai ‘cambiamenti climatici’. In risonanza con il capitolo 6, la Actor-
Network Theory si rivela utile a dimostrare che il ‘successo’ o il ‘fallimento’ del paradigma
dipendono dalla forza dell’alleanza e non dalla forza del paradigma.
I due articoli teorici nella parte III riflettono sull’utilizzo, rispettivamente, del me-
todo della grounded theory e dell’etnografia multi-sito. Anche se versione classica della
grounded theory method richiede che la raccolta dei dati sia dissociata da teorie esistenti,
nel primo articolo riflessivo (Chapter 9) si argomenta che ci sono almeno quattro forme
di inevitabile condizionamento teorico alla raccolta dei dati: (1) l’inquadratura del pro-
blema di ricerca, (2) le ipotesi ontologiche implicite sul mondo e sul problema in esame,
(3) la delimitazione del sito di raccolta dei dati e (4) la carica teorica (‘theory-ladenness’)
di osservazioni empiriche. Basandosi sull’esperienza dell’etnografia multi-sito, l’artico-
lo esemplifica questo condizionamento dei dati ed il suo impatto sulla teorizzazione (la
‘grounded theorizing’). Si afferma, comunque, che questo condizionamento non invalida
il metodo della grounded theory in quanto tale, ma che dovrebbe essere reso esplicito
nel processo di teorizzazione. Pertanto, viene spezzata una lancia per i progressi post-
moderni nel metodo della grounded theory che hanno consentito a categorie ontologiche
tipiche della Discourse Theory e della Actor-Network Theory di entrare nella grounded
theory. Nella fase piu` avanzata di teorizzazione della presente ricerca, quest’ultima teoria
ha fornito potenti categorie per la descrizione dei dati.
In una riflessione a posteriori sulla raccolta e la descrizione dei dati, il secondo articolo
riflessivo (Chapter 10) sottolinea che l’etnografia multi-sito, come metodo di raccolta
di dati, e la Actor-Network Theory, come strumento per descrivere i dati, costituisco-
no, in effetti, un potente pacchetto metodo/strumento per studiare le interazioni sociali
negli aiuti allo sviluppo. L’articolo mostra che il metodo e lo strumento sono particolar-
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mente orientati l’uno all’altro. Successivamente, si dimostra che il pacchetto permette
all’analista di superare le persistenti dicotomie globale/locale e politica/pratica che ca-
ratterizzano molte analisi della politica allo sviluppo. Inoltre, in questo articolo, le sei
strategie operative per l’etnografia multi-sito di George Marcus sono tradotte al contesto
degli aiuti allo sviluppo. Per concludere l’articolo, si richiama nuovamente l’esperienza
dell’etnografia multi-sito condotta per riflettere sulle peculiarita` di assicurare l’accesso ai
diversi siti e forgiare un’identita` negli stessi.
Conclusioni. I quattro articoli empirici sperimentano diversi concetti teorici per pre-
sentare i dati. Partendo da una descrizione genealogica del paradigma della Capacity
Building nel primo articolo empirico, la teorizzazione dimostra successivamente che que-
sto paradigma viene tradotto in vari modi. Il terzo articolo empirico mostra l’importanza
del libero arbitrio individuale nell’attuazione del paradigma GIRI mentre l’ultimo si basa
interamente sulla Actor-Network Theory per descrivere la rete —estesa nel tempo e nello
spazio— che supporta il paradigma GIRI. Anche se ogni prospettiva teorica enfatizza
diversi aspetti dei dati, la Actor-Network Theory risulta essere lo strumento piu` adatto
per descrivere l’eclettico insieme di dati ottenuto con l’etnografia multi-sito, le interviste,
i focus group e i documenti.
Per quanto riguarda le domande di ricerca, i dati mostrano che ne´ il paradigma della
Capacity Building, ne´ quello della GIRI sono emersi da un giorno all’altro ma che invece
hanno una lunga discendenza. Ancora piu` importante, questi paradigmi hanno bisogno
del lavoro incessante di un piccolo numero di persone dedicate per diventare egemonici e
continuano a richiedere una forte rete di attori coerente per rimanere tali.
Inoltre, questi paradigmi non sono delle entita` monolitiche e nemmeno le loro attua-
zioni lo sono. Non si osserva un ‘divario’ tra il paradigma e la sua attuazione; si osserva
solo una vasta rete di attori che aderiscono collettivamente al paradigma e che, a seconda
della loro posizione nella rete, interpretano il paradigma diversamente. Tutti gli attori
iscrivono nella loro interpretazione del paradigma i propri interessi (gli attori ‘traducono’
gli interessi), indipendentemente dal fatto che essi costituiscano il donatore, un mediatore
o il beneficiario dell’aiuto. Queste traduzioni sono necessarie per cementare e riprodurre
la rete: gli attori si ingaggiano a vicenda nella rete traducendo i loro interessi. La forza
di un nuovo paradigma di sviluppo dipende dalla forza della rete e delle traduzioni.
I limiti della ricerca presentata sono evidenti: essa si basa su una ridotta selezione
di paradigmi e su dati provenienti da un unico settore. I risultati potrebbero non esse-
re generalizzabili. Inoltre, la ricerca si e` focalizzata su dei paradigmi che si ritengono
funzionanti mentre nessun dato e` stato raccolto sulla scomparsa o sul fallimento di un
paradigma: quest’ultimo potrebbe essere il tema di una futura ricerca.
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Inleiding en onderzoeksvraag. Het is blijkbaar moeilijk om de sociale interacties die
aan de grondslag van ontwikkelingshulp liggen als onderzoeksobject op zich te benaderen
zonder te vervallen in eindeloze discussies rond de wenselijkheid en effectiviteit van die
sociale interacties. Er bestaat inderdaad een vrij grote kloof tussen, enerzijds, kritische
maar hoogdravende beschouwingen die ‘ontwikkeling’ als een hegemoniaal en Westers
ideaal afdoen, en, anderzijds, de concrete maar navelstarende evaluaties die de effectiviteit
van ‘ontwikkelingshulp’ als instrument proberen te verhogen. In de kloof tussen deze twee
uitersten ligt belangrijke antropologische kennis die weinig ontgonnen wordt. Het betreft
kennis over de sociale interacties op zich, over de strategiee¨n die de verschillende actoren
in ontwikkelingshulp hanteren, hoe zij omgaan met elkaars diversiteit, of hoe ze abstracte
beleidslijnen vertalen in concrete projecten. Een groeiend aantal etnografen begint zich
nu te interesseren voor deze sociale interacties op zich, en het onderhavige onderzoek
situeert zich binnen deze groep.
Aan de basis van dit onderzoek lag een zeker gevoel van tegenstrijdigheid in ontwikke-
lingshulp. Ontwikkelingshulp wordt gedragen door een complex netwerk waarin enorm
veel actoren samenwerken: donoren, multilaterale organisaties, consultants uit Noord
en het Zuid, prive´-bedrijven, overheidsadministraties, de civiele maatschappij uit het
Zuiden, dorpshoofden en boeren. Deze actoren hebben ongelooflijk verschillende wereld-
beelden, culturele achtergronden, belangen, financie¨le middelen en politieke slagkracht.
Vreemd genoeg, wanneer het erop aankomt hulp te leveren en ontwikkelingsprojecten
uit te voeren, spreken alle actoren hetzelfde ontwikkelingjargon en lijken ze een zeer
grote eensgezindheid te vertonen; deze eensgezindheid spreidt zich uit van de donor, over
de consultant, tot bij het dorpshoofd. En hoewel de ideee¨n omtrent ‘goede’ en ‘slechte’
ontwikkelingshulp continu veranderen in de tijd —waardoor elke paar jaar een nieuw ont-
wikkelingsparadigma of -beleid te voorschijn schiet— blijft de eensgezindheid van actoren
toch min of meer voortbestaan.
Deze waargenomen tegenstrijdigheid leidde tot de volgende onderzoeksvragen. Hoe
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kan de eensgezindheid van de actoren worden verklaard ondanks de enorme heterogeniteit
van de actoren en de instabiliteit van ontwikkelingsparadigma’s? Wanneer een nieuw
paradigma ten tonele verschijnt, waar komt dit dan vandaan en hoe verkrijgt het opnieuw
de eensgezinde steun? En is deze steun echt homogeen of is dit slechts schijn?
Onderzoeksmethodologie. Om een antwoord op deze vragen te krijgen werden kwa-
litatieve gegevens verzameld betreffende een aantal wijdverspreide ontwikkelingspara-
digma’s, hun opkomst, en de steun die ze genieten. De gegevens werden verzameld d.m.v
participerende observaties op drie verschillende locaties in het netwerk van ontwikkelings-
actoren (dus d.m.v. een multi-sited etnografie). Er werd geconcentreerd op e´e´n sector:
ontwikkelingshulp in de watersector (dit omvat zowel hulp voor waterbeheer als toegang
tot drinkwater).
Het verzamelen en analyseren van de gegevens gebeurde volgens de Grounded Theory
Method. Volgens deze methode mag de gegevensverzameling niet geleid of gelimiteerd
worden door eender welke theorie, hypothese, of terreinafbakening. Tijdens de eerste van
de drie participerende observaties kwamen drie paradigma’s naar voor waarop geconcen-
treerd werd tijdens het verdere onderzoek:
• ‘Integraal Waterbeheer’ (IWB) als best practice;
• ‘Capaciteitsversterking’ als modus operandi voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking;
• ‘Aanpassing aan de klimaatverandering’ en de gevolgen hiervan voor het IWB-
paradigma.
De gegevens verzameld op de eerste locatie leidden de onderzoeker naar twee andere
maar gerelateerde locaties in het netwerk. De drie locaties van het onderzoek waren, in
chronologische volgorde, de volgende:
• het internationale hoofdkantoor van WaNGO, een niet-gouvernementele ontwikke-
lingsorganisatie die waterprojecten beheert in Afrika en Latijns-Amerika—e´e´n ervan
in de binnendelta van de Niger in Mali;
• zes landelijke dorpen in de binnendelta van de Niger in Mali;
• het internationale hoofdkantoor van het Global Water Partnership (GWP), een
intergouvernementele organisatie opgericht door de Wereldbank en UNDP die we-
reldwijd IWB promoot (dus ook in Mali).
Uiteindelijk bestond het volledige corpus aan gegevens uit 13 maanden observaties op
drie locaties, 48 interviews, 21 focusgroepdiscussies en meer dan 50 officie¨le documenten.
Overzicht van het proefschrift. Het proefschrift, dat de resultaten van het hierboven
samengevatte onderzoek rapporteert, is opgevat als een verzameling van zes originele
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artikels. Deel I van het proefschrift schetst het bredere kader; deel II bevat vier empirische
artikels die elk een deel van de onderzoeksvragen beantwoorden, deel III bevat twee
theoretische artikels die reflecteren op de onderzoeksmethodologie, en het laatste gedeelte,
deel IV, vat de bevindingen van de zes artikels samen in zowel wetenschappelijke als
praktische bewoordingen. Elk van de zes artikels uit deel II en III kan los van de rest van
het proefschrift gelezen worden. De volgende paragrafen vatten de zes artikels samen.
De vier empirische artikels in deel II presenteren de bevindingen omtrent ‘capaciteits-
opbouw’ en ‘Integraal Waterbeheer’ (IWB). Tijdens de analyse van de gegevens werd het
paradigma ‘Aanpassing aan de klimaatverandering’ enkel in beschouwing genomen in zijn
relatie tot het IWB-paradigma. Elk van de empirische artikels rapporteert de bevinding
rond e´e´n van de paradigma’s om een antwoord te geven op e´e´n van de onderzoeksvragen.
Elke artikel gebruikt echter een licht verschillende theoretische invalshoek om de gegevens
te presenteren, hetgeen een weerspiegeling is van de verschillende stadia die doorlopen
werden bij het verzamelen en analyseren van de gegevens.
Het eerste empirische artikel (Chapter 5) peilt naar de oorsprong van paradigmaver-
schuivingen, door concreet te graven naar de wortels (de genealogie) van het momenteel
zeer populaire concept ‘capaciteitsopbouw’. Men zou dit paradigma kunnen beschou-
wen als de tegenhanger van traditionele ‘technische coo¨peratie’ —een stelling die ook de
voorstanders van capaciteitsopbouw zelf onderschrijven. In het bijzonder neemt capa-
citeitsopbouw afstand van het technologisch determinisme dat schuilgaat in technische
coo¨peratie. Het draait eigenlijk allemaal rond de vraag wat de rol van kennis en techno-
logie in ontwikkeling is—of moet zijn. Deze discussie is echter verre van nieuw en kan
getraceerd worden tot aan de Verlichting. Op elk moment in de geschiedenis, sinds de
Verlichting tot vandaag, hebben erg deterministische en minder deterministische inter-
pretaties van die rol elkaar bekampt, waarbij de opeenvolgende ontwikkelingsparadigma’s
heen en weer slingerden tussen beide uitersten. Het idee van ‘capaciteitsopbouw’ is dus
niets meer dan het meest recente, niet-deterministische paradigma betreffende de rol die
kennis en technologie moeten spelen in ontwikkeling.
Nieuwe paradigma’s worden vaak voorgesteld als een wondermiddel dat het voor-
gaande, ‘falende’ paradigma moet vervangen. Dergelijk ‘falen’ wordt meestal toegeschre-
ven aan het ‘foute’ opzet van het vorige paradigma, of aan discordantie tussen het para-
digma en zijn praktische uitvoering. In het geval van capaciteitsopbouw wordt technische
coo¨peratie afgedaan als de ‘falende’ voorganger. Dit tweeledig beeld dat een paradigma
en zijn toepassing voorstelt als twee monolithische maar gescheiden entiteiten, stemt nau-
welijks met de werkelijkheid overeen. Het tweede empirische artikel (Chapter 6) laat
zien hoe het paradigma van capaciteitsopbouw op diverse wijzen wordt ge¨ınterpreteerd
op verschillende punten in het netwerk van ontwikkelingsactoren, van de donor over de
NGO’s tot de gemeentes in Mali. Eigenlijk zijn deze verschillende interpretaties nodig ;
de link tussen donor en Malinese gemeente kan slechts bestaan dankzij het werk van een
233
C. Summary in Dutch
rist aan tussenpersonen en bemiddelaars die, noodgedwongen, het paradigma telkens net
ietsje anders gaan interpreteren. Dat er een kloof zou bestaan tussen paradigma en uit-
voering is dus een betekenisloze stelling. Bovendien zijn die verschillende interpretaties
van het paradigma telkens een vertaling van het eigenbelang van elke actor, zodanig dat
elke actor zijn eigen positie in het netwerk bevestigt en dus ook het netwerk als geheel in
stand houdt. Vandaar dat een paradigma staat of valt met de integriteit van het netwerk,
niet met de effectiviteit van het paradigma zelf.
Het derde artikel (Chapter 7) is het eerste van twee artikels dat IWB onder de loep
neemt. Het stapt resoluut af van het idee dat een paradigma een allesomvattende, onper-
soonlijke, discursieve macht zou zijn, en belicht daarentegen de rol van individuen in de
promotie en implementatie van een paradigma. De invoering van IWB in Burkina Faso
en Mali (in resp. 1996 en 2004) als startpunt nemende, beschrijft dit artikel het samen-
spel van nationale beleidsmakers, internationale organisaties, en structurele condities, in
de hervorming van het waterbeleid in beide landen over de laatste 15 jaar. Ondanks de
schijnbare uniformiteit van het IWB-paradigma toont een kwalitatieve vergelijking van
de beleidsveranderingen in de twee landen dat zowel de hervormingen zelf als ook het
nationale ‘eigenaarschap’ van deze hervormingen beduidend verschillend zijn. De specifi-
citeit van de hervormingen en het niveau van nationaal eigenaarschap zijn het resultaat
van het handelen (agency) van individuen—beleidsmakers in het bijzonder.
In het laatste empirische artikel (Chapter 8) bereikt de uit-de-data-voortvloeiende
theorie zijn meest gearticuleerde vorm. In het artikel wordt het netwerk van actoren ge-
traceerd dat enerzijds het IWB-paradigma gepromoot heeft in de kring van multi-laterale
organisaties, en anderzijds de implementatie van IWB in Mali ondersteund heeft, zowel
via gouvernementele als niet-gouvernementele ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Gebruik ma-
kend van Actor-Network Theory om dit netwerk te beschrijven, toont het artikel hoe de
actoren elkaar rekruteren voor de alliantie door elkaars interesses te vertalen. Op die ma-
nier ontstaat een hecht netwerk dat het paradigma doet werken. Sommige niet-humane
actoren —zoals het typische financieringsmechanisme van ontwikkelingshulp, de Principes
van Dublin voor IWB, de organisatie GWP, of de Nigerrivier zelf— blijken belangrijke
ankerpunten te zijn voor de alliantie. Toch lijkt de IWB-alliantie niet meer zo sterk als
ze ooit was, en de actoren zien zich genoodzaakt om de IWB-alliantie opnieuw te on-
derhandelen door ‘klimaatverandering’ als hulp in te roepen. In overeenstemming met
hoofdstuk 6 toont Actor-Network Theory in hoofdstuk 8 aan dat het ‘succes’ of ‘falen’
van het paradigma afhankelijk is van de sterkte van de alliantie, niet van de sterkte van
het paradigma.
De twee theoretische artikels in deel III maken een nabeschouwing rond het gebruik
van respectievelijk de Grounded Theory Method (GTM) en multi-sited etnografie. Hoe-
wel volgens de klassieke GTM de gegevensverzameling los moet staan van bestaande
theoriee¨n, wordt er in het eerste theoretische artikel (Chapter 9) aangetoond dat deze
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gegevensverzameling op ten minste vier manieren theoretisch geconditioneerd is: (i) door
de probleemstelling zelf, (ii) door impliciete ontologische veronderstellingen betreffende
de wereld en het probleem dat onderzocht wordt, (iii) door de afbakening van het terrein
waar de gegevens verzameld worden, en (iv) doordat waarnemingen altijd theoretisch ge-
kleurd (of theory-laden) zijn. De vier vormen van conditionering worden aangetoond aan
de hand van voorbeelden uit het onderhavige onderzoek. De auteur is echter van mening
dat deze conditionering de GTM methode als zodanig niet onbruikbaar maakt, maar
dat de verschillende vormen van conditionering wel expliciet moeten gemaakt worden.
De auteur pleit ervoor GTM mee te laten evolueren met postmoderne ontwikkelingen
in de sociale wetenschappen, die oog hebben voor, enerzijds, de gesitueerdheid van da-
taverzameling, en anderzijds, innovatieve ontologische categoriee¨n die voortkomen uit
discourstheorie en Actor-Network Theory. In de meest geavanceerde fase van het onder-
havige onderzoek bleek Actor-Network Theory inderdaad zeer krachtige categoriee¨n aan
te kunnen brengen voor de beschrijving van de gegevens.
Het tweede theoretische artikel (Chapter 10) wijst erop dat multi-sited etnografie
als methodologie voor dataverzameling en Actor-Network Theory als instrument voor de
databeschrijving een krachtige pakket vormen voor het bestuderen en beschrijven van de
sociale interacties in ontwikkelingshulp. De methodologie en het instrument zijn bijzonder
goed op elkaar afgestemd. Het pakket laat de de analist toe om vastgeroeste tweedelingen
zoals globaal/lokaal en beleid/praktijk wat genuanceerder te gaan bekijken. Verder in het
artikel worden de zes strategiee¨n van George Marcus voor multi-sited etnografie vertaald
naar de context van ontwikkelingshulp. Tot slot overpeinst de onderzoeker, op basis
van de eigen onderzoekservaring, een aantal kritische kwesties rond het verkrijgen van
‘toegang tot’ en het cree¨ren van een ‘identiteit binnen’ de verschillende sites van de multi-
sited etnografie.
Conclusies. De vier empirische artikels experimenteren met verschillende theoretische
perspectieven om de gegevens te presenteren. Terwijl het eerste artikel de genealogie van
capaciteitsopbouw aanbrengt, wordt in het tweede artikel aangetoond dat dit paradigma
op tal van verschillende manieren vertaald wordt door de actoren. Het derde empirische
artikel toont het belang van individuen en hun handelen in de implementatie van IWB,
en het laatste baseert zich op Actor-Network Theory om het brede netwerk te beschrijven
dat het IWB-paradigma ondersteund heeft in tijd en ruimte. Hoewel elk theoretisch per-
spectief verschillende aspecten van de gegevens benadrukt, blijkt Actor-Netwerk Theorie
het meest geschikte instrument te zijn om de eclectische verzameling van gegevens —die
werd verkregen uit multi-sited etnografie, interviews, focusgroepdiscussies en documen-
ten— tot zijn recht te laten komen.
Wat de onderzoeksvragen betreft, blijkt uit de gegevens dat noch capaciteitsopbouw,
noch IWB uit het niets verschenen zijn, maar dat ze allebei een uitgebreide stamboom
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kunnen voorleggen. Bovendien, en mogelijks nog belangrijker, blijkt dat beide para-
digma’s slechts op het voorplan konden verschijnen dankzij het niet-aflatende werk nodig
van een klein aantal zeer toegewijde individuen. Ook om op het voorplan te blijven,
hangen ze nog steeds af van de sterkte van het netwerk van actoren dat het paradigma
ondersteunt.
Deze paradigma’s zijn allesbehalve monolithische entiteiten, en net zomin is de uit-
voering ervan. Er bestaat geen ‘kloof’ tussen het paradigma en de uitvoering; er bestaat
enkel een zeer uitgebreid netwerk van actoren die allen het paradigma onderschrijven,
en die, afhankelijk van hun positie in het netwerk, het paradigma op de ene of andere
wijze interpreteren. Elk van de actoren verweeft zijn eigen belangen in de interpretatie
van het paradigma (de actoren ‘vertalen’ hun belangen), ongeacht of het om de donor,
een tussenpersoon, of de ontvanger van de ontwikkelingshulp gaat. Deze vertalingen zijn
noodzakelijk om het netwerk samen te houden en te reproduceren: actoren rekruteren
elkaar in het netwerk door elkaars en hun eigen belangen te vertalen. De sterkte van een
nieuwe ontwikkelingsparadigma is daarom afhankelijk van de sterkte van het netwerk en
de vertalingen.
De beperkingen van de gerapporteerde onderzoek zijn duidelijk: het is gebaseerd op
de observaties omtrent een kleine selectie van ontwikkelingsparadigma’s uit slechts e´e´n
ontwikkelingssector. De resultaten zijn mogelijks niet veralgemeenbaar. Bovendien is het
onderzoek gebaseerd op paradigma’s die reeds alomtegenwoordig waren in het netwerk;
er werden geen gegevens verzameld omtrent paradigma’s die afgewezen zijn of die nooit
de status van alomtegenwoordigheid bereikt hebben. Dit zou het onderwerp kunnen
uitmaken van toekomstig onderzoek.
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List of observations and interviews
Participant observations
Description Period Place
Headquarters WaNGO Feb-Jul 2010 Belgium
Inner Niger Delta (6 villages & office WaNGO-Mali) Sept-Oct 2010 Mali
Headquarters Global Water Partnership (GWP) May-Sept 2011 Stockholm
the latter participant observation included:
GWP Regional Days (meeting with regional networks) 15-17 Aug 2011 Stockholm
GWP Network and Consulting Partners meeting 18-19 Aug 2011 Stockholm
Stockholm World Water Week 21-27 Aug 2011 Stockholm
Semi-structured one-on-one interviews
Description Date Where
WaNGO employee, Capacity Building focus point 9 Mar 2010 Belgium
WaNGO executive secretary 12 Mar 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, head of Northern Operations Dept. 15 Mar 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, head of Administrative Dept. 16 Mar 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, head of Southern Operations Dept. 24 Mar 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, head of Northern Operations Dept. 29 Mar 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, desk officer Great Lakes 30 Mar 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, desk officer Mali & Madagascar 12 Apr 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, head of Southern Operations Dept. 29 Jun 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, ex project manager Ecuador 30 Jun 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, IWRM & Climate Change focal point 30 Jun 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employee, ex IWRMIND manager 30 Jun 2010 Belgium
WaNGO-Mali head 16 Sept 2010 Bamako
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Description Date Where
Wetlands-Mali executive secretary 17 Sept 2010 Bamako
Senior technical assistant to DNH (1) 20 Sept 2010 Se´vare´
WaNGO-Mali head 24 Sept 2010 Se´vare´
GWI/CARE-Mali executive secretary 27 Sept 2010 Se´vare´
EU-Mali employee, desk officer water projects 29 Sept 2010 Bamako
EU-Mali employee, Climate Change focal point 29 Sept 2010 Bamako
PNE-Mali executive secretary 29 Sept 2010 Bamako
PNE-Mali permanent staff member 29 Sept 2010 Bamako
World Bank employee, water projects manager 2 Feb 2011 Washington
World Bank employee, Niger Basin project manager 3 Feb 2011 Washington
World Bank employee, Water Anchor 4 Feb 2011 Washington
GWP employee, desk officer West Africa 13 May 2011 Stockholm
SIWI employee, Capacity Building director May 2011 Stockholm
GWP employee, desk officer West Africa 1 Jun 2011 Stockholm
GWP executive secretary 8 Aug 2011 Stockholm
GWP employee, desk officer West Africa 12 Aug 2011 Stockholm
GWP employee, head of Knowledge Management 12 Aug 2011 Stockholm
PNE-Mali chair 17 Aug 2011 Stockholm
Ex GWP employee (1) 18 Aug 2011 Stockholm
WaNGO evaluator 18 Aug 2011 Stockholm
Malian water policy maker 21 Aug 2011 Stockholm
GWP employee, desk officer West Africa 30 Aug 2011 Stockholm
GWP employee, WACDEP manager 1 Sept 2011 Stockholm
Senior consultant to GWP and SIWI 1 Nov 2011 by phone
WaNGO employee, ex IWRMIND manager 4 Nov 2011 Belgium
Senior water advisor to Danida 4 Jan 2012 by phone
Ex GWP employee (2) 29 Feb 2012 by phone
Ex executive director WaNGO 17 Apr 2012 by phone
Independent Belgian consultant 17 Apr 2012 by phone
Burkinabe´ water policy maker1 19 Apr 2012 Ouaga.
Senior consultant, Mali & Burkina Faso expert 23 Apr 2012 by phone
Senior technical assistant to DNH (2) 24 Apr 2012 by phone
SEODC executive director 26 Apr 2012 Brussels
SEODC employee, Capacity Building evaluation 26 Apr 2012 Brussels
Senior consultant to GWP and SIWI2 3 May 2012 by phone





WaNGO employees, about Capacity Building 16 Feb 2010 Belgium
WaNGO employees, about Capacity Building 5 May 2010 Belgium
Representatives of Belgian NGOs in Mali 16 Sept 2010 Bamako
WaNGO-Mali employees & SI-NGOs from Bamako 17 Sept 2010 Bamako
Regional government & Maison du Delta 20 Sept 2010 Se´vare´
Socoura council members 21 Sept 2010 Socoura
WaNGO-Mali employees & SI-NGOs from IND 21 Sept 2010 Se´vare´
Discussion with regional government, mayors, and water
NGOs about MdO in the IND
24 Sept 2010 Se´vare´
WaterAid-Mali employees and executive secretary 28 Sept 2010 Bamako
Soye´ council members 21 Oct 2011 Soye´
Soye´ villagers 21 Oct 2011 Soye´
Togue´-Mourrari council members 26 Oct 2011 Togue´-
Mourrari
Mourrah villagers 26 Oct 2011 Togue´-
Mourrari
Ke´wa council members 27 Oct 2011 Ke´wa
Para-Bozo villagers 27 Oct 2011 Ke´wa
Konna council members 29 Oct 2011 Konna
Takoutala villagers 29 Oct 2011 Konna
Socoura council members 1 Nov 2011 Socoura
N’Gomi villagers 1 Nov 2011 Socoura
Ouroube´-Doude´ council members 9 Nov 2011 Ouroube´-
Doude´
De`ra-Sedengue´ villagers 9 Nov 2011 Ouroube´-
Doude´
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Appendix E
Questions of the 12 focus group
discussions in the IND
Six focus group discussions were held with the council members of six municipalities. Six
other focus discussions were held with a number of villagers in six villages, one village
per municipality. The main objective of these discussions was to understand
• which problems the council members and villagers experience as most pressing with
respect to water availability, management and variability;
• how they word these problems and which terminology they use;
• how they frame the problems and solutions;
• to what extent their wording and framing is influenced by the discourses of external
actors;
• whether they use in their answers the terms ‘capacity building’, ‘integrated water
resources management’, ‘climate change’, or alike, even when the interviewer does
not mention at any moment these terms.
The following questions were asked during the focus group discussions with the municipal
council members:
• Can you describe how the economic activities in your municipality depend on water,
rainfall, and the river?
• Can you describe how the cycles of the rain and the river determine the activities
(domestic activities, fishing, agriculture, animal husbandry).
• Is water or rain sometimes lacking for these activities?
• And in previous years? Do you remember years of scarcity and years of abundance?
• Are there disputes concerning the use of water in the municipality, or amongst
communities?
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• What can be done so that the communities depend less on the varying availability
of water?
• What can you do?
• Have the DRH and/or TFPs carried out interventions in this area in the recent
past to improve the management of water? And to improve the access to drinking
water?
• What else should they do, according to you?
The following questions were asked during the focus group discussions with the villagers:
• Can you describe how your life depends on water, rainfall, and the river?
• Can you describe how the cycles of the rains and the river determine your activities
(domestic activities, fishing, agriculture, animal husbandry).
• Is water or rain sometimes lacking for these activities?
• And in previous years? Do you remember years of scarcity and years of abundance?
• Are there disputes concerning the use of water, due to the different uses of water
you have described earlier?
• What can be done so that you depend less on the varying availability of water?
• What can you do?
• Have the government or NGOs carried out interventions in this area in the recent
past to improve the management of water? And to improve the access to drinking
water?
• What else should they do, according to you?
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Translations of key words in French,
English, Bambara, Fula



















borne fontaine water standpipe robine` robine`




climate change — —
GIRE IWRM — —










development project de`me` djie`koulouw golle`dji djiwirnodji
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Appendix G
List of publications and
presentations
Articles included in this dissertation
Cherlet J. (2013). Epistemic and Technological Determinism in Development Aid Discourses.
Science Technology & Human Values, accepted with revisions.
Cherlet J. (forthcoming). Implementing the capacity building paradigm: a matter of transla-
tions. Journal of Development Studies, submitted.
Cherlet J. and Venot, J-Ph. (forthcoming). Structure and agency: understanding water policy
changes in West Africa. Water Policy, submitted.
Cherlet J. (forthcoming). The deployment of Integrated Water Resources Management in
Mali: an actor-network analysis. Development and Change, submitted.
Cherlet J. (forthcoming). The Grounded Theory Method and the theory-ladenness of ethno-
graphic observations. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social
Research, in preparation.
Cherlet J. (forthcoming). Multi-sited ethnography of aid and Actor-Network Theory. Field
Methods, in preparation.
Other articles
Cherlet J. (2011). Review of Keller R., 2011, Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse. Grundle-
gung eines Forschungsprogramms. Technoscienza—Italian Journal of Science and Tech-
nology 2(1).
Cherlet J. et al. (2010). About the Sense and Nonsense of a ‘Development’ Label. EASST
Review 29(3).
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G. List of publications and presentations
Book chapters
Cherlet J. (forthcoming). Renegotiating the integrated water management paradigm in the
light of climate change. In: Pongigliano, F. and Pancaldi, G. (eds). Proceedings of the
round-table discussion on Climate Change. Bologna: CIS.
Cherlet J. (2010). Political ecology and STS in dialogue: future directions for the social study
of environmental controversies. In: Mazzotti, M. and Pancaldi, G.(eds). Impure Cultures:
Interfacing Science, Technology, and Humanities. Bologna Studies in the History of
Science 12. Bologna: CIS.
Cherlet J. (2010). A Social Study of the Technologies composing the Green Revolution. In:
Frank M.L. and Pogliano C. (eds). Scorci di storia della scienza. Seminario congiunto
dei dottorati. Bari 26-28 giugno 2008. Pisa: Plus.
Conference and workshop presentations
Cherlet J. (2012). The deployment of Integrated Water Resources Management in Mali: an
ANT analysis, 12th EASA Biennial Conference, 10-13 June 2012, Nanterre University,
Nanterre.
Cherlet J. (2012). Translating the capacity building paradigm: evidence from water manage-
ment in the Inner Niger Delta. Science, Technology, and Livelihood Systems, Graduate
Workshop, 15-16 March 2012, CIS, University of Bologna.
Cherlet J. (2012). Renegotiating the integrated water management paradigm in the light
of climate change. Climate change - A round-table discussion, 31 January 2012, CIS,
University of Bologna.
Cherlet J. (2011). Fluid discourses. A multi-sited ethnography of development aid in the water
sector. CRG-MENARG seminar, 3 Oct 2011, Ghent University.
Cherlet J. (2011). Fluid discourses. A multi-sited ethnography of development aid in the water
sector. TIS-CONTEC seminar, 29 Sept 2011, Technical University of Eindhoven.
Cherlet J. (2011). Fluid Discourses. A Multi-sited Ethnography of Development Aid in the
Water Sector. Brown International Advanced Research Institute, 11-25 June 2001, Brown
University, Providence, RI.
Cherlet J. (2011). The Social and Behavioral Dimensions of Climate Change: Fundamental
but Disregarded? Brown International Advanced Research Institute, 11-25 June 2001,
Brown University, Providence, RI.
Cherlet J. (2011). Climate Science at Work: the Structures of Production and Legitimization.
Knowledge at Work: a Graduate Workshop, 8 April 2011, CIS, Department of Philosophy,
University of Bologna.
246
Cherlet J. (2011). A Genealogy of Epistemic and Technological Determinism in Development
Aid Discourses. Proceedings of DIME workshop ’Technology, Institutions, Development’,
Max Planck institute, 18-19 February 2011, Jena.
Cherlet J. (2010). Theoretical reflections on Capacity Building as vehicle for knowledge transfer
in development cooperation, drawing on the observation of water development projects.
EASST010 Conference, 2-4 Sept 2010, Trento.
Cherlet J. (2010). The analysis of knowledge production and global discourse concerning water
scarcity. An outline of the research methodology. IPA2010 Interpretative Policy Analysis
conference, 23-25 June 2010, Grenoble.
Cherlet J. (2010). How to Quench the World’s Thirst: from Knowledge over Discourse to Prac-
tices in Water Development Projects. CRG-MENARG seminar, 25 April 2010, Ghent.
Cherlet J. (2009). Lo ‘Script’ della rivoluzione verde. Seminario congiunto dei dottorati di
Storia della Scienza, 26-28 giugno 2008, Bari.
Cherlet J. (2009). The construction and transfer of knowledge in international development.
The case of water. Current Debates in International Development, a multi-disciplinary
conference of PhD students of development, 25-26 June 2009, School of International
Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich.
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